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CHA.PTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Collective negotiations, in education have played a critical role in 
the shaping·and development o;f a newrelationship between boards of 
education and teacher groups .1 critical to the structu+e of the inter"'.' 
action has been the emerging legal doctrine~ 2 The aggressive thrust by 
instructional and non-:-instructional employees of public schools to work 
out arrangements with the traditional governing structure has been one 
of the most marked trends in education durtng the last decade.3 The 
intensity of this thrust was e:x;emplified by·Riley Casey4 when he 
commented: 
Evidenced by constant headlines and .newspape+ files and 
regardless of one's opinion of their appropriateness in educa-
tion, collective negotiations between boards and unions are a 
fact of present life. They are not only here to stay but will 
grow measurably in the immediate future. 
This.intensified confrontation of the traditional authority structure 
by aspiring professional and non-professional employees of school 
lwesley A. Wildman, The~ and.Collective Negotiations·in 
Education, A Report Prepared for the United States Department of Health, 
Edrtcation and Welfare (Chicago, 1968), p. l~ 
2Ibid. 
3Robert R. Hamilton and E. Edmond Reutter, Jr., The Law of Public 
Education (Min€ola, 1970), p. 411, 
4Riley E. Casey, "Legal Problems of Negotiations," American School 
Board Journal, CLV (November, 1969), p. 16. 
1 
districts leaves little doubt that the area of collective negotiations 
has taken on increased importance in our society. 
2 
As pressure.increases for the bilateral determination of the 
conditions. of employment in the public· schools, a bewLldering variety of 
statutory provisions, judicial decisions, attorney general's opinions, 
and administrative agencies has developed. Litigation in the area of 
collective negotiations is by no means confined to the last decade, yet 
in recent years the increase has been most indicative of the increase of 
confrontations. State statutory enactments have been forthcoming with 
an amazing number of complexities that may have implications beyond 
their original intent. 
The rapidly evolving laws governing concerted activities of school 
employees has played both a vital cause and effect role with r~spect to 
collective negotiations.5 The enactments of s~atutes and the modifica-
tions in legal doctri~e as expressed through.court decisions have often 
been the rei;iults of inc:.reased concern by school board organizations and 
teacher organizations. Furthermore, some of themore stringent statutes 
on organizational activities have been the result·of legislative and 
court reaction to such concern. Thus, prerogatives long cherished by 
the boards of education in regard to conditions of employment are not 
likely to diminish without a struggle. The emerging legal doctrine as 
developed through legislative action, judicial interpretations of the 
statutues and legislation pertaining to the concerted activities of 
employees may have important implications. 
5wildman, op, cit., p. 2. 
It is a well established fact that education in the American 
scheme of government is essentially a matter of state policy. Any 
attempt by public school employees to modify or limit the state's 
authority through the promotion of bilateral arrangements will be chal-
lenged and litigation may result. The evolving legal relationships are 
of greatest consequence, not only for the continuation of.state author-
ity in educational matters but the continued operation of educational 
programs. 
Purpose of the Study 
This study will be especially concerned with emergent legal 
principles, judicial decisions, and state statutory development govern-
ing collective negotiations throughout the United States. Hopefully, a 
foundation can be,established that will facilitate the gathering and 
dissemination of information by interested parties regarding the le~al 
implications of collective negotiations. 
It is .hoped that the information presented in this study pertaining 
to the legal aspects of co~lective negotiations will enhance the compre-
hensiveness of. the available literature. Too, it may serve to reduce 
some of the fragmentation now evident in the growing body of literature. 
Although this study is not intended to provide the interested Persons 
with a handbook to be used as a definite and final authority, it is 
quite possible the study could be utilized as a guide for administra-
tors, boards of education, and state legislators as they attempt to cope 
with the emerging legal aspects of col+ective negotiations. 
4 
Statement of the Problem 
Thisstudywill attempt to loca,te, analyze, an<l present a summary 
of the litigation in the courts in the area of collective negotiations 
pertaining to instructional and.non-instructional employees of the 
public schools. Reasoning of.the courts will be examined for the p\lr-
pose of determining what prin<!!iples and ri,tl,es of law have been developed 
by the courts. A second endeavor of this study is to locate, examine, 
analyze, and present the current status of stat~tory development in all 
states with labor.relations acts applicable to public school em~loyees. 
Among the questions to be answered by the study are the following: 
What legal status do school employees have if the state statutes are 
silent in regard to collective negotiations? Are school employees con-
sidered public employees and if so, are public employee statutes appli-
cable? What standards or judicial guidelines.have been developed by the· 
courts in regard to strikes by school district employees? Mayboards of 
educat;i.on grant.exclusive representation right:s to one organization 
without specific statutorial permission? What is the legal doctrine 
governing the closed shop concept in school districts? What is the 
extent of the doctrine of illegal delegation of authority in collective 
negotiations? What seems to be the trend in state statutory.development 
pertaining to administrative agencies for the p\lrpose of arbitration? 
May boards of education, as a cqndition of employment, prevent an indi-
vidual school district employee from actively participating in extra-
legal organizations? What standards apply in case of a strike by school 
district employees if the statutes are silent? May teachers be dis-
missed for actively part:icipating inunion activities? What standards 
or judicial guidelines have been developed by the courts pertaining to 
5 
dues checkoff? Are.boards·of education required to negotiate·without an 
enabling statutory provision? What is t::he legal doctrine governing the 
agency shop? What legal precedence has been established by the judicial 
system applicable to mass resignations, sanctions, political action, and 
picketing? 
Method and Procedure 
This study falls in the realm of historical research, involving the 
description, analysis, and review of statutory enactments and judicial 
decisions, The techniques employed in legal research as suggested by 
Price and Bitner,6 Rezny and Remmlein,7 and William Roalfe8 will be 
employed. 
Specifically, the procedures contemplated for effective legal 
research pertaining to judicial decisions would be a~ follows: (1) 
location of appropriate cases by use of the Century, Decennial and 
General Digests, (2) reading of cases by the utilization of the National 
Reporter System and (3) the use of Shepard's Citations to Cases to 
determine the current status. 
Statutory law will be located by the use of State Codes, the Law 
Digest volume of the Martindale-Hubbill Law Directory, the Annual Survey 
of American Law, and the Current State Legislation which is prepared by 
the American.Bar Association and published by Bobbs-Merrill. The status 
6Harry Bitner and Miles 0, Price, Effective Legal Research 
(Englewood Cliffs, 1953). 
7Madaline Kinter Remmlein and Arthur A. Rezny, A School Man in the 
Law Library (Danville, 1962). 
Bwilliam R. Roalfe, ed., How_!£ Find the Law (St. Paul, 1965), 
of the statute will be determined by use of the Shepard's Citations to 
Statutes, 
Scope and Limitation of.the Study 
6 
The principal aspects of this study involve the litigation and 
statutory enactments pertaining to collect:ive negotiations. State 
attorney general's opinions will be reviewed if deemed appropriate; how-
ever, all opinions will not be sought.· Data in this research will be 
limited to judicial decisions and statutes appurtenant to instructional 
and non-instructional employees of scl~ool districts. Other cases and 
statutes will bereviewed only.if deemed appropriate· to the point of 
law. 
This study.will not be limited to a specific period of time due to 
the recent emergence of the subject. However, changes. in state statutes 
that are dated beyond September, 1970, will not be reported. All states 
will be included in this study. 
Definition of Terms 
Abrogate - A judicial act that annuls or revokes apreviously held 
doctrine. 
Action - A proceeding in court by which one party prosecutes 
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, the redress of a 
wrong, or the punishment of a public offense; 
Affirm - To make firm; to establish. To ratify or confirm the 
judgment of a lower court. 
Appellant - The party who makes an appeal from one court to 
another. 
Appellate court ..... A higher court which hears a case from a lower 
court on appeal~ 
Arbitration· - k method of settling an employee-management dispute. 
through recourseto an.impartial third party whose·decision is·usually 
final and binding. 
Case law .... A body· of law created by judicial proceedings. 
Certiorari .... An· original writ or action whereby a cause is removed 
from an inferior to a· superior court for trial. The term is most com-
monly used when requesting the U. S. Supreme Court to hear a case from 
the lower court. 
7 
Collectiye negotiations ... A process by which employers negotiate 
with the duly chosen representatives of their employees concel;"ning terms 
and conditions of employment, and on such other matters as the parties 
may agree or be required to negotiate, 
Common law -Legal principles derived from usage and custom, or 
from court decisions affirming such usages.and customs. 
Concurring opinion - An opinion written by a judge who agrees with 
~the majority of the courts as to the decision in a case, but has dif-
ferent reasons for arriving at that decision. 
Defendant The party against.whom relief or recovery is sought in 
a court action. 
Dictum - The expression by a judge of an opinion on.a point of law 
not necessary to the decision on the case; dictum is not binding on. 
other judgeso 
Dissenting opinion - An opinion disagreeing with that of the 
majority handed down by one or more members of the court. 
Enjoin - To require a person or persons by writ of injunction fro~ 
a court of equity, to perform, or to abstain or desist from some.act. 
8 
Fact finding·- The-investigation of an employer'""employee dispute by 
a board or panel. Reports are usually issued whi.ch · describe the issues 
in the dispute-and' recommendations for their solution. 
Injunction~ A prohibitive writ issued by a court of equity for-
bidding the defendant to do some act.he is threatening or forbidding him 
to continue.doing some act. 
Majority opinion - The statement of reasons for the view of the 
majority of themembers in the bench in a decision in which some of them 
disagree a 
Mediation - An attempt by.a third party to bring together the 
parties in dispute. 
Plaintiff - Personwho brings.on action. 
Plenary - Complete power, usually applied to legislatures over 
matters within their entire jurisdiction. 
Police power - The power of legislatures to pass laws regulating 
and restraining private rights and occupations for the general welfare 
and security. 
Preeedent - A decision considered as furnishing an example or 
authority for an identical or similar case afterward arising on a 
similar question of law. 
Quasi-corporation - An organization with· semi-corporate powers, it 
is created by the state with limited powers to act in the place of the 
state for a gi.ven local area, 
Right - A power or privilege in one person against another. 
9 
St a t ute - Act passed by the legislature. 
Ultra v:ires - Acts b'eyond the seope of authority. 
CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND OF STUDY 
The Legal Framework for School Law 
and Collective Negotiations 
School law, in providing the legal foundation for the operation of 
t be public school system, is derived from a combination of constitu-
tional provisions; statutorial enactments, attorney general's opinions 
and case · l aw, Gauerkel classifies th~ legal basis of public education 
as follows: (1) federal and state constitutional law, (2) statutorial 
law which includes acts of administrative bodies, and (3) judge made law 
or that law which relates to the decisions of the court. Thus, law 
applicable to the school is not legal precedent· found in a single source 
such as a book; but, rather a whole body of rules from diversified 
sources . 2 
Col lective negotiations law, as it seeks to regulate hu~an 
activities, is enmeshed ; in and has become an inseparable part of common 
l aw; cons t itutional law, judge made law, criminal law, and statutorial 
law, 3 The shape of the legal framework in which collective negotiations 
l warren E. Gauerke, School Law (New York, 1965), p . 14. 
2r bid . , p . 11. 
3Ni cholas s . Falcone, Labor Law (New York, 1962), p . 1. 
10 
11 
are· conducted·. is ~riangular in- configuration. 4 Common law arising from 
judfcial decisions and interpretations; and.jurisprudence· consisting of 
the accumula1:ion of action taken by various parties, represent the sides· 
·of: the· triangle. 5 However, common law· d·erived from judicial decisions 
is of greater consequence during thee.!).rly stages-of the development of 
·legal framework· pertaining· to a specific area, Thebase of this tri-
angular configuration is·· one of. statutory law as estab:J.:ished by Congress 
and by individual· state legislative bodies. 6 State legislation as exem-
plified through statutorial enaatments·is paramount in collective nego-
tiaticms; thus, the .base of the configuratiQn is, the legal foundation. 
A~ to establishment of precedence.for collective negotiations, the 
judicia:J. decisions in other sectors.of employment cannot be overlooked. 
Litigation and the ensuing precedent established in the public sector is 
often referred to· in legislation i-Pvol.ving school .. employees. Hence- . 
forth, the separation of scho~>l district el)lployees from ot;:her public or 
private.employees in regard to legal doct~ine is difficult even though 
distinguishing characteristics exist, 7 
4co Wilson· Randle,· Collective Bargaining:. Principles and 
Practices- (Boston, 1951), p. 49. 
5Ibid., p. 50. 
6Ibid., p. 51. 
7Jack H. Kleinmann, T, M. Stinnett, and,Martha L. Ware, 
Professional Negotiation 1.!!. _:Public Education (New York, 1966), p. 21. 
12 
The Sovereignty of the State and 
· Delegation of Authority 
Traditionally, the state or its agents havebeen responsible for 
the formulation and administration of policies governing the operations 
of the school. The power. of legislature· over education is plenary or 
complete·except as limit.;i.tions might be imposed, by.a state constitution 
or by the Constitution of the United St;ates. Garber, 8 in commenting on 
state authority ove:i:- school districts stated: 
•. , • the state exercises its authority through the constitu-
tion by constitutional enactment, and through the legislature 
by legislative or statutory enactment. In the absence of any 
restrictions placed upop. it by the constitution, the.legisla-
ture may enact any law it sees fit concerning education-"'." 
except it cannot divest itself of legislative power. Neither 
can it delegate legislative authority to another agency. It 
may create administrative bodies ap.d charge them with the 
responsibility for maintaining schools; it may delegate this 
authority to already· existing agencies such as .cities; town..,. 
ships, and.counties; or it may retain.this authority itself. 
In any case its authority is supreme over schools.and over 
any agencies it desires to make use of for administrative 
purposes. 
Edwards,9 in a similar vein, stated: 
In the absence of constitutional prohibitions, the end to 
be attained and the means to be employed are wholly subject to 
legislative determination. The legislature mp.y determine the 
types of schools to be established throughout the state, the 
means of their support, the organs of their administration, 
the content of their curricula, and the qualifications of 
their teachers. Moreover, all their matters may be determined 
without regard to the wishes·of the localities, for in educa"." 
tion the state is the un:it and there are no local rights 
except such as are safeguarded by the Constitution. 
8Lee o. Garber, Handbook of School~ (New London, 1954), p. 5. 
9Newton Edwards, The Courts and the Public Schools (Chicago; 1955), 
p~ 27. 
Therefore, it seems obvious that the legislature has the unrestricted 
right to prescribe the policies, authorize the means of financing; 
determine th~methods of instruction, and set conditionsof employment 
in a unilateral manner. 
The determination· of the conditions.of employment as advocated in 
collective negotiations is one of bilateral determination; thus, this 
doctrine of the sovereignty of the state is being challenged. Present 
·trends in federal and state.policy regarding collective negotiations 
indicate that the concept of ''state sovereignty'' is losing S\lbstantial 
support.10 Furthermore, even if the con<;:ept is still accepted, it is 
being waived as a result of new statutorial enactments that permit 
extra-legal organizations and school boards to negotiate on conditions 
of employment.11 
New state legislation permitting the local school board and the 
13 
school employees·to negotiate is being contested in the courts. 
Garber,12 in commenting on why the laws are being contested, indicated: 
Where such laws are contested, the arguments are usually 
based on the general principle of law that legislatures may 
not delegate legislative authority and that local school 
boards cannot therefore be legally empowered to engage in 
collective bargaining. 
10Thomas. P. Gilroy, Anthony V. , Sinicropi, Franklin D. Stone, and 
Theodore R. Urich, Educators Guide to Collective Negotiations (Columbus, 
1969), p. 11. . 
11rbid. 
121ee o. Garber, "Board Authority Upheld in Collective Bargaining 
Case," Nations Schools, LXXIV (October, 1969), p. 96. 
14 
A recent case of point is American Federation of Teachers Local 
1485 .!• Yakima School Districtl3 in which the court rejected the princi ... 
ple of illegal delegation of authority. Commenting on the principle 
involved, the court stated:· 
We havelong·recognized that the legislature may confer 
powers of local regulation, or administrative powers, on 
municipal·corporations without violating the constitutional 
prohibition of improper delegation of legislative power. 
• . • We conclude that the legislature may properly grant 
board powers to municipal corporations, including school dis-
tricts, without prescribing detailed standards and guidelines, 
so long as those powers relate to local purposes of administra-
tion. 
One judicial interpretation is not sufficient to clarify the issue 
at point, yet it does point out that the concept of the "sovereignty of 
the state" and the principle of delegation of authority are undergoing 
judicial interpretation. 
Legal Foundation of Individual Rights 
The legal foundation of individual rights· is firmly entrenched .in 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States. The First Amendment forbids Congress to make any law abridging 
". • • the right of the people peaceably: ·to assemble, and to petition the 
government for a redress of grievances." The Fourteenth Amendment to 
the Constitution forbids any state to: 
. • • make or enforce any law which shall abridge the priv-
ileges or immunities of citizens of the United States nor 
shall any state • • • deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws. 
13American Federation of Teachers Local 1485 v. Yakima School 
District, 447 P. (2d) 593 (Washington, .1965) .- -
15 
Theserightshavebeen·unequivocally guaranteed and stated, yet the 
Constitution has not been treated as an immutable instrument.stating 
timeless· prirrctples, · but· rather has been shaped· and reshaped as new · 
problems emerged and publi·c attitudes changed~ 14 · Therefore, the extent 
of rights·as-e:1Cpressed in the.Constitutionand interpreted through our 
judicial system· is· dependent on prevailing ideological and_ political 
forces even though·adaptations'are normally very slow. 
Public· school employees unquestionably have the same rights enjoyed 
by other citizens, yet, a certain measure of restraint must be exercised 
as constitutional· rights are not unlimited.15 This restraint is exem-
plified. in the case of Adler .!.• B·oard of Education of City of New Yorkl6 
when the court expressed: 
It· is· clear that such persons (teachers) have the right 
under our law to assemble, speak, think, and believe as they 
will. It is equally clear that they have no right to work 
for the· State.in a schooi system of their own terms. They 
may work for the school system upon the reasonable terms laid 
down by proper authorities • • • If they do not choose to work 
on such terms, they are at the liberty to retain.their beliefs 
and associations and go elsewhere. Has the State thus 
deprived them of any right to free speech and assembly? We 
think not. 
An allegation that teachers are second class citizens may-contain 
some rays of truth;·nevertheless, teachers do exercise considerably more 
freedom than· ever before. Increased collective negoti.ation activities 
will no doubt· bring to the forefront renewed attempts at defining 
constitutional rights of school employees. Judicial interpretations of 
14sanford Cohen, L.abor Law (ColUlllbus, 1964), p. 14. 
15M. Chester Nolte, Guide to School .Law (West Nyq.ck, 1969), p. l~2. 
16Adler v. Board of Education of City of New York, 227 N •. Y.S. (2d) 
284 (New York: 1952). - - -·- -- -- --
16 
individual rights' resulting from litigation involving·school employees 
may be· of significant consequence not-only for school employees but also 
for all individuals in our nation. 
Teachers and Extra ..... legal Organizations 
Historically;, teachers have refused to participate in extra-legal 
organizations for the primary purpose of promoting economic gains. 
Teachers,·likemany othergroups·ofprofessiona].s; have tendecl to sub-
ordinate questions.of salaries and other economic issues to the consid..,. 
eration of professional status.17 Therefore, teachers, unlike the non-
professional workers in the private sector, have generally affiliated 
with professional organizations rather than- labor unions. The develop-
ment of two competing extra"'.'legal organizations and the increased 
rivalry during the last·· decade has been one of the causative factors in 
increased concerted activities by teachers. Since the American 
Federation of Teachers and the National Education Association are often 
involved in litigation involving coll~ctive negotiations, a skeletal 
historical description of their developmE;!nt seems.to be in order. 
The Chicago Teachers Federation, formed in 1897, was the first 
example.of an independent organization of teachers with distinguishin~. 
characteristics of a union.18 Teacher unions did not become affiliated 
with organized labor until 1902 and by 1916 only twenty local unions had.· 
become A.F.L. affiliates. Membership in the American Federation of 
17Bernard Yabroff and Mary Lily David, "Collective Bargaining and 
Work Stoppages Involving Teachers," Monthly Labor Review, LXXVI (May, 
1953), p. 475. 
18commission on Educational Reccmstruction, Organizing· the Teaching 
Profession (Glencoe, 1955), p. 20. 
17 
Teachers increased to 10,000 by 1919; however, it declined to 3,500 by 
1927 as a result of increased pressure by boards of education to have 
teachers join the-National Education Association.19 Since 1927, member-· 
ship in the A~F.T. has increased to approximately 150,000· resulting from 
consistent·representation·victories,· increased union activity among 
public employees, and· concern about· security and arbitrary discharge, 20 
Inl857; the-National.Education Association, a professional society 
for administrators -and teachers, was fbrmed ·-with an initial membership 
of forty--eight. 21 - Though' the organization's membership' fluctuated con"'." 
siderably during the next thirty years, membership had increased to 
9,115 members by 1887; by 1920 the membership was 52,800. 22 As of 1968, 
a· membership' in excess of one million was reported; however, signs of 
stabilizationwere evident due to the increased rivalry with the 
A.F,T, 23 While the National Education Association advocates profes-
sional growth and status, policies pursued since 1962, indicate an 
increased-awareness of the need to concentrate on economic issues. 24 
19Yabroff, op. cit. 
20Edward B~ Shils· and· Taylor Whittier, Teachers, Administrators, 
and Collective Bargaining (New York, 1968), p, -23. 
21Yabroff~ op.-cit,, p. 476. 
22 rbid. 
23c·1 ° 61 1 ray, op. cit., p, , 
24stinnett, op. cit., p. 12. 
Early Collective Action and Judicial 
Hostility in the Private Sector 
18 
In the Unit~d States, the earliest record of collective action by· 
labor ~.$·.in· 1636 as a group of fishermen in Maine were reported to have· 
"fallen into mutiny" when their wages were withheld. 25 Certainly, this 
instance eanno·t; be considered. the beginning of. any substantial movement . 
for it was not until the mid"."19th Century did anything appe.;ir in the 
labor·movel)lent·that encompassed more than a local action. Although some. 
evidence ·exbts· of earlier concerted activitiesr, most authorities have 
identified the action by a group of printers in 1786 as the first 
st;rike. 26 
Judicially, the startingplace in private industl;'y is 1806, the 
date.of the Philadelphia· .Y.· Cordwainer's case. The court ruling estab-
lished the "conspiracy in restraint of t:i;ade'' doctrine which was cloi;;ely 
adhered to by the· courts .until 1842. This concept followec;l an old 
English law doetrine that any attempt·te raise wages.by.workmen could be 
regarded as.a con~piracy against· the public. 27 · The continued persist-
ene~ of the courts· in· following this doctrine typifies the juc;licial 
hostility that existed in this· nation· towards labor during its early 
attempts at collective action. 
In 1842,·in·Commonwealth .Y.• Hunt, 28 tl).e court ruled ~hat; collective 
action within·itselfwas.not a conspiracy. This court ruling was 
· 25R~ndle, op. cit., p. 5. 
26Ibid., p. 8. 
27 Ihid•, p. 10. 
28commonwealth v. Hunt, Am. Dec. 346 (4 Mete III) 1842. 
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considered a landmark in the development of the law of industrial 
relations as the identity between the conspiracy doctrine and the labor 
union was dissolved.a 29 Use of the conspiracy doctrine by the judicial 
system did not come to a sudden end as a result of the court's ruling. 
Various activities of .. the union were still considered acts. of conspiracy 
by the courts for several ensuing decades. 
To complete this judicial review, omitting the legal 'dogma of state 
and federal statutory.responses, four main developments need to be con-
sidered. These developments were: (1) use of injunctions in labor 
disputes, (2) the suit for damages against unions and union members, (3) 
the yellow dog contracts, and (4) the courts' interpretation of the 
Constitution. 30 
The use of the injunction was a most important innovation by the 
courts to prevent damage.of property or business as a result of callee-
tive action. An injunction as interpreted by many courts was: 
o . • a proceeding whereby a person or management fearing 
injury to his property or business might obtain at once a 
restraining order to preserve the status quo until such 
time that the conflict has been resolved.31 
Certainly, the use of.the injunction favored management in any dispute 
and was the basis for labor's bitter resentment towards the judicial 
system of this nationo. Secondly, the use of suit for damages against 
unions and union members by the courts proveq to be ineffective due to 
29Fred Witney, Government and Collective Bargaining (Chicago, 
1951), p, 33. 
30Benjamin Aaron, Joseph Shister and Clyde W. Summers, Public 
Policy~ Collective.Bargaining (New York, 1962), p. 3. 
31Alphus To Mason, Organized Labor and the Law (Durham, 1925), po 
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the inadequacy of the; funds 0 again.stwhich the· damages could be 
assessed·. 32. The' third· area of development, the use of· yellow dog con-
tracts, was a major concernof legislation due to infringement upon 
20 
individualrights. Basically, a yellow dog contract was.an undertaking 
on the part of the employee that.as a condition of emp:Loyment he would 
not join or· become involved in a labor organization. 33 The court's 
reaction to the use of yellow dog contracts was anti labor in context as 
the courts approved the legality of such arrangements. 
The fourth and final development was of a more general nature as it 
deals withtheinterpretation of the Constitution by the courts, This 
development canbe·expressed in various ways, yet the main thrust was 
the court's possible over-concern with "property rights"· as opposed to 
"human rights"· in viewing· the Constitution.34 
The above mentioned-developments.reflect a judicial hostility that 
did thwart the· effectiveness of unions. Federal statutorial response in 
the 1930's·and 40's helped alleviate many of the probl~ms but the 
judicial system was slow in reflecting the same.societal acceptance of 
labor activityo 
Legal Status of Collective Bargaining 
in the Private Sector 
Collective bargaining in.the private· sector is essentially a power 
relationship anda·process·of power accommodation, whereby the avowed 
32A "t aron, op. ci 9 
33Ibid 0 ' p, 4o 
34Ibido 
21 
theoretical purpose and practical implications have·been to increase the 
employee's control ovet;' the decision making process.35 With the passage· 
-- of the Natienal·Labor Relations Aet -of 1935, the basic· foundation per.,. 
tainingto legal- rights was: provided for the new· familiar collective 
bargaining·· pro·cess of the·- private sector. 36 Though modifications were 
fortb,coming inthe·enactmentof-the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 and the 
Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959·; the collective bargaining process has 
remained con~tant.37 
Essent:j.al to_ the .collective bargaining process in the ,private 
sector arekey elements provided for or supporteqby the federal legis-
latio~ pre~iously mentioned. Nolte38 andWildman39 list similar sets of 
elements: 
1. Employees may organize without influence or coercion from 
either management or labor. 
2. Procedures for· the determination of e~clusive representation 
for eacbof the bargaining units are provided. 
3. A- union granted eJtclusive representation shall_ represent all 
the employees in· the· unit,·whether or not they voted for the union. 
35wesley A. Wildma,n·; · "The Law· an<:i Collective- Negotiations in 
Education," Velume II _Qf Collective Action _E.!, Public School Teachers 
(Chicago, 1968), p. 4. 
36M. Chester Nolte, "Teachers Face Boards of Education Across the 
Bargaining Tabie Legally," School :Soard Journal, CL (June, 1965), p. 10. 
37Kern Alexander, Ray Corns, and Walter Mccann, Public School Law 
(St. Paul, 1969), p. 437. 
38M. Chester Nolte, "Teachers Face Boards of Education Across the 
Bargaining Table Legally," School Board Journal, CL (June~ 1965), p. 12. 
39wildman, op. cit., pp. 5-7. 
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4. Union·shQp is legalized, however, the individual states may· 
enact "right· to work" laws which forbid suchai;t agreement. 
5. Procec;iureshave·been established for dues checkoff. 
6. The· employer must meet and. bargain in good faith·~ Furthermore, 
upon the termination· of the barga;J.ning, the.union and employer must. 
reduce the;!··· terms·· of · the agreemerrt to writing. 
7. ·Disputes over·contract inte:t"pretationor application may be 
resolved by a third person tbrqugh bindi'I!-g arb;i..tration. · 
8. Employees may legally stJ;"ike in the event of an impasse or 
fa.ilure of the employer to meet contra.ct terms. However, a strike may 
legally be enjoined.in case of a nationa+ eme~gency. 
9. Picketing fo.r recognition purposes is severely limited by law 
although other forms of picketing are·legal,.and without serious legal 
constraints. 
It should be emphasized that the National Labor Relations Act, 
Taft~Hartley Act, and Landrum-Griffin Act specifically exclude public . 
empl0yees from the prov;i..sions set forth.40 
Although it has been.estimated by Nolte41 that the bargaining 
process in the private sector .is about thirty years ahead of similar 
accommodations in the public sector, the legal aspects are worth noting. 
If.indeed an "adaptive" concept prevails, present legal doctrine in the 
private sector deserves close review due to possible implications. 
40M. Chester Nolte, "Teachers Face ;Boards of Education Across the 
Bargaining Table Legally," School Board Journal, CL (June, 1965), p. 11. 
41Ibid., p. 10 
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The Emerging Legal Doctrine 
. • • Some Studies 
Much has been written in the general area of collective negotia-
tions·with the preponderance of the major-contributions making at least 
a token att:empt to cope with the·emerging-legal doctrine. Few attempts 
have.been.made to present in an analytical and ex'Q.austive manner the 
judicial decisions and statutorial enactments in collective negotia-
tions. Therefore,· the review of literature presented in the following 
pages only encompasses the major contributions, 
Lieberman,42 while an assistant professor of education at the 
University of Oklahoma, in 1956 published a comprehensive analysis of 
the issues involved in teacher strikes. He made an attempt to give the 
term "strike"an operational definit;:ion and related some of the legal 
aspects involved in strikes. The author.presented a thoughtful analysis 
of the "sovereignty of gove+nment" concept and implied that perhaps 
strikes, if removed from the political framewor~ and treated as an 
employee-employerproblem, would not.be a threat to the "sovereignty" of 
the government.·· · This particular publication has been considered one of 
the ,first major contributions in the area of collective negotiations, 
Lieberman and Moskow,43 through wide contact with organizations 
involved in collective negetiations, produced one.of the most compre-
hensive books in the field. The authors confirmed the need to establish 
policies appropriate to the conditions that prevail in education as 
42Myron Lieberman, "Teacher. Strikes: An Analysis of the Issues," 
Harvard Educational Review, XXVI (Winter, 1956). 
43Myron Lieberman and Michael H. Moskow, Collective Negotiations 
for Teachers (Chicago, 1966). 
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opposed to complete adoption of successful policies in industry. A 
skeletal analysis of judicial decisions and federal statutorial response 
applicable to employee-employer relationships in private industry was 
presented. The legal status of the right to organize, selection and 
determination- of bargaining' units, and strikes were presented with sup-
porting judicial decisions. The possibility of one organization for 
teachers-was explored and the types of·representation for bargaining 
purposes were discussed. 
Comprehensive legal research on· judicial decisions and statutorial 
enactments pertaining to collective negotiations was completed by the 
National Education Association44 in 1965. The lack of an exhaustive 
examination of the litigation prevents this legal research from being an 
appropriate guide for future research. The research reaffirmed that, 
from a legal viewpoint~ " •.• it is difficult to separate public 
employees generally." One distinguishing characteristic of this legal 
analysis was the inclusion of attorney general's opinions. 
Seitz45 has completed salient research over a period of time; 
however, one of his earlier analyses published in the 1963 Yearbook.£.!. 
School Law, was paramount. The author analyzed the rights of public 
school teachers to engage in collective bargaining and concluded, at 
least by implication, that·school districts may make the decision to 
bargain collectively whether encouraged by law or not. Several judicial 
44National Educaton Association, Professional Negotiation with 
School Boards. A Legal Analysis and Review (Washington, D. C.: NEA 
Research Division, 1965). 
45Reyno!ds C. Seitz, "Rights of Public School Teachers to Engage in 
Collective Bargaining and Other Concerted Activities," 1963 Yearbook of 
School Law (Danville, 1963). 
25 
decisions pertaining to collective negotiations and their ensuing 
implications were reported; however, some of the implications drawn are 
no longer valid as a result of additional judicial rulings. 
A report prepared for the U s. Office of Education by Wildman,46 
provides one of th~ most comprehensive discussions of the emerging 
legal doctrine in collective negotiations presently available. The 
author analyzed the legal rights of teachers pertaining to organiza-
tional membership, union activities, representation, written negotiation 
contracts, strikes, picketing, arbitration, and union security issues. 
Substantial numbers of cases were cited to support the conclusions 
reached in each of the areas previously mentioned. The in-depth discus-
sion of union security issues presented by the author was most signifi-
cant considering the date of the report. The second part of Wildman's. 
report included an analysis of state statutory response relevant to the 
labor relations situation in regard to public employees. 
Doherty and Oberer47 discussed what "model or ideal" legislation 
covering negotiations might contain. Several threshold questions were 
used as the basis for discussion of the various legal aspects involvedo 
One of the unique aspects of the study was the authors' thoughtful 
analysis of administrative agencies for arbitration purposes. Extensive 
statutory documentation and a limited number of court decisions were 
46wesley A, Wildman, "The Law and Collective Negotiations in 
Education," Volume Q of Collective Action £y Public School Teachers 
(Chicago, 1968). 
47Robert Eo Doherty and Walter E. Oberer, Teachers, School Boards 
and Collective Bargaining: A Changing of~ Guard (New York, 1967). 
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presented to substantiate the authors' response to various threshold 
questions, 
Kleinman, Stinnett and Ware48 devoted part of their book, 
Professional Negotiation in Public Education, to the legal status of 
negotiations and the ens~ing implications. The authors presented a 
legal discussion of the teachers' rights in the areas of membership, 
non-membership, strikes, negotiation, representation, and mediation pro-
cedures. In disc~ssing the need to understand and consider the law, the 
authors implied that negotiation procedures and processes could not be 
considered outside the context of the law. A comprehensive analysis of 
state statutory enactments as of 1965 was presented. 
Additional legal research, on constitutional developments relevant 
to teachers' rights, has been recently completed by Chanin. 49 An exten-
sive and well documented discussion of teachers' rights was presented in 
eight basic categories. Though the author's discussion of rights per-
taining to organizational membership was the only category deemed 
applicable, the style and format utilized was worth noting, Chanin 
concludes that the constitutional protection afforded teachers is not 
static; he predicts that the courts will have no hesitancy in discarding 
doctrines that are incongruent with the needs of society, In his 
opinion, change is presently the mode, while the direction is towards 
increased protection of teachers' rights. 
48Jack H. Kleinmann, T. M. Stinnett, and Martha L. Ware, 
Professional Negotiation in Public Education (New York, 1966), 
49Robert H. Chanin, Protecting Teacher Rights: !:_ Summary of 
Constitutional Developments (Washington, D. C., 1970), p. 21. 
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A doctoral study by Bellone50 in 1966, reported the judicial 
decisions, attorney generals' opinions, and statutory enactments rele-
vant to the legal rights of public teachers in professional negotia-
tions. Applicable cases, statutes and attorney generals' opinions were 
located and grouped by state into eight basic categories. The study was 
principally devoted to the public school; however, several cases involv-
ing public employees were reported. Bellone, in his reconnnendations, 
indicated that all states without appropriate legislation should enact 
laws which clearly define the legal rights of teachers in the profes-
sional negotiation process. 
SUIIllllary 
In the final analysis, it appears that the infinite body of law 
relevant to collective negotiations may be found in federal and state 
constitutional law, statutory law and judge made law. While the founda-
tion of labor relations law may be found in statutory law, connnon law 
derived from judicial decisions is vital during the early development 
periods of an area. Too, jurisdictional differences will exist in a 
large'number during these early stages, 
Although the major contributions reviewed discussed the emerging 
legal doctrine, their selective treatment of the subject indicates a 
need for a comprehensive and analytical study of the litigation and 
statutorial development. Therefore, the following chapter deals with 
50samuel c. Bellone, "rhe Legal Rights of Public School Teachers 
in Professional Negotiations," (unpub. Ed.D. dissertation, Colorado 
State College, 1966). 
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the judicial decisions relevant to collective negotiations in the public 
school. The subsequent chapter will be concerned with statutory 
enactments. 
CHAPTER III 
THE EMERGING LEGAL DOCTRINE 
AS A RESULT OF L~TIGATION 
It is the purpose of·this chapter to consider the significance of 
judicial decisions in establishing legal precedence pertaining to col-
lective negotiations in the pu~lio school. With respect to the litiga-
tion that will be reported, analyzed, and briefed on the ensuing pages, 
the overriding focal point will be one of establishment of legal doc-
trine. Specifically, this chapter wi.1,1 be primarily concerned with, and 
limited to, the judicial considerations involving: (1) right to organ-
ize and maintain membership, (2) union security issues, (3) right to 
dues checkoff, (4) right of ~epresentation, (5) right to negotiate and 
enter into contract, (6) right to strike, (7) right to participate in 
other concerted activities. Though these categories are not discrete as 
some overlapping occurs, they will allow analysis. Too, such a categor-
ization scheme should contribute to the clarity of the presentation. 
Judicial decisions pertaining to the constitutionality of specific 
statutes appurtenant to the negotiations phenomenon will not be reported 
in this chapter since Chapter IV will deal with statutes. Another 
purpose of this chapter is to clarify the "blurred" line between the 
public and private sectors in regard to certain relevant legal questions 
pertaining to collective negotiations. 
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Right to Organize and 
Maintain Membership 
Governmental n~straints ·on the right of teachers to organize and/or 
maintain membership in otganization" .traditional,ly have sought to 
achieve either of two Qbjectives,l First is a desire to keep the teach-
ing profession free of individuals who advocate or support "un-accept-
able" poli t:i,cal philosophies and; secc;md, the desi1!e to prevent or 
retard the development of qnionism or a legal f ramewor~ that may lead to 
the bilateral determination of policies.2 Nevertheless, the judicial 
system has, over an extended period of time, gradually sought the pro-
tect;:ion of individqal right$ in such matters. 
There is little qoubt. today that; school employees have the right to 
organize and maintain membership in employee organizations, whether said 
membership involves a professional org~nizatin or u0ion.3 Individual 
rights, unequivocally guaranteed and stated in the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Cons~itution of the Pnited States, have not always 
received universal and affirmative response by the judiGial system. 
Nonetheless, governmental and judidal attempts to prohibit public 
employees from organizing or maintaining membership in order to reduce 
the propab;l..lity of being c;::.onfronted with concerted activities seem to be 
on dubious constitutional grounds, 
1Robe+t H. Chanin, Pro~ectin~ TeaeherRight;:s: A Summary of 
Constitutional Developments (Washington, D. c., 1970), p. 21. 
2Ibid. 
3Jack H. Kleinmann, T, M, St:;i.nnett~ and Marth.a L. Ware, P:rofes.., 
sional Nesot:lation in J?ublic EducaUon (New York, 1966), p, 22. 
; ... -. ' 
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Earli Judicial Decisions 
The earlier cases located concerning the right to organize 
reflected the courts' willingn~ss to consider public and private 
employees as separate entities. For example, in 1917, the court in 
People ~ rel. Fursam y. City. of Chicago et al., 4 upheld a board of 
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education policy that prohibited teachers from maintaining membership in 
labor unions. The court stated.that union membership was" ••• inim-
ical.to proper disciplines, prejudiced to the efficiency of the teaching 
force and detrimental to the welfare of schools." Insistence by the 
boarq of education upon non-membership in a labor union was considered a 
condition of employment, therefore no individual rights were abridged. 
As" ••• no person has.the right to det11B.nd that.he be employed as a 
teacher;'' the court. reasened that a condition of employment was within 
the jurisdiction prerogative of.the board of education. 
Facts somewhat similar.to those in the Chicago case were reported 
in .Seattle Hi~h School, Chapter No. 200 ~· Sharples.5 The board of 
directors at a legally convened meeting adopted the following resolu-
tion: 
That no person be employed hereafter, or continued in the 
employ of the district as a teacher while a member of the 
American Federation.of Teachers, or any local thereof; and 
that before any.election be considered binding, such teacher 
shall sign a declaration to the following effect: 
I hereby declare that I am not a member of the American 
Federation of Teachers~ or any local thereof, and will not 
·become a member during the term of the contract. 
4People ex rel. Fursam v. City of Chicago, 116 N.E. 158 (Illinois, 
1917). 
Sseattle High School, Chapter No. 200 ~· Sharples, 293 Pac. 994 
(Washi.ngfon, 1930). · 
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Although the plaintiffs contended that the enactment of the resolution 
would constitute an abridgement of constitutional rights, the court, in 
its majority opinion, upheld the board of directors' authority to impose 
a condition of employment. The court stated: 
The right of freedom of contract as it exists in this 
case to refuse .for any reason or no reason at all to engage 
the professional services of any person is in µo sense a 
denial of the constitutional rights of that person to follow 
his chosen profession. 
The decision of the court, however, was not unanimous. One of the 
judges writing a dissenting opinion expressed a concern that the 
respondents, the board of directors, could in a discriminatory fashion 
abridge constitutionally guaranteed rights as deemed necessary. It was 
further contended that such a wide discretion of power should not be 
permit tell. 
. ~ 
A Judicial Departure 
A landmark decision in 1951, Norwalk Teachers Association y. Board 
of Education of City~ Norwalk, 6 provided the real impetus for collec-
tive negotiations in the public school. The plaintiff asked the court 
for a declaratory judgment pertaining to its respective rights, priv-
ileges, duties, and immunities. Ten questions ranging from the right to 
organize to the utilization of mediation agencies were submitted to the 
courts to act upon. The court, in addressing itself to the question 
involving the rights of teachers to organize as a labor union stated: 
In the absence of prohibitorr statute or regulation, no 
good reason appears why public employees should not organize 
as a labor union • • • It means nothing more than that the 
6Norwalk Teachers Association y. ]3oarq ~ Education of· City .2f 
Norwalk, 83 A. (2d) 482 (Connecticut, 1951). 
plaintiff may organize and bargain collectively for the pay 
and working conditions which it may be in the power of the 
board of education to grant. 
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The court further pointed out that the plaintiff, upon organization 
as a labor union, could not organize for all the purposes for which 
employees in private enterprise may unite. Although the court responded 
to other questions pertaining to collective negotiations which will be 
reported in their appropriate classifications, the significance of the 
court's ruling on the right to organize was very important. It 
reflected a definite departure from the earlier judicial considerations 
pertaining the right to organize and provided a basis of concern for 
individual rights that heretofore had not been expressed by the judicial 
system. The precedence established in this judicial decision cannot be 
over-emphasized, as this case appeared to be the focal point for the 
recognition of public employees constitutional r;l..ghts. 
A related line of cases, during the next few years involving 
municipal employees in organizational issues was located. Even though 
these cases did not involve school employees, a discussion of the legal 
questions involved and the subsequent decisions seem most relevant. For 
example, in 1958, the court enjoined city officials from requiring non-
membership in a police union as a condition of employment. 7 The court's 
reasoning was somewhat congruent to that of the Norwalk case in that 
said condition of employment was held to be an abridgement upon 
constitutionally guaranteed rights. Further substantiation of the right 
of membership or non-membership appeared in the public sector in the 
7Potts et al., v. Hay, 318 S.W. (2d) 826 (Arkansas, 1958). 
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case of Levasseur v. Wheeldon, 8 a class action by city employees to 
enjoin the city, mayor, and city connnissioners from placing into effect 
a resolution. The resolution sought to cause termination of union 
affiliation on the part of the city employees, The court, in reversing 
a lower court decision and affirming the class action by the city 
employees, concluded in part: 
The resolution sought to be annulled is clearly repugnant 
to and in conflict with the Constitution . • • and the right 
of citizens to assemble peaceably and organize for any proper 
purpose, to speak freely and to pre~ent their views to public 
officers has been preserved by the federal and state 
constitutions. 
Several cases in the public sector similar to the two discussed 
have come before the bench and have been upheld on the basis of rights 
guaranteed in the Constitution. 9 However, in American Federation of 
State, County and Municipal Employees y. City of Muskegon10 the Supreme 
Court of Michigan reversed a lower court decree for the plaintiffs in 
litigation involvipg a membership issue. The court held that a regula-
tion prohibiting police officers from being members of any organization 
identified as a federation or labor union was not " ... unreasonable or 
arbitrc:i.ry and did not deprive officers of any constitutional rights," 
Although contrary to the heretofore mentioned cases, substantial support 
81evasseur v, Wheeldon, 112 N.W. (2d) 898 (South Dakota, 1962), 
9see, e.g., Los Angeles Metropolitan Transportation Authority y. 
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainman, 8 Cal. Rptr. 1 (California, 1960) and 
Belshaw y, City of Berkeley, 54 Cal. Rptr. 727 (California, 1966). 
10American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees v. 
City E.f Muskegon, 120 N.W. (2d) 197 (Michigan, 1963). 
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on the basis of subsequent decisions was cited. 11 Thus, as amply 
illustrated, the courts did not concur with any degree of consistency as 
to what constituted an abridgement of individual rights. 
Limitations on Constitutional Rights 
It should be remembered that rights guaranteed in the Cons~itution 
are not unlimited. As was so aptly put in Satin Fraterntiy v. Board of 
Public Instruction for Dade County:l2 
It is pertinent to state that none of our liberties are 
absolute; all of them may be limited when the common good or 
common decency requires . Freedom after all is not some-
thing turned footloose to run as it will like a thoroughbred 
in a bluegrass meadow. 
Limitations do indeed exist and services essential to public safety and 
security seem to be paramount.13 
The leading case that provided a judicial basis for not limiting 
the right of public employees is Keyshian y. Board Ef Regents.14 
Although a higher education ruling, the judicial reasoning needs to be 
noted for it marks another significant departure in the court's attitude 
towards membership issues. The Supreme Court, in its decision, repu-
diated in its totality the doctrine whereby". o • public employment, 
11see, eogo, Carter yo Thompson, 180 S.E. 410, Fraternal Order of 
Police y. Lansing Board of Police and Fire Commissioners, 10 N.W. (2d) 
310; Perez y. Board of Police Commissioners of the City of~ Angeles, 
178 Po (2d) 537; Hayman v. City Ef Los Angeles, 62 P. (2d) 1047; and 
City of Detroit v. Division l?_ of the Amalgamated Association of Street, 
Electric, Railway, and Motor Coach Employees _£f America, 51 N. W. (2d) 
228. 
12satin Fraternity .Y• Board _£f Public Instruction for ~ County, 
22 Soo (2d) 892 (Florida, 1945) •. 
13M. Chester Nolte, Guide to School Law (West Nyack, 1969), po 212. 
14Keyshian y. Board of Regents, 395 U.S. 589 (1967). 
including academic employment may be conditioned upon the surrender of 
constitutional rights which could not be abridged by direct government 
action." The court indicated that mere membership in a subversive 
organization without an indication of specific intent to further the 
unlawful aims of the organization was not justification for dismissal. 
The opinion further pointed out that merely joining an organization 
without contributing to its unlawful activities was not justification 
for the state to interfere with indi:vidual rights. 
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Further, repudiation of the doctrine of maintaining a distinc.tion 
in constitutional status between private and public employees was forth-
coming in Garrity v. New Jersey.15 In this case the court in its 
majority opinion indi~ated that public employees cannot be" ••• regu-
lated to a watered-down version of constitutional rights." Certainly, 
the judicial opinions expre~sed in these two Supreme Court cases repre-
sent a major change in judicial interpretation of rights possessed by 
public employees. As previously noted, the judicial system, although 
slow in recognizing public employee rights, made a substantial contribu-
tion in this direction as a result of these two 1967 cases. 
Applicability of Civil Ri~hts Act of 1871 
There is a parallel and consistent line of cases directly related 
to the public schools which provides further substantiation of the 
rights of membership. !n McLaughlin y. Tilendis, 16 two probationary 
teachers sought damages in the amount of one hundred thousand dollars 
l5Garrity y. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). 
16McLaughlin y. Tilendis, 398 F. (2d) 287 (1968). 
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from the superintendent and the board of education members on the basis 
that their contracts had not been renewed because of union membership. 
It was claimed by the pla:i.ntif fs that relief should be granted under the 
Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. 1983) which reads: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any state or territory, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
States or other person within the jurif;;diction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured 
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceedings for redress. 
With Judge Parsons presiding, the United States District Court of 
Illinois granted defendent's motion to dismiss complaint, holding that 
plaintiffs had no First Amendment rights to join or form a labor union 
thus the Civil Rights Act was not applicable. Plaintiffs appealed to 
the United States Court of Appeals whereby the Circuit judge reversed 
the lower court by indicating that a claim upon relief can be granted 
under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The court stated in part: 
It is settled that teachers have the right of free 
association, and unjustified interference with teachers asso-
ciation freedom violates the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 
• . • Public employment may not be subjected to unreasonable 
conditions, and the assertion of First Amendment rights by 
the teachers will usually not warrant their dismissal. 
In reference to the lower court's contention that overriding community 
interests are involved, the Appeal Court quoting in part from Elfbrandt 
v. Russe1117 asserted: 
Those who join an organization but do not share in its 
unlawful purposes and who do not participate in its unlawful 
activities, surely pose no threat either as citizens or public 
employees. 
17Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966). 
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Thus, the court disposed of the case by reversing the District Court and 
the cause was remanded for trial. 
A similar question arose in American Federation of State, County 
and Municipal Employees AFL-CIO v. Woodward.18 The principal question 
raised pertained to whether public employees discharged because they 
joined a union have a right of action for damages and injunctive relief 
under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 against the public official who dis-
charged them. The District Court for the District of Nebraska dismissed 
the complaint on the grounds that insufficient facts were available to 
constitute a claim. However, on appeal the lower court decision was 
reversed and itwasheld that the right to membership was protected by 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments and thus damages and injunctive 
relief under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 were appropriate. The case 
was then returned to the District Court for trial on its merits. 
During the past two or three years, the courts and attorney 
generals, with the exception of Nevada Attorney General Opinion No. 494, 
were unanimous in holding that public employees have a right to join 
unions which cannot be abridged. 19 Although there are still cases on 
the books in a few states which declare right of a board of education 
to condition employment on non-membership in employee organizations, 
18American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees 
· AFL-CIO y. Woodward, 406 F. (2d) 137 (1969). Additional cases which 
have considered the applicability of the Civil Rights Act of 1871: 
Jones v. Hopper, 410 F. (2d) (1969), the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
District Court's ruling that insufficient evidence was available to 
indicate applicability, however, two dissenting opinions were reported 
and seem worthy of consideration; Indianapolis Education Association v. 
Lewallen, 71 LRRM 2898 (Indiana, 1969), litigation in the public school 
that substained the applicability of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 
19Research Division, National Education Association, Negotiation 
Research.Digest, November, 1969, Volume III, p. 21. 
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these cases appear to be deadletter, even though not specifically over-
ruled. 20 However, it is still propounded by a few that joining a union 
which espouses collective bargaining and ultimately the strike is not 
necessarily a right for public employees as guaranteed in the 
Constitution. 21 
Right to Engage in Union Activities 
Closely related and not mutually exclusive of the legal questions 
involving membership issues were the judicial considerations pertaining 
to the right to engage in union activities. Although a limited number 
of cases were located, the legal issues involved seem to be significant. 
Certainly, one might argue that the right to organize and maintain mem-
bership means little unless one can actively participate in union 
activities. 
The foca-1 point of the litigation loc:.ated pertains to the legality 
of terminating an instructional staff member's contract on the basis of 
his union activity. An overriding and most complex legal question was 
the determination of whether contracts were not being renewed due to 
incompetent teaching or union activity. For example, in Muskego-Norway 
Consolidated Schools Joint School District v. Wisconsin Employment 
Relations Board22 a teacher contract was not renewed by the school dis-
trict on the basis that the teacher was incompetent. Substantial 
20wesley A. Wildman, The Law ~ Collective Bargaining in 
Education, A Report Prepared for the United States Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (Chicago, 1968), p. 8. 
21Ibid. 
22Muskego-Norway Consolidated Schools Joint School District v. 
Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 151 N. W. (2d) 617 (Wisconsin, 196 7). 
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documentation had been prepared by the administrative staff to support 
this claim. The teacher, an enthusiastic chairman of the teachers 
association welfare committee, claimed that his dismissal was the result 
of extensive union activity on his part. It seemed apparent that the 
teacher not only pursued with enthusiasm his responsibility as chairman 
but in a consistent manner caused several problems to come forth in the 
operations procedures of the school district. 
As the administrative staff became highly: disturbed over the 
militancy that seemed to spew forth as a result of the leadership of the 
teacher, recommendations were forthcoming to not renew the teacher's 
contract, The recommendation by the superintendent that the staff mem-
her be· dismissed was based on "competency" as a teacher and no mention 
was made of the union activity. Thus, the teacher's contract was not 
renewed by the board of education. 
The teacher brought this complaint before the Wisconsin Employment 
Relations Board (W.E.R.B.) and the W.E.R.B. ruled that: 
• . , the district offer the discharged teacher his former 
position without prejudice, pay the teacher any damages he may 
have suffered and to post notice to all teachers notifying 
them of actions taken and future policy to be observed by the 
districtc 
Members of the board of education asked the Circuit Court to review the 
findings of the W.E.R.B. as relief was sought. The Circuit Court set 
aside the W.E.R.B. ruling on the basis that the teacher's dismissal was 
not due to union activity but inadequacies as a teacher. The W.E.R.B., 
highly disturbed over the findings of the lower court, appealed, 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, after reviewing all the evidence 
submitted, reversed the lower court's order to set aside the recommenda-
tions made by the W.E.R.B. Convinced that the reason for the teacher's 
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dismissal was that of union activity, the court said, in part, "o • 0 a 
school board may not terminate a teacher's contract because the teacher 
has been engaging in- union activities," 
The basic reason for non-congruency in the conclusions reached by 
the various judicial levels involved pertained to what constituted 
"substantial evidence" and/or valid reason for dismissal. Upon elimina-
tion of union activities as a valid reason, it becomes apparent that 
substantial evidence must be forthcoming for dismissal. 
In the same vein was the case of a teacher in Wisconsin whose con-
tract was not renewed on the basis that his performance had been inad-
equate. 23 The teacher claimed before the W.E.R.B. that his dismissal 
was due to his union activity and not his ability as a classroom 
teacher. Affirmative response in behalf of the board of education was 
recorded by the W.E.R.B., the Circuit Court when asked to review the 
findings of the W.E.R.B. and the Wisconsin Supreme Court, The Supreme 
Court in part stated: 
The appellants, Kenosha Teachers Union, possessed the 
burden of proof before the W.E.R.C. The appellants must 
establish that the union activity of Spaight was a motivat-
ing factor in the non~renewal of his contract by the clear 
and satisfactory preponderance of the evidence, 
, It is therefore, our determination that the findings 
of the W.E.R.C. are supported by substantial evidence when 
considering the entire record. 
In neither the Kenosha nor Muskego-Norway case did the court 
uphold the legality of dismissal due to union activities, The guiding 
principle was whether "substantial" evidence existed in behalf of the 
individual's competencies. It seems clear that the term "substantial" 
23Kenosha Teachers Union Local 557 y_. Wisconsin Employment 
Relations Conunission, 158 N.W. (2d) 914 (Wisconsin, 1968). 
may well take on a different emphasis when the individual has been 
involved in union activities. The court in the Muskego-Norway case, 
quoting with approval from an earlier case, 24 said: 
The issue before us is not of course whether or not there 
exists grounds for dismissal of these employees apart from 
union activities. The fact that the employer had ample reason 
for discharging them is of no moment. It was free to dis-
charge them for any reason, good or bad, so long as it did not 
discharge them for union activities. And even though the dis-
charge may have been based upon other reasons as well, if the 
employer were partly motivated by union activity, the dis-
charges were in violation of the Act. 
Thus, the timing aspect of board action seems most significant, As a 
trial judge may instruct the jury to disregard certain testimony by 
hostile witnesses due to the fact that said testimony may prejudice 
their decision, the board of education and its administrative officers 
must not let the union activities of a teacher or teachers prejudice 
their decision in regard to competency. 
Further substantiation of the right to engage in union activities 
seems to be fruitless at this point as no litigation was located that 
contradicted the right of teachers to engage in union activities. 25 
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24N.L.R.B. v. Great Eastern Color Lithographic Corporation, 309 F. 
(2d) 352 (1962). 
25Additional cases involving the right to engage in union activi-
ties include: Albaum v. Carey, 283 F. Supp. 3 (1968), a case involving 
the public school; Service Employees International Union AFL-CIO v. 
County of Butler, 306 F. Supp. 1080 (Pennsylvania, 1969), a case involv-
ing public service employees; Beauboeuf y_. Delgado College, 303 F.S. 861 
(1969), an action against a city college board of managers; Helsby y_. 
Board of Education of Central School District No. 2, 301 N.Y.S. (2d) 383 
(New York, 1969), a-Case pertaining to a tenured teacher and union 
activities; Yuen v. Board of Education of School District No. U-46, 222 
N.E. (2d) 57~llinois, 1966), the court upheld the dismissal~a 
physical educ.ation teacher who absented himself from duties to attend a 
professional meeting, however dismissal was for misconduct; Roberts Y..· 
Lake Central School Corporation, 74 LRRM 2795 (Indiana, 1970), court 
ruled the dismissal of the president of teachers negotiation team for 
making remarks pertaining to the tactics of the administration was 
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Union Security Issues 
In the private sector, a union security clause in a collective 
bargaining agreement requires all employees to become members of the 
union within a specified time and, furthermore, requires them to remain 
members during employment.26 The typical "union shop" clause allows 
thirty days for a new employee to acquire membership affiliation with 
the union; however, a significant number of states have adopted "right 
to work" laws which make it illegal for collective negotiations to 
include a union shop clause. 27 Similarly, states that have enacted 
"right to work" laws applicable to public employees prohibit collective 
negotiation agreements that contain a union security clause. 
Although union security clauses or agreements were not found to be 
in common practice in public employment, a number of cases pertaining to 
the legality of such agreements have come before the court for judicial 
consideration. 28 The first case in point involving public school 
teachers was Benson et al v. School District Noo 1 of Silver Bow County 
unjustified; Russell~· Edgewood Independent School District, 406 S.Wo 
(2d) 249 (Texas, 1966), the court held that a school superintendent in 
recommending the discharge of a teacher involved in union activities for 
incompetency was not subject to tort actions; Hanover Township Federa-
tion of Teachers Vo Hanover Community School Corporation, 318 F. Suppa 
757 (1970), federal district court did not have jurisdiction in a union 
activities case pertaining to applicability of Civil Rights Act of 1871; 
Knarr v. ,Board of School Trustees, 75 LRRM 2335 (Indiana, 1970), court 
ruled the dismissal of a teacher due to competency, although the teacher 
was actively engaged in union activities, was justified. 
26Jack He Kleinmann, T, J. Stinnett, and Martha L. Ware, Profes-
sional Negotiation in Public Education (New York, 1966), p. 28. 
27wildman, op, cit. 
28Kleinman, op. cit. 
et aL 29 This case involved the legality of a clause the A.F.T. local 
had successfully negotiated with the board of education that discrimi-
nated against non-union members in regard to new benefits negotiated. 
Specifically, the clause stated: 
As a condition of employment all teachers employed by the 
Board shall become members and maintain membership in the 
unions as follows: 
(a) All members now employed by the Board, who are not 
now members of the Union, must become members of the Union on 
or before the 4th day of September, 1956, and shall maintain 
their membership in the Union in good standing as defined by 
the constitution and by-laws of the Union during the term of 
their employment. 
(b) All teachers now employed by the Board, who are now 
members of the Union, shall maintain their membership in the 
Union in good standing as defined by the constitution and by-
laws of the Union during the term of their employment. 
(c) All new teachers or former teachers employed by the 
Board shall become members of the Union within thirty (30) 
days after date of their employment and shall maintain their 
membership in good standing as defined in the constitution and 
by-laws of the Union during the term of their employment. 
The provisions of this Union Security Clause shall be 
adopted as a Board Rule and shall be a condition of all con-
tracts issued to any teacher covered by this agreement. 
Any teacher who fails to sign a contract which includes 
the provisions of this Union Security Clause and who fails to 
comply with the provisions of this Union Security Clause 
shall be discharged on the written request of the Union, 
except that any such teacher who now has tenure under the laws 
of the State of Montana shall not be discharged but shall 
receive none of the benefits nor salary increases negotiated 
by the Union and shall be employed, without contract, from 
year to year on the same terms and conditions as such teacher 
was employed at during the year 1955-56. 
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Non-union teachers brought mandamus and declaratory judgment action 
against the school district, board of trustees, and union to obtain a 
judgment declaring that school districts could not discriminate against 
29Benson et al. v. School District No. 1 of Silver Bow County, 344 
P. (2d) 117 (Montana,-1959). 
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non-union teachers and furthermore requested that the union security 
agreement be declared void. The Supreme Court of Montana in its opinion 
stated in part the following judicial viewpoint: 
It is not competent for the school trustees to require 
union membership as a condition to receiving the increased 
salary. So far as this case is concerned it is sufficient to 
say that the legislature has not given the school board 
authority to make the discrimination sought to be imposed 
here •.• 
o • • For the purposes of this case it is sufficient to say 
that the School Trustees have no authority or power to discrim-
inate between the teachers employed by it as to the amount of 
salary paid to each because of their membership or lack of mem-
bership in a labor union. The School Trustees have no author-
ity to invade that field. As well might be argued that the 
Board of School Trustees might provide that the increased sal-
ary shall not be allowed to those who do not affiliate with a 
certain lodge, service club, church, or political partyo 
Thus, the court held without extensive elaboration that the school board 
trustees had no authority or power to discriminate between union and 
non-union teachers as exemplified in the union security clause hereto-
fore stated. 
A second case, Magenheim _y, Board of Education of the District of 
Riverview Gardens, 30 decided in 1961, provides a judicial ruling in 
contrast to the Benson court decision, The plaintiff, a teacher who was 
not re-employed for the ensuing school year, because of his refusal to 
join certain professional organization, brought suit against the board 
of education. The suit requested the court to: (1) order his rein-
statement and (2) declare a provision in the 1955 and 1958 salary sched-
ules to be void and beyond the board's authority to enact. The court 
refused to grant the plaintiff either of the two requests. 
30Magenheim v. Board of Education of the District of Riverview 
Gardens, 347 SoW. (2d) 409 (Missouri, 1961); Motion for rehearing or 
transfer to Supreme Court of Missouri denied July 11, 19610 
Worthy of special consideration was the salary schedule provision 
that the court refused to declare void. The provision stated: 
Each person on this salary shall join the professional 
organizations which include the community Teachers Associa-
tion, the National Education Association, the Missouri State 
Teachers Association and the St. Louis Suburban Teachers 
Association. Failure to join such organizations precludes the 
benefits derived through the salary schedule and places such 
person outside the salary schedule. 
Although the above provision, at least in effect, parallels the 
clause negotiated in the Benson case, the court held that the school 
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board had the legal right to adopt the provision under the board's stat-
utory provision that authorizes school boards " .• , to make all needful 
rules and regulations for the organization and government of the school 
district," Furthermore, the court, stressing the virtues of improving 
the quality of the educational program through membership in profes-
sional organizations, stated: 
In the teaching profession, as in all professions, mem-
bership in professional organizations tends to increase and 
improve the interest, knowledge, experience and overall pro-
fessional competence. Membership in professional organiza-
tions is no guarantee of professional excellence, but active 
participation in such organizations, attendance at meetings 
where leaders give the members the benefit of their experience 
and where mutual problems and experiences and practices are 
discussed, are reasonably related to the development of higher 
professional atainments and qualifications, Such membership 
affords an opportunity for self improvement and self-develop-
ment on the part of the individual member, It is the duty of 
every school board to obtain the services of the best qual-
ified teach~rs, and it is not only within their power but it 
is their duty to adopt rules or regulations to elevate the 
standards of teachers and their educational standards within 
their district. 
The court, in responding to the defendant's claim that precedence 
had been established in the Silver Bow case, reasoned that the nature 
of the organizations was not the same and thus precedence established 
was not applicable. Although distinguishing differences were apparent 
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between the two cases, the nature of the organization and its objectives 
seem to provide the basis for contrasting judicial opinions. Certainly, 
the legality of union security clauses in school districts cannot be 
determined by these two cases; however, they do provide some insight 
into judicial reasoning in the early 1960's. 
Agency Shop Clauses 
A recent development of significance has been the emergence of 
• 
"agency shop" clauses in a limited number of collective negotiation 
agreements. The typical agency shop clause provides that while 
employees in the bargaining unit do not necessarily have to belong to 
the bargaining representative organization, all employees must at least 
pay a sum equal to the organization's dues or not be retained for the 
ensuing school year. 31 Although, the agency shop clause may not be con-
strued to be identical to a union shop clause and/or compulsory member-
ship provisions heretofore discussed, the distinguishing differences 
seem rather minute. Nevertheless, a close examination of the judicial 
deoisions seems appropriate at this point due to the many constitutional 
objections that were raised in the litigation involving union shop 
agreements, 
The first ruling of significance, although not a court decision, 
was a Michigan Labor Mediation Board (M,L.M.B.) decision in January, 
1968.32 It was held that a request for an "agency shop" clause was a 
3lwildman, op. cit., p. 12. 
32oakland County Sheriffs Department v. Metropolitan Council No, 
~' AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Michigan Labor Mediation Board Case No. C66F63, 
(January 8, 1968), reported in 237 GERR, F-1. 
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mandatory subject for bargaining in public employment and the inclusion 
of such a clause in a contract between an employee organization and a 
public employer was legal in Michigan. Although recognizing the non-
legal status of a union or closed shop clause, the M.L.M.B. accepted in 
principle the "agency shop" clause by stating in part: 
The prohibition, however, is the encouragement and dis-
couragement of union membership. A union is required to rep-
resent all employees in the bargaining unit in good faith and 
without discrimination. Thus, union membership is discouraged 
if employees enjoy the fruits of the union vine without shar-
ing the cultivation of the vineyard. Grapes may not be har-
vested until the ground has been prepared; the vines planted, 
trimmed and sprayed; the soil weeded and fertilized , , , 
A requirement that employees pay their share of the cost 
of negotiating and administrating a collective bargaining 
agreement neither discourages nor encourages membership in the 
labor organization selected by the majority of employees in 
the bargaining unit to represent them. It is not discrimina-
tory, as the requirement that each employee pay his pro rata 
share of the costs applies alike to all employees in the bar-
gaining unit, whether they are, or are not, members of the 
union. 
, , • an agency shop provision in a collective bargaining 
agreement is not prohibited by the public employment relations 
act , 
One of the members of the three-man board in a vigorous dissent 
expressed the following: 
The idea of "publicness" has been lost in the majority 
opinion, , • • The safety and welfare of the people must be 
maintained--which does not allow for union security dis-
charges where workers are in short supply or truly essential 
such as policemen, nurses, firemen, etc. Government services 
are not operated with a profit motive, but rather as econom-
ically and efficiently as possible--which is frustrated when 
the supply of workers is not available because of a desire not 
to join a union; unions being an industrial phenomenon some 
people seek to escape by working for the government, 
It is a basic principle of public employment that the merit 
system was to cure the bad effects of the political "spoils" 
system--which evils may be continued under another "spoils" 
system, , • , There is no protection of minority rights in 
(the Michigan Act), as there are no unfair union practices, 
no secret ballots for union security, no provisos as to 
tender of dues, and no positive protection in a suit for fair 
representation • . • 
Freedom of association and the merit system is violated 
by saying, "You must support a union to work here," just the 
same as saying, "You must be Republican or a Catholic to work 
here," To uphold such .a term of employment would be to say 
that a person can only properly perform the work if he sup-
ports the union, which is inane • • . 
Consistent with the majority ruling, the Michigan Labor Mediation 
49 
Board in a matter of fact finding between the Board of Education of the 
Schools in the City of Insker and Insker Federation of Teachers33 
recommended that a "Professional Responsibility Clause" be incorporated 
into a new negotiations agreement. The clause provided that any member 
of the bargaining unit who has not joined the union within 30 days after 
his employment or the execution of the agreement shall: 
• , o pay to the union a sum equal to the union dues and 
assessments established by the union for each school year and 
shall execute an authorization permitting the deductions of 
such sums. 
Obviously, the "Professional Responsibility Clause" was no more or 
less than a typical agency shop clause even though no specific mention 
was made as to the possible discharge of a staff member in case of 
refusal to make payment. While these two Michigan Labor Mediation Board 
rulings were subject to appeal and additional interpretation, neither of 
the cases were reported in the courts, 
33Board of Education of the Schools of the City of Insker ~· Insker 
Federation of Teachers Local 1068, American Federation of Teachers, 
AFL-CIO, MiChigan Labor MediatiOil Board (September 23, 1968), reported 
in 263 GERR, F-1. See, e.g., Swartz Creek Board of Education v, Swartz 
Creek Teachers Association, Michigan Labor Mediatio"n Board (September 9, 
1968) reported in Negotiation Research Digest, March, 1969. 
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In addition to the foregoing M.L.R.B. rulings, a limited number of 
court cases were located that considered the legality of agency shop 
clauses. Smigel et al. y. Southgate Community School District et alo 
and Southgate Education Association34 was the leading case reported. that 
provided extensive judicial consideration relevant to the legal ques-
tions involved. The plaintiffs, teachers in the Southgate School Dis-
trict, brought a complaint with order to show cause why the defendants 
should not be restrained from enforcing the provisions of contract 
entered into by the parties in September, 1968. Of special concern to 
the plaintiffs was.Article II of the agreement which read: 
All teachers as a condition of continued employment shall 
either: 
1. Sign and deliver to the Board an assignment authorizing 
deduction of membership dues and assessments of the 
Association (including the National and Michigan Education 
Associations) and such authorization shall continue in 
effect from year to year unless revoked in writing between 
June 1 and September 1 of a given year. Such sums shall 
be deducted during the eight (8) consecutive pay periods 
commencing the 1st day of October from the salary of all 
teachers authorizing deductions and remitted within thirty 
(30) days to the Association. Teachers joining the 
Association at the beginning of the second semester and 
signing and delivering to the Board an assignment author-
izing deduction of said membership dues, may have dues for 
that semester deducted from the six (6) consecutive pay 
periods commencing the 1st day of February, or 
34smigel et al. y. Southgate Community School District et aL and 
Southgate Education Association, 180 N.W. (2d) 215 (Michigan, 1968)0 
Additional cases which have considered the legal issues involved in 
agency shop clauses: Warczak y. Board of Education, Michigan Circuit 
Court, Wayne County, 73 LRRM 2237, (Michigan, 1970), agency shop clause 
did not violate constitutional guarantees of freedom of association and 
due process; City of Grand Rapids y. Local 1061 AFSCME, Michigan Circuit 
Court, Kent County, 72 LRRM 2257 (Michigan, 1969), court upheld a modi-
fication of the typical agency shop clause in that non-members had to 
contribute to scholarship fund; ~ et al. y. City of Detroit, 71 LRRM 
2363 (Michigan, 1969), agency shop clause in collective bargaining 
agreement was a proper subject for bargaining and within legal 
boundaries set forth. 
2. Sig~ and deliv~r to the Board an assignment authorizing 
deduction of a representation fee equivalent to the dues 
and assessments of the Association (including the National 
and Michigan Education Associations). Such sums shall be 
deducted during the eight (8) consecutive pay· periods com-. 
mencing with 1st day of October from the salary of all 
teachers authorizing deductions and remitted within thirty 
(30) days to the Association. Teachers beginning their 
employment at the beginning of the second semester and 
signing and delivering to the Board an assignment author-
izing deduction of said representation fees may have fees 
for that semester deducted from the six (6) consecutive 
pay periods connnencing the 1st day of February. 
Any teacher who wishes to pay cash for this fee must pay 
the full amount to the Treasurer of the S.E.A. within 
thirty (30) days of the commencement of employment. 
In the event the representation fee shall not be paid, the. 
Board upon receiving a signed statement from the Associa-
tion indicating the teacher has failed to comply with this 
condition, shall immediately notify said teacher that his 
services shall be discontinued at the end of the current 
semester. The Board shall follow the dismissal procedure 
of the Michigan Tenure Act. The refusal of said teacher 
to contribute fairly to the costs.of negotiation and 
administration of this and subsequent .agreements is rec~ 
ognized as just and reasonable cause for termination of 
employment. However, if at the end of the semester, the 
teacher, or teachers, receiving the termination notice 
shall then· be engaged in pursuing any legal remedies con~ 
t.esting the discharge under this provision before the 
.Michigan Tenure Connnission, or a court of competent 
. jurisdiction, such teacher's service shall not be termi-
nated until such time as such teacher or teachers have 
either obtained a final decision as to the validity or 
legality of such charge, or such teacher or teachers have. 
ceased to pursue the legal.remedies available to them by 
not making a timely appeal of any decision rendered in 
said manner by the Tenure Connnission, or a court of 
competent jurisdiction. 
The Circuit Court for the County of Wayne, Michigan, ruled that the 
agency shop provision did not violate statutory law in that it forces 
one to join a union and furthermore the claim pertaining to discrimin-
ation was without merit. The court summarized its ruling in these 
terms: 
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, , • such provision in an agreement serves the purpose of 
allocating indiscriminately the cost of representation for 
collective bargaining among all those participating in the 
benefits received. Such a provision eliminates the free 
riders. 
As to a "reasonable and just cause" necessary for discharge due to 
tenure laws, it was reasoned by the court that any action which would 
disturb the" ••• delicately balanced relationships between the bar-
gaining parties" could result in less. stability and harmony .within the 
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school system and therefore constituted reasonable grounds for dismissal 
under the Tenure Act. 
The plaintiffs appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals which con-
sidered the case on May 28, 1970. After careful consideration of the 
facts, the Court.of Appeals reversed and remanded to the trial court for 
additional evidence concerning the relationship between" ••• payment 
of sum equal to amount of union dues and non-member participation share 
of cost of negotiating .• and administering the agreement." Although the 
Court of Appeals reversed the. lower court's findings, the agency shop 
clause.concept was not.disputed nor rejected, The reversal was forth-
coming due to possible.discrimination as a result of fee assessment and 
thus it was decided additional information should be forthcoming. 
To the same effectwas.a New Hampshire Supreme Court ruling that 
union security clauses may be included in public employment labor agree-
ments. and " , that union security is a reasonable requirement for the 
efficient and orderly administration. 11 35 This decision offered little 
in analysis of the issues; however, it does provide additional 
35Tremblay et al. v. Ber].in Police Union et al., 237 A (2d). 668 
(New Hampshire, 1968). 
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substantiation for the implementation of agency clauses in a different 
geegraphic region. 
Many legislators may well decide and the courts accept in the years 
ahead that it could be in the-best interest of the various government 
entities to adopt agency clauses in order to encourage responsibility 
and stability in: labor relations. 36 Although the judicial decisions 
located were limited in number and confined to a narrow geographic area, 
it seems certain that union security agreements similar to the agency 
clause will be forthcoming in large numbers in the iillI!1ediate future. 
The legality of all the relevant aspects of an agency clause has yet to 
meet the test of court interpretation. Certainly, one cannot ascertain 
with any degree of clarity what may result in future court rulings. In 
fact, to do so would provide the basis for unwarranted assumptions in 
the field of law. 
Right to Dues Checkoff 
One important aspect of organization security is the checkoff or 
payroll deduction-of organization dues.37 Usually considered as a 
contractual provision whereby the employer withholds dues from an 
employee's pay to be submitted at a later date to a designated organiza-
tion or union, checkoff procedures have posed certain legal and practi-
cal problems.38 Though some of these legal problems were discussed 
36wildman, op. cit., p. 13. 
37Myron Lieberman and Michael H. Moskow, Collective' Negotiations 
for Teachers (Chicago~ 1966), p. 99. 
38Myron Lieberman, Education as a Profession (Englewood Cliffs, 
1956), p. 368. 
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previously in relationship to.uni.on security issues, other litigation 
has been forthcoming relevant to dues checkoff. 
In 1962, a school board resolution which permitted dues checkoff 
for one labor organization but not for a similar organization was chal-
lenged by the minority union.39 Specifically, the board resolution 
stated: 
Monthly payroll deductions for dues to employee associa-
tions will not be considered unless a minimum of 50% of the 
employees eligible for membership in the specific organization 
applying for this privilege so indicate by a signed order that 
they desire such a service. 
A petition for writ of mandate to compel the school district to deduct 
authorized amounts was filed by the appellants claiming that the resolu-
tion was arbitrary and discriminatory. The school district contended 
the resolution was reasonable as the burden on the accounting and 
clerical staff without such a provision", could thereby be 
increased without forseeable limitation," 
Though other considerationswere discussed pertaining to·the nature 
of the organizations involved, the central question the court had to 
consider was whether a school. district, once it had exercised its dis-
cretion in granting dues checkoff to one organization, could refuse to 
grant the same privilege.to a similar type of organization. The court 
ruled in behalf of the appellants, indicating that the resolution was 
". · •• unreasonable and arbitrary and not founded on reasonable and 
substantial basis," 
39Ranken et. al. :!..• Comptom City School District et aL, 24 Cal 
Rptr. 34 7 (California, 1962), 
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In 1963, one year after the Rankin case, a similar question arose 
in McLaughlin et al. -:!...· Niagara Falls Board of Education et al. 40 The 
petitioners sought to have their dues in the Niagara Falls Federation 
of Teachers deducted from their wages by the Board of Education as state 
law had "authorized." Although the board of education permitted payroll 
deductions for hospitalization, life insurance and various community 
funds, it was decided by the board not to honor the teachers' request, 
It was contended by the board that the word "authorized" as used in 
the state law was permissive and connoted discretion on the pqrt of the 
board, whereas the teachers contended it was mandatory. The court, how-
ever, ruled that the word "authorized" was discretionary in connotation 
and thus the board was not required to make the requested deduction or 
any deductions. Said action, according to the court, would be within 
the realm of discretionary power possessed by the board of education, 
In the.State of Wisconsin, a school board involved in an exclusive 
representation dispute sought clarification of rights and privileges of 
the majority· and minority or organizations before the Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Conunission (W.E.R.C,), 41 Specifically, the school board 
asked for a ruling on: (1) can a minority union representative be 
denied the right to be heard at a public board of education meeting, (2) 
can exclusive checkoff privileges be granted to the majority union and 
(3) can exclusive access to a list of newly employed teachers be granted 
to the majority union. The W.E.R.C, ruled the latter two were 
40McLaughlin et al. -:!..,o Niagara Falls Board of Education ~ al., 237 
N,Y,S, (2d) 761 (New York, 1963). 
41Board of School Directors of the City of Milwaukee ~q Wisconsin 
Employment Relations Conunission, 168 N,W. (2d) 92 (Wisconsin, 1969), 
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permissible but a board of education could not deny the minority 
representative the right to be heard at a public meeting. The board 
immediately appealed the decision due to the possible consequences that 
might come forth. The Circuit Court reversed the W.E.R.C. ruling on all 
points and the W.E.R.C. appealed to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. 
The Supreme Court, however, upheld the lower court ruling stating 
in.part: 
Those rights or benefits which are granted exclusively to 
the majority representative, and thus denied to minority 
organizations, must in some rational manner be related to the. 
functions of the majority organization in its representative 
capacity, and must not be granted to entrench such organiza-
tion as the bargaining representative. 
On this basis, the Supreme Court contended that the "sole and complete 
purpose of exclusive checkoff is self-perpetuation and entrenchment" 
and exclusive access to a list of new teachers by the majority union 
was not " ••• rationally related to majority representative status." 
Furthermore, the minority union had no right to negotiate with the 
employer which could in fact exist if the minority representative were 
allowed.to present proposals at a public meeting. 
Despite the precedence established in the W.E.R.C, case just 
discussed, tqe United States District Court in June of 1970 upheld the 
right of a school district to deny "internal channels of communications 
and checkoff dues to theminority unions. 1142 The court contended that 
the exclusive grant of privileges of the majority union would serve as a 
policy of insuring labor peace in public· schools and permit the majority 
union to function better as a representative of all teachers. It was 
42Ame.rican Federation of Teachers, Local 858 Vo School District No. 
_!, 314 F. Supp. 1069 (Colorado, 1970). - -
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further contended that such action by a board of education did not 
impair the minority union's right to organize teachers who were not mem-
hers of the majority union and thus was not in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. 
Although other cases 43 were located which may be considered germane 
to the legal issues involved, none of these cases could be cited as 
controlling. It appears the precedence established in the United States 
District Court's ruling in the American Federation of Teachers case must 
be cited as controlling until such time as a higher court.has the oppor-
tunity to overrule this particular case or until other litigation comes. 
forth contrasting the court's conclusions; the precedence established 
should stand. 
Right of Representation 
Beyond the right to organize, maintain membership in various 
organizations and participate in union activities, the legal rights 
43Additional cases which have considered the legal issues involved 
in dues checkoff provisions: Dade Countx Classroom Teachers Association 
Inca y, Ryan, 225 So. (2d) 903 (Florida, 1969), it was ruled that the 
same privileges must be made available to all teachers or their collec-
tive bargaining agents and the board could at its discretion cancel 
privileges, Thus, exclusive privileges could not be granted to the 
majority union; California State Employees Association v. Regents of the 
University of California, 73 Cal. Rptr, 449 (California, 1968), the 
court ruled that employees of the University of California were not 
"state employees" within the statute empowering state employees direct 
dedu~tions for the purpose of union dues. The Regents may permit deduc-
tions at their discretion; Mugford et al. v, Mayor and City Council of 
Baltimore et aL, 44 A (2d) 745 (Maryland, 1946), court declared the 
city may not lawfully make payroll deductions for the purpose of paying 
union dues at the union's request. Said deductions would be lawful if 
the employees make the necessary request; Hagerman y. City of Dayton et 
aL, 71 N.Eo (2d) 246 (Ohio, 1947), a municipality may not lawfully 
adopt an ordinance granting the right of payroll deductions for the 
purpose of paying uni.on dues, 
pertaining to collective negotiations" ••. enter a thicket of some 
density, 1144 This appears to be especially true in the area of rights 
relevant .to representation though recently the large influx of statu-
• torial enactments has greatly enhanced the clarity of representation 
rights. Nevertheless, a plethora of legal questions remain to be con-
sidered in states where statutes have·not been enacted. 
For example, one very important issue which must be considered in 
this context pertains to the legality of a school board's granting 
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exclusive representation status to an employee organization in which all 
employees were not included. Wildman45 asserts that a public employer 
ma¥ not grant exclusive representation without specific statutorial 
authorization since: 
" a , such grant would interfere with the employee citizen's 
right to petition his government and might constitute a dis-
criminatory conferral of privileges to one organization not 
tendered to others. 
Seitz, 46 in an early publication, submits that in absence of a statute 
authoriz:ing exclusive representation the organization if recognized by 
the board of education may only negotiate in behalf of its members, It 
would appear that some mechanism must be implemented to allow for 
redress of grievances on an individual basis in order to avoid 
discrimination, 
While the courts have not been asked to consider a large number of 
cases concerning representation rights, they have been reasonably 
44Mo Chester Nolte, Guide to School Law (West Nyack, 1969), po 240 
45wildman, op. cit,, Po 14, 
46Reynolds Co Seitz, "Rights of Public School Teachers to Engage in 
Collective Bargaining and Other Concerted Activities," 1963 Yearbook of 
School Law (Danville, 1963), p, 2130 
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consistent in their- findings. In· Norwalk Teachers Associal~ion v. Board 
of Education of City of Norwalk47 the court in responding to a question 
pertaining to the recognition of the plaintiff for the purpose of 
collective bargaining stated: 
The statutes and private acts give broad powers to the 
defendant·with referenee·to educational matters and school 
management in Norwalk~ If it chooses to negotiate with the 
plaintiff with regard· to the employment, salaries, grievance 
procequre and working conditions of its members, there is no 
statute, public or private, which forbids such negotiations. 
It is a matter of conunon knowledge that this is the method 
pursued in most school systems large enough to support a 
teacher's association in some form. It would seem to make 
no difference theoretically whether the negotiations are 
with a committee of the whole association or with individuals 
or small related groups, so long as any agreement made with 
the committee is confined to members of the association. 
Thus, a school board "if it chooses" may recognize and negotiate with a 
particular organization, although only the organizatin's members may be 
representeq. Furthermore, legislation was not necessary for the board 
of educationtorecognize an exclusive representative. 
Similarly in 1966, the Appellate Court of Illinois in Chicago 
Division of Illinois· Education Association v. Board of Education48 ruled 
that a. board of education did not require legislative authority to enter 
into a collective agreement with a sole collective bargaining agency. 
Although similar to the Norwalk ruling, the court's finding implied that 
the board at its discretion could negotiate with an exclusive represent-
ative and, upon conclusion of the negotiations' the decision reached 
" ••• shall apply equally to all teachers and other educational 
47No:rwalk Teachers Association v. Board of Education of City of 
Norwalk, -83A (2d) 482 (Connecticut, l951). 
48chicago Division of the Illinois Education Association y. Board 
of Education of the City of Chicago, 222 N.E. (2d) 243 (Illinois, 1966). 
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personnel employed by the board." Furthermore, it was submitted that 
the board of education was the best judge of the procedure to be uti-
lized and as long.as suchmeans were not "manifestly unreasonable" the 
matter was within the board's discretion, No mention was made of any 
provisions for individual petition although such a provision may have 
existedo NeV'ertheless, it seems reasonable to conclude that the court 
was of the opinion·the board could at its discretion recognize an 
exclusive representative that would in fact represent the interest of 
alL 
Whether the court intended to grant the board such broad discre-
tionary power that individual teachers could be denied the right to 
petition was not clear, However, in light of recent decisions pertain-
ing to constitutional rights of teachers the board's action without 
specific legislation would appear to be ultra vires. 
As judicial decisions were not located that provided the majority 
of teachers in a school system the "right" to exclusive representation 
in states without statutorial provisions, one may ascertain that no such 
"right" existso49 However, based on a limited number of judicial 
49Additional cases which have considered the legal questions 
involved in re.presentation issues: In ~ Investigation of Richfield 
Federation of Teachers, 115 N,W. (2d) 682 (Minnesota, 1962), the court 
ruled that the State Labor Conciliator was without jurisdiction to pro-
ceed with election to select representatives among teachers as he could 
intervene only in private industry; New Haven Federation of Teachers Vo 
New Haven Board of Education, 237 A.-c2d) 373 (Connecticut"'; 1967), the 
court ruled the passage of a statute pertaining to selection of repre-
sentative did not nullify board of education's recognition of group.as 
exclusi.ve representative, although the election was held before the 
effective date of statute; American Federation of Teachers of Buffalo Vo 
Board of Education of Cit~ of Buffalo, 287 N.YoS:- (2d) 756 (New York, -
1967), the court upheld a representation election which was held a few 
days prior to the effective date of a statutory enactmenL Furthermore, 
the court was of the opinion that there was nothing in the law of the 
state prior to the statutory enactment to prevent a public employer 
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decisions and.attorney general opinions, boards of educations may 
recognize an exclusive bargaining agent without statutorial affirmation, 
but not to the exclusion of those not represented in the organization 
recognized. 
While one may.concede that some precedence has been established to 
remove the "thicket of density" surrounding representation rights, .a 
clear and concise doctrine applicable to all states without statutorial 
provisions has not emerged. As Lieberman.and Moskow50 expressed: 
the probl~ms of recognition in education are as impor-
tant as they are or were outside of ,public education ••• 
Indeed, if there.is one conclusion that can.be dr~wn from the 
current status of recognition in education, it is that recog..,. 
nition has been, is and will continue to be a major problem 
for many years to come. 
Right to Negotiate and.Enter into Contract 
The right to negotiate and enter into contract, whether considered 
in the context of "meet and con:l;er" or the more formal bilateral deter-
mination of condi~ions, has understandably met with resistance. Many 
government entities, including boards of education, have argued that 
without specific legislation they are not legally bound to enter into 
from voluntarily recognizing a representative organ:{.zation. . Cases in 
public employment which support the non-existence of· the "right to. 
· represexitation:': Nutter et al. .Y.· ·City of .Santa Monica et al., 168 P. 
(2d) 741 (California, 1946), it was decla~ed t~at a public body may.not 
lawfully be compelled to recognize a labor union; Miami Water Works. 
Local No~ 654 .Y.~ City of ,Miami, 26 So. (2d) 194 (Florida-, 1946), it was 
ruled by the Supreme· Court.of the State of Florida that the .City of 
Miami cannot lawfully be compelled to recognize a labor u~ion; Lipsett 
~ala .Y.· Gillette et al., 187 N.E. (2d) 782 (New York, 1962), govern~ 
men~ entity could.recognize exclusive representative, however, selection 
of bargaining unit must be fair and reasonable. 
50Myron Lieberman and Michael H. Moskow, Collective Negotiations 
for Teachers (Chicago, 1966), p. 99, 
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any type of formal or collective arrangement with their employees.51 
Furthermore~ any written agreement resulting from negotiations must be 
considered as an extra...,legal document which is not binding on either 
party.52 Legal basis for these arguments may be found entrenched in the 
principle of illegal delegation of authority. 
Although this principle was derived· from the ancient concept of 
"sovereignty," whereby.the king can do no wrqng, it has been a potent 
force in. forestalling negotiations in the public sector. Boards of 
education have consistently used this common.law principle of illegal 
delegation of authority· to avoid confrontation with their employeeso 
While conceding· the fact· that the doctrine has been gradually relaxed in 
recent.years and no doubt will diminish as an effective block to col-
lective negotiations,53 the diminishing aspects of the doctrine have not 
been recognized by the courts in a consistent.manner. 
The public school teachers in their efforts to obtain·. their rights 
to negotiate and sign a written agreement in absence of a legislative 
mandate, have claimed t1'at said rights are secured" ••• by the freedom. 
of assembly and association and by the cognate right.of petitioning 
their government;:· for a redress of grievances~ 1154 Petitioning the gov-
ernment for a reqress· of grievances; however, can hardly be construed as 
a legal basis for bilateral determination of working conditions, yet.one 
51Robert E. Doherty, "The Law and Collective Bargaining for 
Teachers," Teachers College Record, LXVIII (October, 1966), p. 2o 
52rbid. 
53wildman, op. cit., p. 15. 
54Robert E. Doherty and Walter E. Oberer, Teachers, School Boards 
and Collective Bargaining: A Changing of the Guard (New York, 1967), 
p. 51. . 
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might ascertain that a "meet and confer" arrangement would be within the 
legal boundaries normally recoguized. Certainly, in the absence of 
state legislation which specifically authorizes a school board to nego-
tiate and enter into a written agreement:, the judicial view is not 
clear, 55 
Part of the difficulty in ascertaining the courts' view in a manner 
conducive to elarity arises as a result of the courts' interpretation of 
whether theright to negotiate and enter into a contract promotes or 
substantiates the right to strike. Kleinmann, Stinnett, and Ware56 
state: 
This issue, the-right of public employees to strike, 
should not be so closely connected to the right to negotiate. 
But since it has been in private employment, there is a tend-
ency to assume that any public employment group seeking nego-
tiation rights is also seeking the right to strike. Of 
course, this is not necessarily so. 
Another author supports· this same position by stating: 
A large body of law, both statutory and judicial, has 
given the term collective bargaining a legal meaning which 
inescapably ties the strike into the process. No matter how 
much sheep's clothing we wrap around the wolf, the fangs are 
still present under the masquerade.57 
Although the issues to the writer appear to be distinct and mutually 
exclusive, the courts in their judicial rulings have not always consid-
ered them as such, Subsequently, in the ensuing judicial analysis the 
interrelationship of the right to negotiate and the right to strike as 
perceived by the courts must be considered. 
55Kleinmann, op. cit., p. 38. 
56rbid. 
57Arthur F. Corey, "Strikes or Sanctions," National. Education 
Journal, LI (October, 1962), p, 13. 
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Almost all the court cases located involved some issue other than 
the right to negotiate and sign an agreement. One of the first cases 
that provided substantial judicial consideration for the right to nego-
tiate without legislative mandate was the heretofore mentioned Norwalk58 
case in 1951. As already noted, the plaintiffs requested a declaratory 
judgment in respect to ten specific questions. One such question, "Is 
colle.c.tive:ba,rgaining to" establish salaries and working conditions 
permissable between the plaintiff and the defendant?" received a qual-
ified "yes" from the court. The qualification of the "yes" response was 
based on the premise that the court's response would not be construed as 
authority to negotiate a contract which involved the surrender of board 
authority or ultra vires. However, it is important to note that the 
court in its judicial considerations did not imply that the board of 
education had to negotiate, only that it was permissible. The authority 
to negotiate according to the court "is and remains in the board." No 
mention was made of the plaintiff's rights in the absence of a stat-
utorial enactment, thus one could conclude, on the basis of this case, 
that the right to negotiate was at the board's discretion. 
The case of Chicago Division of Illinois Education Association v. 
Board of Education,59 although previously mentioned in regard to 
representation rights, provides additional substantiation for boards of 
education to enter into a collective bargaining agreement without legis-
lative authority. The court ruled that the board could enter into a 
58Norwalk Teachers Association ~· Board of Education of City of 
Norwalk, 83 A. (2d) 842 (Connecticut, 1951). 
59chicago Division of the Illinois Education Association v. Board 
of Educatio~ of City of Chicago, 222 N.E. (2d) 243. 
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collective bargaining agreement and furthermore such an agreement"~ •• 
is not against public policy." In no way did the court imply that the 
board of education had to enter into an agreement only that it could 
without authorization from the legislature. Such action was not con-
strued as an illegal delegation of authority on the part of the board of 
education. 
However, in- School Committee. _£f City of Pawtucket ~· Pawtucket 
Teachers Alliance Local No • ..21Q.,60 the court reached a different con-
clusion. The governing school committee maintained that the "right" to 
bargain collectively must be established by statute and since no law was 
in existence, they were within their legal rights to ignore requests 
from the teachers organization to bargain.. Although this seemed to be a 
reasonable position on the part of the committee, the Pawtucket Teachers 
Alliance sought.judicial relief from the school committee's position. 
Judge Weisberger of the Rhode Island Superior Court ruled that the 
teachers union was entitled to. judicial relief against the school com-
mittee if the committee did not bargain in good faith. He sta.ted .in 
part: 
. in respect to the rights of a public employee to bargain 
and negotiate with the State.or agency of the State which is 
his employer, we-have very little positive guidance. We have 
no statute on the question. We have no ancient principles of 
law, exc~pt those which would be adverse to that right, and 
of those there are many. But as the Court views the statutory 
pronouncements which h~ve taken place in the last thirty 
years, the Court is of the opinion that these statutory pro-
nouncements of policy by our legislature or legislatures can-
not be compartmented into a neat package and said to have no 
effect in an area in which these statutes do not by their 
very terms apply. It seems to the Court that by these 
60school Committee of City of .Pawtucket v •. Pawtucket Teachers 
Alliance Local No. 930, American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, et 
aL , 60 LRRM 2314. -- -
generalstatementsofprinciple,·by these general enunciations 
of policy, designed ••• to preserve industrial peace, to 
promote harmony between employer and employee; in this enunci..,. 
ation after enunciation of policy in this respect, that these 
principles are' perhaps more broadly applicable than in the 
narrow context in which the act applied, consistent with 
other over~riding public policy which may have presented the 
legislature from making certain acts applicable to certain 
situations. It seems to the Court that, without question, the 
Rhode Island Labor Relations Act does not apply to public 
employees;. that certain of the benefits conferred by the Rhode 
Island Labor Relations.Act cannot and should not be applied to 
public employees unless and until the legislature sees fit in 
its wisdom to make either all or a portion so applicable. 
However, the enunciation of principle is not made in a con..,. 
trolled vacuum, Those things wh:Lch the legislature states to 
be desirable ends, those statements of intent and purpose .do 
form the public policy of the state and, to the extent con-
sistent with other policy of which the Court is quite aware, 
those principles should be made applicable. 
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This ruling, although not widely acclaimed, did strike at several basic 
assumptions made·by governing boards and may have been the necessary 
impetus for the enactment of a statute pertaining to public employee 
rights a short time later in the State of Rhode Island. In effect, 
Judge Weisberger's ruling forced a governing board to negotiate in good 
faith without statutorial consent. The implications seem clear as they 
pertain.to thiscase, yet other courts and legal authorities have not 
reGognized the precedence established and the implications that were 
forthcoming as a result of his ruling. Thus, even though a significant 
departure from previous rulings, the case was of little significance in 
subsequent rulings. 
A similar line of cases was located that established precedence 
whereby, in abs·ence of a statute, public school teachers have no author-
ity to engage in collective negotiations.61 Basic reasons submitted by 
6lsee·e.g., Levasseur v. Wheeldon, 112 N.W. (2d) 898 (South Dakota, 
1962), it was ruled that in-absence of statute pertaining to public 
employment, there is no.right to engage in collective bargaining; 
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the court were: (1) no basis in· the common law, (2) possible illegal 
delegation of authority, and (3) lack of any abridgement of rights. 
Furthermore, a significant number of cases pertaining to the public 
employees exclusive of teachers were located that provided precedence 
for st,tbsequent rulings in the. public school. 62 
The emergence of a legal doctrine that can be readily grasped and 
applied was not forthcoming as to the right to bargain. Undoubtedly, 
boards of education have the power and authority to set educational and 
personnel policies, 63 Within this-power, the board can establish 
Philadelphia· Teachers Association y. Labrum, 203 A. (2d) 34 
(Pennsylvania, 1964), no authority exists for public employees and 
employers to negotiate in absence of specific statute. 
62cases in the public sector that substantiate the right to nego~ 
tiate in absence of an applicable statute: Lipsett v, Gillette, 187 
N.W. (2d) 782 (New York, 1962); Local 266, International Brot;:herhood.of 
Electrical Workers, AFL y. ~River Project Agricultural Improvement 
and Power District, 275 P~ (2d) 393 (Arizona, 1954); International 
Brotherhood· of Electrical Workers, Local Union Number 611, AFL-CIO v. 
Town. of Farmfugton, 405 P. (2d) 233 (New Mexico, 1965)-.-Cases in the 
public sector that substantiate the illegality of the right.to negotiate 
in absence of an applicable statute: Dade.County v. Amalgamated Assoc-
iation of Street Electric Railway.and.Motor Coach Employees of America, 
157 So. (2d).176 (Florida, 1963); Fellows v. LaTronica 377 P. (2d) 547 
(Colorado, 1962); International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO .Y.· 
Georgia Ports Authority, 124 S.E. (2d) 733 (Georgia, 1962); City of 
Springfield .Y.· Clouse et al., 206 S. W •. (2d) 539 (Missouri, 194 7); Inter-
national Union of Operatins Engineers, Local Union Number 321 AFL-CIO 
v. Water Works Board of the City 2.f Birmingham, 163 So. (2d) 619 
(Alabama, 1964); Nutter et al. y. City of Santa Monica et al., 168 P, 
(2d) 741 (California, 1946); State v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen 
et.al., 232 P. (2d) 857 (California-:- 1961; Mugford et al. y. Mayor and 
City Council of Baltimore~ al,, 44 A. (2d) 745 (Maryland, 1946; 
Belware River and Bay Authority .Y.· international Organization of Mas-
ters, Mates, and Pilots, 211 A. (2d) 789 (New Jersey, 1965); Interna-
tional BrotherllOod of Electrical Workers Local Union 976 v. Grand River 
~Authority, 292 P:- (2d) 1018 (Oklahoma, 1956); Weakley-County Munic-
ipal Electrical System v. Vick, 309 S.W. (2d) 792 (Tennessee, 1957). 
63Reynolds C. Seitz, "Rights of Public _School Teachers to Engage in 
Collective Bargaining and Other Concerted Activities," 1963 Yearbook of 
School Law (Danville, 1963), p. 214. -
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procedures or the mechanics that would enhance educational and personnel 
policies which might· include provision for input on the part of the 
employees. This could be construed to be collective bargaining. None-
theless, in the absence of legislation, it seems unlikely that the court 
would force a board of education to negotiate although at least one cas~ 
was located whereby the court's decision was in contrast to this state-
ment, As long as the board's involvement is one of voluntary participa-
tion and remains at the board's discretion, collective negotiation 
agreements appear to be legal. Little evidence was located to support 
the "right" of teachers to negotiate without specific legislation 
granting such right. 
Right to Strike 
Unlike the rights of teachers in areas previously discussed, the 
universal judicial view without exception maintains that teachers do not 
have the right to strike.64 Thus, teachers have refrained from using 
the term "strike" to describe their work stoppages, preferring instead 
to stress the protest nature of their action and attempt to avoid the 
general legal prohibition against such action,65 Use of such terms as 
sanctions, professional protest, and sick leave protest have been pre-
ferred but in effect may be construed as a form of work stoppage.66 
Beyond the matter of terminology, the courts have consistently perceived 
64Edmond Reutter, Jr. and Robert R. Hamilton, The Law of Public 
Education (New York, 1970), p. 412. 
65Ronald W, Glass, "Work Stoppages and Teachers: History and 
Prospect," Monthly Labor Review, XC (August, 1967), p. 43, 
66rbid. 
any group action- that negatively affects the orderly operation of the 
educational program as a strike. 
In the private sector, where· the bargaining· process must be con-
sidered essentially-a pawer relati'onship and a process of power accom-
modation,67 the strike is not only legal but considered the power 
concomitant 0f the relationship.68 Thus, the real nub of the teacher 
collective negotiations problem is that no mechanism has come forth 
within the legal bounds presently set forth which will permit the 
resolution of impasse situations.69 
69 
Although teacher strikes have occurred in significant number, very 
few of these conflicts have reached the courts. As stated in the 
American Law Reports (2d):70 
Although there have been many strikes by public employ-
ees, very few of them have reached the courts, or at least 
very few have been reported. Usually, temporary restraining 
orders are granted by the courts, the strikers' demands are 
met and the strike settled. However, in every case that has 
been reported, the right of public employees to strike is 
emphatically denied. 
In view of t~e fact that 1egislatures71 and the judicial system have 
consistently opposed strikes in the public sector, a discussion of some 
67wildman, op. cit., p. 4. 
68Kleinmann, op. cit., p. 320 
69Robert Eo Doherty .and Walter E. Oberer, Teachers, School Boards 
and Callee ti ve Bargaining: A Changing of the Guard (New York, 196 7) , 
p. 96. 
70Robert T. Kimbrough (ed.), American Law Reports Annotated Second 
Series, XXXI (Rochester, 1963), p. 1159, 
7lsee_e.g,, Statutory response in Chapter IV of this document. The 
States of Hawaii, Pennsylvania, and Vermont enacted legislation in 1970 
that permits strikes by public employees under certain conditions~ 
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of the basic reasons for denying public employees the right to strike 
·seems pertinent :to the litigation that will be discussed on the ensuing 
pages. Public officials have long taken positions that there is no 
right to strike.. Perhaps the most profound statement in this regard. was 
President Roosevelt's72 connnents ina letter to the National Federation 
of.FederalEmployees which asserted: 
All gevernment employees' should realize that the process 
of c0llective bargaining,· as usually understood, cannot be 
transplanted into public service • . • Administrative offi-
cials and employees are governed and guided, and in many 
instances restricted, by laws which establish policies, pro-
cedures, or rules in personal matters. 
Particularly, I want to emphasizemy conviction that 
militant tactics·have nE> place in the functions·of any organ-
ization of government employees. Upon employees in the 
Federal service rests the obligation to serve the whole 
people, whose int~rests and welfare require orderliness .and 
continuity in the conduct of government activities. This 
obligation is paramount~ Since their own services have to do 
with the functioning of the government, a strike of public 
employees manifests nothing less than an intent on their part 
to prevent or obstruct the operations of government until 
their demands are satisfied. Such action, looking toward the 
paralysis of government by those who have sworn to support it 
is unthinkable and intolerable. 
Lieberman73 wrote that the major reasons for legal limi;tations were: 
L The services pnivided by government are essential. These 
services.must not be. disrupted under any circumstances. 
2. The government represents all the people. Public employ-
ees who strike are really rebelling against the will of 
the people, as expressed in legislation and in the actions 
of public administrators. 
3. A strike is a challenge to public authority and as such 
cannot be tolerated if anarchy is to be avoided. 
72Letter, Fr.esident Franklin D. Roosevelt to Luther C. Steward, 
presid.ent ef the National Federation of Federal Empleyees, August 16, 
1937, cited by Charles S. Rhyne, Labor Unions and Municipal Employee 
Law (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Municipal Law Officers, 
1946), pp. 436-437. . 
73Myron Lieberman, "Teacher Strikes: An Analysis of the Issues," 
Harvard Educational Review, XXVI (Winter, 1956),·p. 55. 
4. The government cannot· afford te lose a strike. The 
authority and prestige of government would disappear if 
greups of.public employees should win.strikes against the 
government. 
5. Strike.s'by· gove.rnment .empleyees are unnecessary. 
6. Strikes by gevernment·employees are ineffectual and tend 
to worsendnstead of improve the positio,n -of. the strikers. 
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These reasans, if valid, certainly provide a sound basis for the c.ontin.,. 
ued non"'"legal status of the strike in the public sector. However, many 
0f these who favor the legali~ation of the strike feel that ··a distinc-
tiansb,ould be·made·between those public emplc;>yees who perform essential 
·services· and those who perform non"'"essential services. 74 They argue 
that no justifiable·reasons exist as towhy employees in the public 
sector perferming· nan ... essential duties· should· not be.· afforded the same 
rights as thase'"in the·private·.sector.75 Whether· teachers perform 
essential or non-essential duties which if interrupted would bring ferth 
dire consequences is debatable; however, the courts have not been will-
ing to.concede· any such·dis~inguishing differences. 
The trad:i,.tional·view prohil?iting strikes by teachers is normally 
justified on the basis· of sovereignty of the ·state.76 Although this 
concept·hasheen:discussed at some length previously, additional com-
ments pertaining to the legality of.strikes seem justified. The courts 
have ·consistently ruled· that an illegal delegation of '.authority exists 
when aboard of education· has been coerced to take action on a non-
.. 
74JohnBloedorn; 11 The Strike and the Public Sector," Labor Law 
Journal;, Volume·XX (March;, 1969), p. 155~ 
75rbid. 
76Robert E. Doherty· and Walter E-. Obe+er, Teachers, Sche1;>l Boards 
and Collective Bargaining: A Changing of.the Guard (New York, 1967), 
p. 97 0 
72 
voluntary basis. ·Doherty, 77 in commenting on tbe··concept of sovereignty 
stated: 
It may be' contended· with,· considerable·· force that· the mere 
execution of a eallective·bargaining cont::ract by a school 
board, even~theugh the contract be for a fixed term, does not 
constitute an"unlawful delegation of the board's authority 
under law:, bot, on the contrary·, is merely one way for the 
board to exereis.e its authorit::y. • •• It is. quite another 
matter, however, to take the next step and declare that it 
also is lawful for teachers to coerce the school board by 
striking, te·enter thekind of contract the teachers desire. 
Here, the·.school board cannot be said to be exercising its 
discretion via the collective agreement, since.it is, to the 
e~tent of the coercion, not a free agent. 
Ramifications of this· can be· found in the precedence establishing case 
of Norwalk· Teachers Association y. Board of Education of City of 
N0rwalk.78 One ofcthe ten questions asked· by the plaintiff in this 
decla:i;-atory judgment-was' "May the plaintiff engage in concerted action 
such as a· strike, work stoppage, or collective refusal to enter upon 
duties?" .·Said the court: 
In the American system, sovereignty is inherent in the 
people. ·They can delegate it to a government which they 
create andoperate by law •. They can give to that government 
the power and authority to perform certain duties and furnish 
certainservices. The government so created and empowered 
must empley.people to carry on its task. Those people are 
agents of the government. They exercise some part of the 
sovereignty· entrusted to it. They occupy a status entirely 
different' from those who carry on a private enterprise. They 
serve·the·public welfare and not a private purpose. To say 
that they can· strike is the equivalent of saying that they 
can deny the authority of government and contravene the public. 
welfare. · The· answer to the question is ":tfo." 
Although the court did recognize the right'to negotiate,, it is evident 
by the above statement the court was unwilling to allow the public 
77rbid. 
78Norwalk Teachers Association v. Board of Education of City of 
Norwalk, 83 A. · (2d) 482· (Connecticut, 1951). 
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sector any kind of mechanism which could be utilized as a power 
commitment •. 
In 1957 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire was asked to rule on the 
correctness of a lower court decision whereby it had been decided that 
public school teachers did not have the right to strike against the city 
and, furthermore, that the strike was subject to injunction.79 The 
strike was conducted in a peaceful manner without picket lines, vio-
lence, damage or any disturbance; however, the primary reason for the 
strike was to obtain salary increases. The court, after extensive 
review of the arguments set forth by the parties involved and a review 
of the precedent heretofore established, drew the following conclusions: 
1. A strike by employees while under contract of employment for a 
stated term is illegal. 
2. The basis for public policy against strikes by public employees 
is doctrine that governmental functions ~ay not be impeded. 
3. Any change in the public policy that governmental functions may 
not be impeded by strikes of public employees is for the Legislature and 
not for the courts. 
4. Collective action of school teachers in refusing to work for 
city in order to obtain salary increases even though executed in a 
reasonable manner was illegal and properly enjoined. 
5. Such action by the court did not impose on any individual an 
obligation to work against his will. 
In addition to these conclusions, the court in its dicta indicated that 
the legislature could provide by statute the right of teachers to 
79city,of Manchester y. Manchester Teachers Guild et al., 131 A. 
(2d) 59 (New Hampshire, 1957). 
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enforce their eellective bargaining by arbitration or strike. 
Certainly,· this cannot be ccmstrued as an advocation of the right· to 
strike but it does· point out the court's concern for the peculiar status 
of the public employee. 
Consistent· with· these holdings on the· illegal status of the strike, 
the court in City ._tl Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Teachers Alliance80 ruled 
that teachers did net have the right tostrike•and that.the strike could 
be halted by· an injunction~ In this case,·the respondents, upon failure 
to negotiate a new ccmtract with the defendants, failed to report en 
masse a short time later. Plaintiffs claimed " ••• that if the strike . 
was not restrained substantial and irreparable injury would be sustained 
by the students enrolled in the public schools." It was further con"".' 
tended that th.e superintendent of schqols and the school committee would .. 
be unable to carry out their statutory duties if a court order was not 
issued· to enjoin the teachers from striking. 
1 Although·the respondents submitted extensive documentation, part of· 
which suggested· that the denial of teachers to strike was an infringe-
ment upon the·constitutionalrights·of teachers to·assemble, the court 
was of tqe·opinion·that tea".!he:i;-s did not have the right to strike, 
In· the.same vein is the•case of Pinellas County Classroom Teachers 
v. Boardof Public Instruction of Pinellas County.Bl The·teachers prior 
to the kieginningof the school term sent a written communication to the 
governing body that·until " . such things as salaries and general 
80city ·of Pawtucket et al. y. Pawtucket Teachers' Alliance Local 
930 et al., 141 A.· (2d) 624 (Rhode Island, 1958). 
BJ_ Pinellas County- Classroom. Teachers Association y. Board of Public 
Instruction of•Pinellas County, 214 So. (2d) 34 (Florida, 1968). 
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working ccmditions could be agreed and incorporated in their respective 
contracts" they would: not begin performance of their services. Con-
tracts had been: signe&by• the instructional staff prior t6 this written 
communication. 
The governingcboa.rd immediatelysoughtand obtained a temporary 
injunction to prohibit the strike.· Two weeks later the temporary 
injunction was made permanent and· the teachers appealed to the Supreme 
Court of Florida •.. The· Supreme Court reviewed the precedent established 
on strikes and.· e.qncluded that ", , . a strike against the government is 
one which· all authorities agree cannot be· tolerated in the absence of 
·expressed:. eensent ·by· the government," The court further contended that 
the "involuntary servitude'.'· claim by the plaintiffs was without. 
substance and precedence. · Said the court: 
We:arenot·here con:l;ronted·by an arbitrary mandate to 
compel performance of pen~onal service against the will of the 
employee. These people were simply told they had contracted 
with the government· and that they could, if they wished, ter-
minate the contract legally or illegally, and suffer the 
results thereof. They could not, however, strike against the 
government and: retain the benefits of their contract 
positions. 
Asimilar question·arose in the latersunnner of 1967.82 The 
teachers in:the·school district of .the City of Holland, Ottawa, and 
Allegan. Ceunties of Michigan did not resume their teachingduties on the 
day· set by the board of education.· Thus, the school district sought an 
injunction~: :A hearing was held and the trial court issued a temporary. 
injunction. The asseciation appealed and, upon the lower appellate 
82schoo1District·for the City of Holland, Ottawa and Allegan 
Counties v.' Ha!hland Education Association, 152 N.W. · (2d) 572 (Michigan, 
1967). 
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court's decision to affirm' the injunction, appealed the case to the 
Supreme Court of Michigan. 
It was c0ntended by the teachers that< the injunction violated their 
constitutionalrights of freedom of speech and assembly and freedom from 
involuntary servitude. Furthermore, the injunction was.not justified as 
the board failed to indicate", •• proper showing of violence, irrepar-
able injury or breach of peace." Although the court denied the 
teachers' ·claim pertaining to the abridgement of constitutional rights, 
the court in a precedent se~ting ruling relevant to temporary injunc-
tions said, in part: 
We here hold it is insufficient merely to show that a 
concert of prohibited action by public employees has taken 
place and .that ipso facto such a showing justified injunctive 
relief. We so hold .because it is basically contrary to public 
policy in this State to issue injunctions in labor disputes 
absent a showing of violence, irreparable injury, or breach of 
the peace. • • 
We indicated earlier that we deal with .a meager record. 
No testimony was t~ken on the hearing upon the application for 
the temporary injunction. Simply put, the only showing made 
to the chancellor was that if an injunction did not issue, the 
district's schools would not open, staffed by teachers on the 
date scheduled for such opening. We hold such showing insuf-
ficient to have justified the exercise of the plenary power of 
equity by the force of injunction. We are mindful of the 
exemplary conduct of the teachers when the writ, valid on its 
face, was issued. We are mindful, .too, that the appellee.dis..,-
trict has cooperated by the maintenance of the previous year's 
schedule of payments to the teachers as was conceded in oral 
argument. 
We recognize that great discretion is allowed the trial 
chancellor in the granting or withholding of injunctive 
relief. We de not, in ordinary circumstances, substitute .. our 
judgment for his. We hold, however, that there was a lack of 
proof which would support the issuance of a temporary 
Injunction. 83 
83school District for the City of Holland, Ottawa and Allegan. 
Counties v. Holland Education Association, 157 N.W. (2d) 206 (Michigan, 
1968). 
Thus, the temporary injunction was dissolved and the case remanded to 
the circuit court for further proceedings. It was suggested by the 
Supreme Court that: 
, • . the proceedings inquire into whether as charged by the 
defendants, the plaintiffs school district has refused to bar-
gain in good faith, whether an injunction should be issued at 
all. 
The significance of this ruling cannot be over emphasized as it estab-
lished the ,"principal of equity" in the issuance of an injunction by 
suggesting that future courts determine whether the plaintiff school 
district refused to bargain in good faith prior to a strike or the 
imposition of an injunction against the strike. 84 
Affirmation of this precedent setting 1968 ruling occurred with a 
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high court's reversal of an anti-strike injunction issued by tqe circuit 
court in Cre.stweod School District ~· Crestwood Education Association. 85 
A complaint was filed by the plaintiff in the Wayne County Circuit Court 
seeking injunctive relief against the striking teachers on grounds per-
taining to their status as public· emplpyees who had not reported to 
work, Defendants· claimed that· the district had refused to submit the 
issue of· the mediation andhad not proved it would suffer "irreparable 
damages." The circuit·court, however, "permanently restrained" and 
enjoined the association".· .• from encouraging, inducing, or persuad-
ing teachers to strike under any guise whatsoever II The Supreme 
Court of Michigan reversed the circuit court order and remanded the case 
84Research Division, National Education Association, Negotiation 
Research Digest (Decemper, 1969), Volume III, p. 4, 
85crestwood School District v. Crestwood Education Association et 
al., 170 N.W. (2d) 840 (Michigan,-1969). 
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to·the circuitcourt .for" ••• further proceedings eon$istent with the 
result.ordered· in the Ho.lland case." 
Within five days of the decisien madein the Crestwood case, the 
Supreme Court of Indiana was asked to rule on a lower court decision 
whereby the striking teachers were feund to be in contempt of court for 
. 1 t . t •i . d 86 via a ing- a res ra ning- or er·. The restraining order directed the 
members of the federation to refrain· from picketing and striking against 
the school district. 
The injunction had been issued without.notice one day after the 
teachers failed to· perfonn: their teaching· re$ponsibili ties. The inj unc"':' . 
toin was.ignored by the teachers, .and the contempt action followed four 
days later •. It was contended by the federation that the state anti-
injunction statute· or "Little Norris,...La Gua:t"dia Act," was applicable to 
the employees'in the private sector. After due consideration of other 
cases and rulings set· forth, the court upheld the lower court's 
decisien. The court stated in part: 
Wedo not agree with thE!!appellant that this act is 
applicable to disputes concerning· publi.c employees. The· over-
whelming weight.of authority in the.United States is that'gov-
ernment employees may not engage in strike for any purpose. 
In a vigorous and• extensive· dissenting opinion, it was expressed:. 
It is true that a strike by puplic employees may result 
in .some.amE>Unt ef disruption of the agency for which they 
we:rk. In the absence ef legislation dealing with this sub-
ject, we believe· that it is a judicial function to determine. 
whether the amount of the disruption ef the service is so 
great that itwarrants everriding tile legitimate interests of 
the empleyees in having effective means to insure good.faith 
bargaining by the employer. This is a minimum requirement 
before acourt.can declare a strike by public employees 
illegal. 
86Andersen:Federation of Teachers, L0cal 519 v. School City of 
Anderson.,· 251 N.E. (2d) 15 (Indiana, 1969). ·-- -
It was further contended by Chief Justice DeBruler in his dissenting 
opinion that: 
o •• it is a very unwise policy to allow a trial court to. 
enjoin a peaeef.ul strike,·in the· absence of anyway to insure 
that the underlying dispute will be discussed and settled 
amicably. 
The Chief Justice cited extensively the court's ruling in the Holland 
case and subsequent procedures. 
A petition for rehearing and petition for leave to file amicus 
curiae was heard before the Supreme Court of Indiana in January of 
1970. 87 The Supreme Court held that" ... intervention would not be 
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permitted where parties seeking to intervene as amicus curiae sought to 
raise new issue." Final disposition of the case remains uncertain as an 
appeal has been filed in the Supreme Court.of the United States, 
Although other, cases pertaining to the legality of the strike in 
the public schools88 and .the public sector89 have been litigated, the 
87Anderson Federation of Teachers, Local 519 v. School City of 
Anderson, 254 N.E. (2d) 329 (Indiana, 1970), U, S. Appeal Pending. 
88Additional public school cases which have cons.idered the legal 
issues involved in the right to strike: Manchester Education Associa-
tion v. Superior Court, 257 A. (2d) 233 (New Hampshire, 1969), the court. 
denied a writ of prohibition vacating and staying enforcement of a. 
temporary injunction order issued by a lower court enjoining the 
teachers from supporting or engaging in a strike; Board of Education of 
Martin Ferry City School District v. Ohio Education Association, 235 
N.E. (2d) 538 (Ohio, 1967), the court held that teachers had no right 
to strike; City of ~York v. DeLury ~al., 243 N.E. (2d) 128 (New 
York, 1968), the court held the right to strike by teachers for an 
illegal objective is enjoinable at instance of aggrieved party; Newmaker 
v. Regents of the University o-J: California et al., 325 P. (Zd) 558 
(California, 1958), it was held by the court that where a strike against 
a public entity is unlawful, the strike terminates the employment rela-
tionship; Legman y. Scheol District City of Scranton, 263 A. (2d) 370 
(Pennsylvania, 1970), the court ruled that a board of education may 
increase the salaries of teachers who had participated in strike; School 
Committee of the City of Pawtucket y. Pawtucket Teachers Alliance, 221 
A, (2d) 806 (Rhode Island, 1966), restraining order issued by the court 
80 
judicial sy~temhas been- consistent in its rulings. Nonetheless, a 
limited number of cracks have appeared in the traditional· judicial view 
pertaining. to public employee strikes. 90 One rather obvious crack, 
among the several discovered, was the Holland case ruling on temporary 
injunctions which has already been discussed. Although, these portents 
of change appeared in the court's dicta as opposed to specific court 
decisions that deviated from the traditional view, they cannot be 
overlooked. 91 
enjoining a strike .or collective work-stoppage though ambiguous was 
legalo 
89Additional public sector cases which have considered the legal 
issues involved in the right to. strike: City of Rockford v. Interna-
tional Association ef Firefighters Local No. fil, 240 N.E. (2d) 705 
(Illinois, 1968), court ruled the c:Lty was entitled to temporary injunc-
tion to enjoin .. strike even though firemen performed services on,a 
partial basis; East Bay Municipal Employees Union y_. County of Alameda 
et al., 83 Cal. Rptr. 503 (California, 1970), the court ruled that the 
striking employees of a municipality were entitled to former status upon 
settlement of .dispute. Furthermore, it was not within the municipal-
ity's authority to assess penalities beyond that provided by law; City 
of Evanston v. Buick et al., 421 F. (2d) 595 (1970), the court ruled 
that striking. city employees did not have the right to strike and 
involuntary servitude.claim was not applicable in this instance to .con-
stitutionally guaranteed rights provided in the Thirteenth Amendment; 
Almond et aL v. Counti of Sacramento, 80 CaL Rptr. 518 (California, 
1969), the court ruled that in absence of an authorizing statute a 
public employee has no right.either to bargain collectively or to 
strike; Lo.cal266, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Vo 
Salt River Pro~t Agricultural Im12rovement and Power.District, 275 P. 
(2d) 393 {Arizona, .1954), the Supreme Court held that the power dis..,. 
trict can legally enter into collective bargaining agreements with its 
employees and that they may strike to enforce terms of the agreemento 
Private ownership as opposed to public was the deciding point in this 
case, 
90Jack H. Kleinman, T. W. Stinnett, and Martha L. Ware, Profes-
sional Negotiation in Public Education (New York, 1966), Po 340 
91Ibid. 
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The first· case to this· point was Board of Education .£!.. City of 
Minneap?elis y.· Public· School Emel:oyees .Union.92 This case involved.an. 
attempt by the board to restrain and enjoin school custodians from 
participating in a strike. A temporary restraining order was issued and 
after an extensive hearing, the court.discharged and vacated the tempo-
rary restraining order thus denying the board relief. Of special inter~ 
est was the court's language pertaining to the traditional view on the 
legality of public empleyees to strike. ·The court .commented as follows: 
~. the right· to strike is rooted in the freedom of man, and .. 
he may.not·be denied the right except by clear, unequivocal 
language.embodied in·a constitution,. statute, ordinance, rule 
or contract. 
The·plaintiffs·appe.;i.led the case·to the Supreme Court of Minnesota which 
aHirmed·the ·lower CQUrt;'s decision and furthermore indi.cated that jan-
itors were not " ••• officials charged with duties related to public 
safety~" The implications of.· this· statement althougq applicable to a 
specific anti ... injunctien statute cam~ot be overlooked as the court 
seemed to indicate that non-instructional staff members were not 
essential to the operations of the educational program. 
Althougl;l the· precedence ef?tablished in this case was overruled in 
1966 by the Supren1:e Court of Minnesota in Minneapolis Federatiop. of 
Teachers v. Obermeyer,93 the dicta of the courts in this 1~51 litigation 
seems pertinent in analyzing the right to strike. 
92Board of Education of City of Minneapolis v. Public School 
Employees Union Local 63, 45 N.W. (2d) 797 (Minnesota, 1951). 
93Minneapoiis Federation 2i, Teachers Local59 v. Obermeyer, 147 
N.W. (2d) 358 (Minnesota, 1966). 
In a 1957·ruling previously discussed, the.court in upholding an 
injunction prohibiting a~teachers' organization from striking had this 
to say: 
In the light· of the increase in public employment, the 
disparity existinginmany cases in the salary of public 
employees as compared· to similar positions·in private employ-
ment, and the enactment in recent years of legislation guar~ 
anteeing the rightof private employees to bargain collect-
ively and to strike, it may seem anomalous and u~fair to some 
that government should deny these same rights to its employees . 
working in similar employment. However any modification in 
the common.law doctrine that the sovereignty of the state 
should not be hampered by strikes by public employees involved 
a change in public policy. It has been the consistent opinion 
of this court that such .a change is for the legislature to 
determine rather-than being within·the province·of this 
coqrt.94 
Though the court upheld a restraining order in the form of an injunc-
tion, it did· recognize thatthe legislature could bring forth a change 
in public policy •. 
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The last case the writer identified as relevant to a possible break 
in the traditional judicial view on strikes was the 1965 case of Board 
of Education of Community Unit School District v. Redding et al.95 The 
Supreme Court of Illinois was asked to determine the correctness of a 
lower court's ruling whereby the custodians of the district were not 
enjoined from striking. The Supreme Court reversed the ruling; however, 
the judicial reasoning set forth by the lower court for not enjoining 
the strikes- seems paramount. 
The-basis; for. the• lower court's ruling focused upon the following: 
(1) plaintiff·hadcfai1ed to show irreparable injury, (2) lack of 
94city of Manchester v. Manchester-Teachers Guild et al., 131 A, 
(2d) 59· (New Hampshire, 1957). 
95Board of Education of Community Unit School District v. Redding 
et al., 207 N~E~ · 427 (Illinois, 1965). 
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substantial·evidenee·that strikeinterfered with:theoperations of the 
·· sch00l, ·and (3) picketing was a valid exercise of constitutional rights.·· 
Thus, this lower court' ruling clearly expressed· that non-instructional 
employees·cannet be:enjeinedfrom striking:unless·irreparable injury and 
interferencewith~the·educational program· can· be· substantiated to the 
satisfaetion·of the court .. 
Although these·cases highlighted some of t4e·court's dicta which 
were eon trary . to·· the traditional - judicial view on· strikes, they should 
not be construed to be precedent setting with the exception of the 
Holland case. 
Right to Participate in Other 
Concerted Activities 
As the right to strike has been denied to teachers, other means 
have been seught to exert pressures on local boards of education.96 
Same of the pressure tactics reported in the literaturewere (1) mass 
resignations, (2) state and local political action, (3) sanctions, (4) 
picketing, (5) en masse sick leave, and (6) refusal to participate in 
extra curricular .activities.97 Of these, the writer was able to locate 
judicial decisions pertaining to the first four in tbe National Reporter 
System. Thus, only litigation pertaining to mass resignations, polit-
ical actioµ, sanctions, and picketing'will be reported. 
96M. ChesterNelte; Guide to School Law (West Nyack, 1969), p. 222. 
97Myron·Lieberman and·Michael H. Moskow, Collective Negotiations 
for Teachers (Chicago, 1966), pp. 311-312. 
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Mass Resignations 
This concerted activity may be construed as a tactic whereby the 
individual.teachers submit resignations to a teacher organization to be 
used as the organization deems necessary.98 Similarly, teachers may on 
an individual basis submit; their resignations en masse directly to the 
board of education. Such was the situation that developed in Lee 
County, Florida, in 1968, which was the prelude to a class suit reported 
in National Education Association v. Lee County Board of Public 
Instruction.99 
In early 1968, an educational crisis developed throughout the State 
of Florida due to the failure of the governor to act in a positive man~ 
ner towards specific legislation which would have alleviated a school 
financial crisis. As a form of protest, approximately four hundred Lee 
County teachers submitted their resignations. The resignations were 
accepted. However, thirty days later (due to the enactment of an 
appropriations bill) the teachers requested permission to return to 
their teaching assignments. The board of education initially rejected 
their request; but, after extensive mediation by private citizens they 
agreed to reinstate the teachers upon payment of a $100.00 fine per 
teacher to the board of education. 
Several teachers, the ~ationa1 Education Association, and the 
Florida Education Association filed a class suit contesting the imposi-
tion of the fines and asked for judgment reinstating with lost pay those 
98Nolte, lac. cit. 
99National Education Association y. Lee County Board of Public 
Instruction, 229 F. Supp. 834 (Florida, 1969). 
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teachers· who· refused to pay t;he fine. Plaintiffs. contended that the 
fine was imposed without legislative authority and constituted a breach 
of due· process. Defendants claimed that the imposition of the fine was 
not ultra.vires. 
Contrary to the arguments of the board, the.court ruled the board's 
act as ultra vires and without provision for due process. The court 
ordered the school board to return the payments made and to reinstate 
those teachers who had refused to pay the fine. 
In·1967, the case of Board of Education of the City of New York~· 
100 Sha:o.ker ~ al. was heard before the Supreme Court of New York County. 
Although this case involved contempt proceedings against a teachers 
unionand their officers for violations pertaining to a court issued 
injunction, th.e ccmrt considered the !~gal status of resignations. 
Defendants·contended the purported 40,000 teachers did not-strike but in 
fact had·resigned. None of the 40,000 resignations had been individ-
ually executed or transmitted to the board of education. Instead, the 
resignations.were sent to the union to be used as deemed necessary. The 
court without extensive elaboration, ruled the resignations constituted 
a strike. Said the court: 
Defendants, in contending that a strike is not the same 
as the so-called resignations are urging a distinction with-
out a difference; the argumeµt is specious and sham and is 
rejected. 
Thus, no distinguishing differences exist between en masse resignations 
and a strike if the resignations were.not individually executed and 
lOOBoard of Education of City of New !E.rt v. Shanker et al., 283 
N.Y.S. (2d) 548 (New York, 1967). . 
delivered to.the board. Furthermore, said resignations would be 
effective only at the.end of the contract period. 
State and Local Political Action 
As to the use of state and local political action as a means to 
exert pressure to effect changes in an education system, the courts 
generally favor this met~od since it is congruent with the democratic 
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concepts of orderly and lawful change. However, it appears that 
certain constraints exist relative to the extent and nature of.the 
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political activities that may be pursued by the teachers. For example, 
in 1960, a large group of teachers of the New York City Schools resolved 
to absent themselves en masse in order to confer and petition state 
1 . 1 . d k' d' . 102 egis ators on matters germane to retirement an wor ing con 1t1ons. 
Aware of the possible consequences of an absence en masse, the 
te.achers decided to seek a declaratory judgment from the court on the 
legality of their resolved action prior to implem~ntation of the pl~n. 
It was cont~nded by the teachers that the absence en masse was necessary 
to present a petition of grievances. The right to petition was consti-
tutionally guaranteed. Specific mention was made of the First Amendment 
whereby Congress " shall make no law . • . prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof . • • tqe right to the people peaceably to assemble and 
to petition the government for redress of grievances." Though the 
courts considered the arguments submitted by the plaintiffs, it did not 
concurin its declaratory judgment. The court concluded that an en 
lOlNolte, 't 224 op, C1 , , :p, , 
102 Pruzan et al. v. Board of Education of the City El New~' 209 
N.Y.S. (2d) 966(New York, 1960~ 
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masse absence would of necessity be construed as a strike and further-
more such action by the court did not " ••• unconstitutionally deprive 
teachers of rights pertaining to free speech, assembly and the right to 
petition the legislature." Nevertheless, a limited number of absences 
was deemed appropriate when the court in part stated: 
Surely it cannot be held that the absence of a limited 
number of employees for a limited time in setting forth the 
views of the greater number they represent would interfere 
with the full and faithful performance of the duties of the 
limited number of absentees. 
Of a different vein, but nonetheless germane, was the court's 
ruling in Pickering v. Board of Education. 103 The plaintiff .was a 
teacher in Illinois who sent a let~er to a local newspaper for publica-
tion, cl)arging that.the board had misinformed the public about a pro-
posed school.pond issue. The letter also revealed an alleged threat by 
the superintendent to dismiss any of the teachers that did not support 
the bond issue. After the let~er was published, the board conducted a 
hearing and 9ecided the letter was " ... detrimental to the efficient 
operation and administration of tl)e school district" and subsequently 
cause for dismissal of the plaintiff. 
Arguing that his dismissal violated the First and Fourteenth 
Amendment, the de£endant brought suit against the board~ The lower 
court rejected tl)e plaintiff's claim; however, the United States 
Supreme Court reversed the.decisions. The Supreme Court indicated a 
school poard could circumscribe a teacher's right to publicize his views 
103Pickeringy. Board~Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). See, 
e.g., Belshaw y. City of Berkeley~ 54 Cal. Rptr. 727 (California, 1966), 
the court held that a letter written by a fireman and published in a 
newspaper was nothing more. than an exe.rcise of his constitutionally 
protected right of free speech and in the absence of a showing that his 
conduct impared the public service, he could not be punished. 
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only if it was able to show cause for confidentiality; or to demonstrate 
that the employee's working relationship with his superiors would be 
affected. Although this case does not pertain to political action by a 
group of teachers, the court's reasoning appears to be applicable. 
For example~ in Los Angel~s Teachers Union~· Los Angeles City 
Board of Education, 104 the California Supreme Court enjoined the 
enforcement of a school board regulation prohibiting teachers from cir-
culating a petition on school premises during their duty-free lunch 
periods. The petition was in opposition to cut backs in funds for 
higher education and supported an increase in funds for public 
education. 
The school.board prior to the court action agreed to allow the 
teachers to meet in school facilities after school hours to obtain sig-
natures for the petition, however, the members of the union felt that 
this was insufficient. A request was submitted by the plaintiffs to 
obtain signatures in the lunch and faculty areas, however, it was 
denied. Thus, the plaintiffs submitted a petition calling for the court 
to issue a writ of mandate to enj9in the board from enforcing the prohi-
bition of obtaining signatures as requested. The lower court denied the 
writ but when appealed the lower court's decision was reversed by the 
Supreme Court. 
The court ruled that the school board had not provided sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate that the circulation of the petition on school 
premises during duty free periods would cause " ... substantial dis-
ruption of or material interference.with school activities." 
104Los Angeles Teachers Union v. Los Angeles City Board of 
Education, 455 P. (2d) 827 (California, 1969). 
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Furthermore, " ..• tolerance of the unrest instrinic to the expression 
of controversial ideals is constitutionally required even in the 
schools." Therefore to justify a restraint on the political activities 
of the teachers, the governing officials must demonstrate that the 
restraint is necessary to prevent the impairment or disruption of the 
educational program. 
One of the most recent cases in the area of political action 
involves the legality of the right of teachers to make public state-
ments pertaining to the competency of the administrators and school 
board members.105 In.this case the teachers' association sent telegrams 
to the· superintendent, high school principals, and the members of the 
boar9 of edocation·demanding their resignations ". for full and 
sufficient·reasonsknown to you." Upon public announcement of these 
reasons, the board of education sought to enjoin the teachers association 
from making public statements and for judgment requiring that grievance 
procedures be used. 
The court held.that a contract which included a grievance procedure 
between the board of education and the teachers' association did not 
entitle the board to compel use of grievance procedures with respect to 
the association's public statements. It was further contended by the 
court that in the event the complaint was not dismissed by the court no 
preliminary injunction was feasible. To enjoin speech pending trial, 
concluded the court, may be placed in the same context as prior 
105Baard .. of' Education, Union Free School District No. rJ.... y. West 
Hempstead·Chapter·Branch·II of the New York State Teachers Association, 
311 N.Y.S. (2d) 708 (New York, 1970). See, e.g., Tempedino y. Dumpson 
301 N.Y.S~ (2d)' 967 (New York, 1969), the court reinstated social 
workers who had written a letter critical of department procedures. 
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restraintc"~ .• which,has·long been' recognized as unpermissible with 
but the narro.wes.t,.· .ef exceptiqns." 
Sanctions 
Another·means of exert:i.ng pressure on SGhool boards by teacher 
organization . has.' been the.·· use· of "sane tions," Al though 1.1 sane tions" run 
across a. broad spectrum of activities, 106 ·they·· have· been· defined by the 
National Edueation Associat;ion as:. 
· . censure, suspension or expulsion of a member, severance 
of· relationship-with an affiliated association or other agency 
controlling the·welfare of the schools: bringing into play 
forces that will enable the community to help the board or 
agency to realize its responsibility or the application 0f one 
ormore steps in the withholding of services.107 
Authorized for use in 1962 by the l'{ationalEducation Association,108 
sanctions have been. utLLized extensively by teacher organizations for 
nearly a decade. Two court decisions of recent vintage were located by 
the writer which:were' considered applicable and germane to the legal 
issues involved in sanctions. 
In February, 1967, a dispute arose between.the secretary.of a 
school· board and the~loca1 teachers association in Union Beach, New 
Jersey, concerning the mailing of certain information to patrons of the 
school.district prior to the resubmission of a budget to the voters.109 
106KernAlexander,·Ray Corns, and Walter Mccann, Public School Law 
(St. Paul, 1969), p. 485. 
107National·Commissionon Professional Rights and Responsibilities, 
Guidelines for ProfessienalSanctions (Washington: N.E.A., 1963), p. 9. 
108Alexander, loc. cit. 
109Board of· Education, Borou~h of Union Beach:!...· New Jersey Educa~ 
tion Association!.! al., 233 A. (2d) · 84 (New. Jersey, 1967). 
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On Mareh· 14, 1967, the board at; a legally convened meeting decided not 
te.offer·a·eentract'"tO the presidentof theUnionBeach:'feaehers Ass0ei.,-
ation· {U. B• T .A.)· and• two other teachers who held responsible positions 
in the· local teachers·erganizations. Upon.notification of the board's 
action at this meeting, the U.B.T.A. held a special meeting at which a 
lengthy resoilutionwas·ad0pted listing seventeen grievances, 
On April 4, the president of the U.B.T.A. presented the grievances 
and· the resignation· of· thirty-six of the forty-seven teachers to be 
effective on June 3rd, about two weeks prior to the end of the school 
term, The board called upon the teachers to withdraw their resigna.,-
tions;·however,i thirty-one of· the teachers refused to heed to the 
board's request.· Sanctions were invoked against the school district by 
the U.B,T.A., N.J•E•A. and the N.E.A, ·a short time later. 
The school board· sought a deGlaratory judgment to enjoin the action 
by the local, state,· and national organizations and furthermore asked 
for a mandatory- judgment requiring the· associations to take immediate 
steps to wi~hdraw their actions. The court issued the injunction and 
held the actions' taken by the teachers association constituted a 
coercive activity· designed for the'purp0se of compelling the school 
• 
.. 
poard to meet their demands. 
The court rejected th~· arguments submitted by the various associa,.,. 
toins claiming a· constitutional :dght for their actions, saying that: 
We are not dealing with freedom of speech but rather with 
expression and· threating action to accomplish a purpose pro-
scribed by the public•policy of the State of New Jersey. 
It was further contended.by the court that the injunction issued was 
legal as "irreparable injury" would have been suffered by the board had 
a. preliminaryi!ljunctionnot been issued. 
Defendants·appealed·~o the Appellate Division and the case was 
certified to the Supreme Coul;'t of New Jersey,110 The Supreme Court 
after considering a significant number of arguments affirmed the lower 
court ruling. Though several points of law were forthcoming in the 
court ruling•;.· the following should suffice in adding clarity to the 
legality of sanctions: 
1. Whether actions of teachers and associations constitute a 
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strike, substance of situation and not its shape must control. A strike 
is a sanction and a severe sanction may be construed as a strike. 
2. To use freedom of speech as an instrument to achieve an unlaw-
ful end is not a right within the context of the First Amendment. 
3. Although individuals and associations may seek to exert pres-
sure on a public entity to gain certain needs, they may not take action 
that disables the public entity from acting at all. 
4. Obstructing a public body from access to the necessary manpower 
sources which may eventually lead to the· interruption of services may be 
construed as a strike. 
The second case deemed appurtenant to. the legal questions focusing 
on the use of sanctions was Wahpeton Public School District v. North 
Dakota Educatipn Association.111 In this case the Supreme Court of 
North Dakota was asked to judge a lower court's ruling which restrained 
the North Dakota·Education Association from invoking sanctions against 
the WahpetonPublic·School District~ Facts relevant to the case were 
llOBoardof·Edocation,· Borough of UnionBeach·y. New Jersey 
Education Association et al.~ 247 A. (2d) 867 (New Jersey, 1968). 
lllwahpeton Public School District No. 11. v, North Dakota 
Education Association, 166 N.W. (2d) 389 (North Dakota, 1969). 
as. fellews ~ In· 1969·~ the' Wahpeten··School ·District due to financial 
difficulty submitted a proposal: to the district votei"s for additicmal 
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· taximg"authority· ... The• voters rejected· the preposal and the board of 
eduea.t:i©1F eliminatedrs·evera:l: teaching positions· to assure fiscal respon-
sibility~ A' demand was made by the' North Daketa· Educatien Association 
(N.D.E.A.) that the positions be restored and other means be utilized to 
raise the funds ··necessary· for funding·· the positions. Furthermore, 
11
• • • sanctions would· be imposed if matters were not settled to the 
satisfaction of·· the teachers." 
Subsequently, both parties agreed to.meet to discuss the problem 
at hand;· however·,· prior to· the scheduled meeting, the board of education 
sought and·: obtained a temporary restraining order to enjoin the N.D.E.A. 
from invoking sanctions• Similarily, the N.D~E.A. sought and obtained 
a.temporary.restrainingorder to prevent the school district from 
offering·· employment contracts to any teacher until such time that the. 
injunction against the·N;.D~E.A •. was lifted. At a subsequent court hear-
ing the restraining• order against the board was lifted-; however, the 
restraining order against the·teachers·was to remain in effect for two 
weeks. 
ThoughtheN~D;.E.A. and the school-board reached a settlement, the 
N.D.E.A. appealed in order to have the Supreme Court of North Dakota 
establishlegal precedence in the area of sanctions. However, the court. 
asserted the matter: was moot due to the prior settlement of differences 
between parties. ·Also the court refused to consider the extent that 
school districts could interfere with the rights of an association. 
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Picketing 
·Lastly,no•discussion-of the right of teachers to exert pressure 
c:m a particular· gevernmental entity can avoid the cons idera ti on of the 
right . to picket. ··Though the legal doctrine pertaining .to picketing by 
pub;lic: employees ". , . is in a relatively nascent stage, 11112 several 
judicial decisions were located that considered the legal issues 
involved. As might be· expected, claims of freedom of spee·ch, of assem-
bly, andpetitioef have often been raised to substantiate public 
employees' rights in the·area of.picketing.113 Furthermore, most of the 
litigation:. concerning the· legal issues involved in picketing also con-
sidered•legal· questions on the right to strike. Therefore, some of the 
cases that will be reported on the· ensuing pages have heretofore been 
In Board of-Education ef Community Unified School District v. 
Redding,ll4 the Supreme Court of Illinois was asked to rule on the 
legality of a picket line established by thirteen striking custodians. 
Although the lower court did not enjoin the custodians from picketing 
on·the basis that peaceful picketing was a form of free speech, the 
Supreme Court·inreversing the lower court decision said: 
While picketing has an ingredient of communication, the 
cases make.it clear that it cannot be dogmatically equated 
with·constitutionally protected freedom of speech, and that 
112wesley A.·· Wildman' "The Law and Collective Negotiations in 
Education," Volume _g .£!:. Collective Action .£1.· Pub Uc School Teachers 
(Chicago,·1968), p. 8. 
ll3Edmond Reutter, Jr. and Robert R. Hamilton, The Law of Public 
Education· (New.Y0rk, 1970), p. 412. 
114Board of Education of Community Unit School District v. Redding 
et al., 207 N.E. (2d) 427 (Illinois, 1965). 
picketing. is1m0re>than free spe-ech0 because picket lines are 
deaigned ·to ue:rt1, and- do- ex:ert, ·influences· which produce 
aeti0ns·and consequences different from other modes of 
e01nmunicati0n. 
Quoting JusticeFrankfurter'sstatement in an earlier case to substan-
tiate the distinguishing-characteristics between speech and picketing, 
the Supreme Court reported: 
It has been amply recognized that picketing, not being 
the equivalentof speech as a matter of fact, is not its 
·inevitable legal equivalent.· Picketing is not beyond. the con-. 
tr0l of a- state· if· the-manner in which: picketing is conducted 
or the purpose which it seems to effectuate gives grounds for 
its disallowance • A state is not required to tolerate in 
all places and all circumstances even peaceful picketing by an 
individua1.115 
Although the< Supreme Court recognized the specific situation must con-
trol its decision, picketing may be restrained where such curtailment 
95 
was necessary to protect the non ... interruption o.f an educational program. 
Consistent, with these holdings was the court's decision in Board of 
Education ef the· Martins· Ferry City School District v. Ohio Education 
·Association~ll6 In this case, the court upheld and modified a lower 
court restraining 0rder which was sought by the board after the teachers 
of the school district went on strike. Of special interest was the 
judicial reasoning discounting the right to picket as an expression of 
speech as contended by the defendants. The court in quoting from Ohio 
Jurisprudence stated: 
.~ . 115Hughes ~ Superior Court State of California, 339 U.S. 469 
(1950). See, e.g., City of West Frankfort~· United Association of 
Journe~an and Apprentices, 202 N.E. (2d) 649, the court decision was 
contrary to the Hughes ruling, however, the picketing was in the court's 
opinion directed' to or-in the furtherance of an unlawful purpose. It 
was construed as informational picketing, 
116Board·of Education of the Martins· Ferry Citz School District v. 
Ohio Educati6n Asseciation et al., 235 N.E. (2d) 538 (Ohio, 1967). 
•.• there\is·na violation of constitutional rigqts in the 
· restrain.t· af ·picketing employed solely to induce a breach of 
contract or to aid· or-bring: about a secondary boycott. Pick-
eting accompanied· by false statements· 01:" misrepresentation is 
·Rot pretected·by the· constitutional guaranty of freedom of 
speeeh. Pieketingrcarried•on with'."fe:rce, violence, and 
intimidationcmaybeenjeined not withstanding the freedom of 
speech guaranty. 117 
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Though- the court modified· the lower court's restraining order due to its 
scope and vagueness·,· the teachers were restrained from picketing. The 
caurt contended· that· picketing could not be employed by teachers to 
induce a· breach of contract. 
Other cases·were located and directly applicable to picketing by 
the public school employeesll8 and other employees· in the public 
sector, 119 however, only two cases offered legal precedence contrary to 
the heretofore established trend. In 1968, the Supreme Court of 
11710 Ohio Jurisprudence (2d) 546, Section 474, 
118see, e.g., City of Pawtucket et al. y. Pawtucket Teachers 
Alliance, 141 A~ (2d)· 624 (Rhede Island, 1958), the court ruled .that 
picketing to support an unlawful act.ceuld be enjoined. Anderson Feder-
_ation _tl Teachers·v. School City of Anderson, 254 N.E. (2d) 329 
(Indiana, 1970),· the caurt adjudged teacqers union in c0ntempt .of court 
when the teachers.refused to refrain from picketing; Board of Education 
of Kankakee School District v. Kankakee Federation of Teachers, 264 N.Eo 
(2d) 18 (Illinois, 1970), te;chers were restrained from picketing and 
furthermere held in contempt when certain officers and members failed to 
stop·; and State v. Heath, 177 N.W. (2d) 751 (North Dakota, 1970), the 
court ruled that~picketing even though it is peaceful, without violence 
and disorder, may be enjoined if it is used to support or foster a 
strike. 
119see, e.g., City of Rockford v. Local No. 412 International 
Assoc:i,.ation of Firefighters, 240 N.E. (2d) 705 (Illinois, 1968), the 
court c:oncluded that picketing does not of itself contain an inherent 
threat to public saf.ety and, absent proof that picketing actually 
interfered with governmental functions, cannot be enjoined; State Board 
of Regents v. United· Packing Houpe Food and Allied Workers, 175 N.W. 
(2d) 110 (Iowa, 1970), the court ruled that non-academic personnel in a 
university who operated the physical plant of a state university had the 
right to picket for informational purposes if picketing did not. inter-
fere with or impede· the operation of the university. 
Califerniareversed'a lower court decision relevant to an injunction 
issued against·striking· social workers~ 120 ·The basis for the reversal 
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was: ene ofbroaan-ess·aml·scope or~ as the court indicated,. "unconstitu-
tiena.liy overboard.": The· injunction in part prohibited: 
. pi.cke;ting·: er· causing picketing, er causing, participat-
. ing in or inducing- others to participate in: any demonstration 
or demonstrations· on any: grounds or street or sidewalk adjoin-
ing grounds owned or possessed by the county . 
It was contended by the court that the order " .- imprope+ly restricts 
the exel;"ciseof the First Amendment· freedoms • II 
InPeters·v. South Community Hospital,121 the Supreme Court of 
Illinois reversed an· Appellate Court ruling which enjoined hospital 
employees from picketing. The Supreme Court held that public policy 
does not prohibit employees of a hospital from peacefully picketing and 
furthermore· the· Anti-Injunction Act in Illinois was applicable. Thus, 
no restraining order0 or injunction could be granted. 
While conceding·that a limited number of cases and dissenting 
opini0nsl22 .. were located which enhanced the right of public employees to 
picket, one· may not' cite these instances· as controlling. It appears 
that:picketing,•whether peaceful or not, may be enjoined by the courts 
120In ~ Colin Berry et al., 436 P. (2d) 273 (California, 1968). 
121Peters ~· South· Chicag·o Community Hospital et al., 253 N. E. (2d) 
375 (Illinois, 1969). 
122see, e.g~,. In re Colin Berry et al., 436 P. (2d) 273 
(California, 1968); Board of Education v. Redding, 207 N.E. (2d) 247 
(Illinois:,· 1965), lower court did not enjoin school custodians from 
picketing., however, the ruling was reversed; Anderson Federation of 
Teachers, Local 519 v. School Citz of Anderson, 251 N.E. (2d) 15 -
(Indi.ana, 1969), dissenting opinion of Justice De Bruler; Peters v. 
South Chicago Community Hospital et al., 253 N. E. (2d) 374 (Illinois, 
1969), Supreme Court ruled that public policy does not prohibit 
employees of hospital from picketing. 
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if it interrupts' a vital pro.cess or is com;trued as a means of coercing· 
a geive:i:ning:board·to meet demands. Sufficient legal precedence has been 
established to· indicate that the right· to picket may not be construed 
synonymous· with·· the· right to freedom of speech. 
Summary 
In view of' the, length of the foregoing discussion of litigation 
pertaining to collective negotiations in the public school, it seems 
appr0priate to reflect upon some of the generalizations implied. 
Although the writer has· indicated the more significant ramifications of 
the cases cited, the primary purpose has been to report the law as it 
has developed. Admittedly, the issues discussed and the selection of 
cases presented to substantiate the legal precedence, have been 
arbitrarily selected. 
The general topics of the chapter included: (1) the right to 
organize and maintain membership, (2)·union· security issues, (3) right 
to dues checkoff, (4) right of· representation, (5) right to negotiate 
and sign a written contract, (6) right to strike and theright to par-
ticipate in other concerted activities. Though case authority was 
occasionally in conflict between jurisdictions and a significant number 
of cases have not·been specifically overruled, a legal doctrine appli~ 
cable to each of· the foregoing' classifications seems to be emerging. 
Litigation concerningme~bership issues no doubt will diminish. 
There are few, if· any, reasons to assert that teachers may not join and 
maintain membership in a professional or union organization. Substan-
tial legalpreeedence has been established to reflect an abridgement of 
rights guaranteed in the Constitution if an individual teacher is denied 
the r1ght::te·ma·iRtain membership· •. Furthe·:rmore, ·the dismissal of a 
teacb.ex··.fc:>.:I!'· .a.etiv::ely participating- in" union- activities· has not been 
upheJ:d·by the court. 
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Theugb· most legal writers were in agreement in• the early 60' s that 
a closed· shop or union· shop· arrangemewt wou·ld not be- upheld by the 
courts, recent· court· ruiings on agency· sha·p clauses provide a basis for 
a form· of the closed• shop·.··· While conceding that the court rulings were 
from· a limited geographical area, one could predict that the agency shop 
arrangement maybe· legalized in other areas. However, additional court 
decisions in other areas need to be forthcoming before a clear pattern 
can emerge onr the legality of· the agency shop. 
The matter of dues checkoff,·though essential to the -effectiveness 
of an.organization, remains unclear at this point without an enabling 
s·tatute.. It· appearsc that sufficient legal precedence has been estab-
lished in·most jurisdictional areas to allow boards of ~ducation at 
their discretion to·· deduct dues. Whether this can be don,e on a discrim-. 
inatory basis: remains- questionable; however, based on a recent federal , 
court ruling, the·maj:ority union may· be granted exclusive rights to dues 
checkoff, 
Little evidence was located to substantiate the right of teachers 
to negetiate and have representation without enabling legislation. 
Thi:mgh judicial decisions were located whereby boards of· education could 
negotiate and recognize a· representative· at their discretion, other 
decis.ions questiew the :Legality of such practice due to the common law 
principle of 11 illegal: delegation of authority." It seems certain that 
withaut an eniib:ling statute, boards of education may not be forced to 
participate in. negotiations. 
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· Wi•themt; ~uestion•, the' judicial view is that teachers do not have 
theright·tostrikewithout· legislation to that effect. Mass resigna-
tions andsanetions· though different in some respects were consistently 
delcared il:legalif they interrupted the educational program. Suffi-
cient legal precedence was located to deny school employees the right to 
picket if itwas in support of an unlawful action. The courts were very 
consistent in ruling that picketing could not be construed as a form of 
speech guaranteed protected by the First Amendment. 
Finally,• collective negotiations in the public school may be 
consid.ered only in its infancy with a complete legal doctrine yet to 
emerge. Additional judicial decisions and statutory enactments. should 
add clarity in the.near future, however, the law is not static and legal 
doctrines not congruent with societal needs will be in a constant state 
of flux. 
··,· 
CHAP.TER IV 
STATUTORY ENACTMENTS REGARDING NEGOTIATIONS 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider the main provisions of 
statutory enactments r~levant to collective negotiations in the public 
school. An attempt will be· made to report, summarize and analyze only 
these comprehensive "state l,abor relations acts" germane to the collec-
tive negotiations process. More specifically, this chapter will provide 
·a framework for the cc;:nnparison, ··analysis, and comprehension of legisla-
ture enactments concerning: (1) guarantee of rights pertaining to mem-
bership, organization and union activities, (2) type of negotiations 
permitted, (3) employees covered, (4) scope of bargaining, (5) type and 
length ef representation, (6) unfair labor practices, (7) strikes and 
·other concerted activities, and (8) procedures for resolving impasses. 
Judicial decisions relevant to the interpretation and constitu-
tionality of state statutes located may be found in Appendix A. It 
should be noted, however, that, due to the lack of litigatio~ in some 
jurisdictions, the opinions forthcoming from the Attorney General's 
office relevant to state interpretation must suffice, Therefore, 
Attorney General opinions will be reported when they contribute to the 
clarity of a particular statutory provision. 
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An Overview of Statutory Enactments 
Commencing with the legislation enacted by Wisconsin.in 1959, state 
governments have been giving increasing attention to collective negotia-
tion rights· of employees in the public school. Al though the majority of 
the "state laboi- relations acts" applicable to school employees have 
been enacteQ during the last five years, a total of twenty-four states 
have passed legislation since 1959 in an attempt to recognize the right 
of school employees and to regularize the negotiation process. As 
illustrated in Table I, twelve of the twenty-four states have attempted 
to establish the rules governing the employer-employee relationship 
during the last two years. 
Though some states have enacted legislation to include school 
employees with other employees in the public sector, the majority of the 
states have provided separate statutory coverage for school employees. 
As exemplified in Table II, fifteen of the states have considered the 
uniqueness of the public school employee, while only nine of the states 
have treated schoo1 employees in the same fashion as other public 
sector emplt:>yees. Whether a trend· has developed to enact separate 
legislation for school employees is not apparent for, during the last 
two years, the states of Hawaii, Maine, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and South 
Dakota have included school employees with other public employees, while 
the states of Alaska, Delaware, Florida, Kansas, Maryland, North 
Dakota, and Vermont have enacted separate legislation. 
1959 
Wisconsin 
1968 
New Jersey 
TABLE I 
STATES ENACTING STATUTES APPLICABLE TO SCHOOL 
EMPLOYEES BY YEAR OF ENACTMENT 
1965 
California 
Connecticut 
Massachus~tts 
Michigan 
Oregon 
Washington 
1969 
Delaware 
Florida 
Maine 
Maryland 
Nevada 
North Dakota 
Vermont 
1966 
Rhode Island 
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1967 
Minnesota 
Nebraska 
New York 
1970 
Alaska 
Hawaii 
Kansas 
Pennsylvania 
South Dakota 
State 
Alaska 
California 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
Florida 
Hawaii 
Kansas 
Maine 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
Minnesota· 
Nebraska. 
Nevada 
New Jersey 
New York 
North Dakota 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
South Dakota 
Vermont 
Washington 
Wisconsin 
TABLE II 
STATUTORY SCHEMA FOR SCHOOL EMPLOYEES 
IN TWENTY-FOUR STATES 
School Employees 
104 
Are Specifically School Employees Are 
Included Aniong Under Separate 
Year of Other Public Statutory 
Enactment Employees Provision 
1970 x 
1965 x 
1965 x 
1969 x 
1969 x 
1970 x 
1970 x 
1969 x 
1969 x 
1965 x 
1965 x 
1967 x 
1967 x 
1969 x 
1968 x 
1967 x 
1969 x 
1965 x 
1970 x 
1966 x 
1970 x 
1969 x 
1965 x 
1959 x 
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State Statutory Response Pertaining to the Right 
of Membepship and Participation in 
Organization Activities 
As indicated in the previous chapter, the right of school employees 
to organize, maintain membership and participate in union activities is 
now generally conceded. The state statutes examined, though varied in 
comprehensiveness, generally complement the rights of individuals 
guaranteed by the Constitution. As shown in Table III, twenty-one of 
the twenty-four states identified as having 11 labor relations acts" 
applicable to school employees, specifically state one or more of these 
rights. Though the statutes of Alaska, Oregon, and Washington do not 
clearly grant these rights, it cannot be ascertained that these rights 
are not afforded school employees; it can only be said that such 
rights are not specifically indicated in the statutes reported. 
While the statutory schemes pertaining to organizational membership 
arid activities are varied, they can be divided into four categories. 
First, the most common:l-yemplpyed scheme grants school employees the 
right to form organizations, join, and participate in lawful activities 
or to choose to refrain from any or all of the foregoing activities. 1 
A' second group. of states h~ve employed a scheme which grants school 
employees the right to form and join any organization or refuse to join 
any organization; however, the right to participate in lawful activities 
lTen states have employed a statutory scheme of this type: 
California, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Nebraska, New Jersey, 
North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. 
State 
Alaska 
California 
Connecticut 
Delaware· 
Florida 
Hawaii 
TABLE III 
COMPARISON OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS REL.EVANT 
TO ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERSHIP 
Code Citation 
Alaska Statutes, Chapter 18, 
Sections 14.20~550-14.20.610 
West Annotated California Code: 
~~ ~~
Education Code, Section 13082 
-Connecticut General Statutes 
Annotated, Title 10, Section 
10 ..... 153a 
Delaware Code Annotated, 
Title 14, Chapter 40, Section 
4003 
Florida Statutes Annotated, 
Title 15, Chapter 59, 
Section 233.4 
Revised Laws of Hawaii, (1970 
Supp.), Title6, Chapter 89, 
Section 89.3 
Organizational Membership Provision 
Not specifically indicated. 
Public school employees shall have the right to form, 
Join, and participate in the activities of the 
employee organization. Public employees also have the 
right to refuse to join an organization. 
Members of the teaching profession shall have the 
right to Join or refuse to join any organization for 
professional or economic improvement. 
Public school employees have the right to join any 
organization for their professional or economic 
improvement, but membership in any specific.organiza-
tion shall not be required as a condition of employ-
ment. 
Teachers shall have the right to organize. 
Employees have the right of self organization and the 
right to form, join, or assist any employee organiza-
tion for the purpose of bargaining. May engage in 
....... 
0 
"" 
State. 
Hawaii 
(Continued) 
Kansas 
Maine 
Maryland 
Massachusetts · 
Michigan 
TABLE III (Continued) 
Code Citation 
Kansas Statutes Annotated, 
(1970 Supp.), Chapter 72, 
Section 72-5414 
Maine Revised Statutes, 
Titfe 26, Chapter 9~, 
Section 963 
Annotated Code of Maryland, 
Article 77, Chapter 14. 5, · 
Section 160a 
Annotated Laws of Massachusetts, 
Chapter 149; Sections 178D and 
178L 
Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated, 
Chapter 423, Section 423.209 
Organizational Membership Provision 
lawful concerted activities and or refrain from any or 
all of the activities except of making such payment of 
service fees to an exclusive representative. 
Professional employees shall.have the right to form, 
join, or assist professional employee organizations or 
refrain·from any or all of th,e foregoing activities. 
Public employees may-.join, form and. participate in 
the activities of organizations of their own choosing 
or refrain from any or all of the foregoing activities. 
Public school employees shall have the right to form; 
join, and participate in the activities of employee 
organizations of their own choosing. Employees shall 
also have the right to refuse to join or participate. 
Employees of the Commonwealth or any political.sub-
division shall have the :r;ight·to form.and join voca-
tional or labor organizations. Any employee shall 
also have the right to refrain from any or all of the 
foregoing activities. An agency service fee may be 
assessed to offset the cost of collective bargaining. 
Public employees shall have the right to organize 
together or form, join, or assist in labor organiza-
tions and to engage in lawful concerted activities. 
Employees shall have the right to refrain from any or 
all of the foregoing activities •. I-' 
0 
-'1 
State 
Minnesota 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
New Jersey 
New York 
North Dakota 
Oregon 
TABLE III (Continued) 
Code Citation 
Minnesota Statutes ~nnotated, 
(1970 Supp.), Chapter 125, 
Section 125.21 
Revised Statutes of Nebraska, 
(1969 Supp.), Chapter 79, 
Section 79-1288 
Nevada Revised Statutes, 
Title 23, Chapter 288, 
Section 288.140 
New Jersey Statutes Annotated, 
Title 34, Chapter 13A, Section 
34-13A-5 
Consolidated Laws of New York: 
Civil Service Law,Article 14, 
Section 202 
North Dakota Century Code, (1969 
Supp.), Chapter 15, Section 38.1-
07 
Oregon Revised Statutes, 
Chapter 342, Sections 342.450-
342.470 
Organizational Membership Provision 
Teachers shall have the right to form and join teacher 
organizations, and shall have the right not to form or 
join such organizations. 
Certificated public school employees shall.have the 
right to form, join, and participate in the activities 
of the organization as well.as refrain from any or.all 
of the foregoing activities. 
Local government employees shall have the right to 
join any employee organization of their choice or 
refrain from joining any employee organization. 
Public employees shall have the right to form, join, 
and assist any employee organization or refrain from 
any such activities. 
Public employees shall have the right to form, join, 
and participate in, or refrain from forming, joining 
or participating in any employee organization of their 
own choosing. 
Teachers or administrators shall have the right to 
form, join, and participate in the activities of 
representa~ive organizations of their choosing or 
refrain from any of the foregoing activities. 
Not specifically indicated. 
I-' 
0 
00 
State 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
South Dakota 
Vermont 
Washington 
Wisconsin 
TABLE III (Continued) 
Code Citation 
Purdon's Legislative Service 
Pamphlet Number 3, Act 195, L. 
1970, Section 40l 
General Laws of Rhode Island, 
1956, Title 28'; Chapter 9.3, 
Section 28-9.3-2 
South Dakota Compiled Laws, 
(1970 Supp.), Chapter 3-18, 
Section·3-18-2 
Vermont Statutes Annotated, 
(1970 Supp.), Title 16, 
Chapter 57, Section 1982 
Revised Code of Washington, 
Chapter 23A.i2; Sections 
28A.72.010 -- 28A.72.090 
Wisconsin Statutes Annotated, 
Title 13, Chapter 111~ 
Section 111.70 (2) 
Organizational Membership Provision 
Public employees shall have the right to organize, 
form, join or assist in employee organizations or to 
engage.in lawful concerted activities. Public 
employees shall have the right to refrain from any of 
the foregoing activities. 
Certificated public school teachers shall have the 
right to organize. 
Public employees shall have the right to form and join 
labor or employee organizations, and shall have the 
right not to form and join such organizations. 
Teachers shall have the right to or not to join, 
assist, or participate in any teacher's organization 
of their choosing. 
Not specifically indicated. 
Employees shall have the right of self organization, 
to be affiliated with a labor organization and 
participate in activities pertaining to the negotia-
tion process. Employees shall also have the right to 
refrain from any and all such activities. 
I-' 
0 
'° 
is not included. 2 A third statutory scheme employed by a few states 
simply grants the right to form or join an organization. 3 
Finally, two states have enacted a statutory scheme that grants 
llO 
school employees the right to form, join, and participate in organiza-
tional activities or refrain from any or all of the activities; however, 
a reasonable service fee may be assessed, regardless of membership 
status, to offset the cost involved in the bargaining process.4 For 
example, the Hawaii,5 agency clause states: 
The employer shall, upon receiving from an exclusive 
representative a written statement which specifies an amount 
of reasonable service fees necessary to defray the costs for 
its services rendered in negotiating and administering an 
agreement and computed on a pro rata basis among all employees 
within its appropriate bargaining unit, deduct from the pay-
roll of every employee in the appropriate bargaining unit the 
amount of service fees and remit the amount to the exclusive 
representative. 
Similarly, the Massachusetts statute which was amended in 1970 to 
include a service fee, states in part that " ••• such an agency fee 
shall-be proportionally commensurate w:i,th the cost of collective bar-
gaining and contract administration. 116 Furthermore, the Massachusetts 
law expressly prohibits a service fee be required as a condition of 
2seven states have employed a statutory scheme of this type: 
Connecticut, Delaware, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, South Dakota, and 
Vermont. 
3The states of Florida and Rhode Island have employed a statutory 
scheme of this type. 
4The stat~s of Hawaii and Massachusetts have employed a statutory 
scheme of this type. 
5Revised Laws of Hawaii, Title 6, Chapter 89, Section 89.3. 
6Annotated ~of Massachusetts, Chapter 149, Section 1781. 
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employment unless the majority of the employees in a bargaining unit 
approve its implementation. 
It is important to note that both· states enacted legislation in 
1970 to effect the implementation of the agency clause. Whether other 
states will follow suit cannot be ascertained; however, it does appear 
that legislators may well be confronted with this issue in the 
conceivable future, 
Type of Collective Negotiations 
Once a state has authorized school employees to organize and 
participate in lawful concerted activities, a decision relative to the 
type of collective negotiations to be employed should pe forthcoming. 
Without question, the specific statutory language employed germane to 
the type of negotiations allowed is related to the strength of ensuing 
negotiations. Doherty7 states: 
• • , If the statute gives a right to teachers to bargain 
collectively with their school employer over conditions of 
their employment, the corollary of this right is a duty on 
the part of the employer to so bargain. The content of this 
duty is best expressed as a good faith effort to reach agree-
ment. lf the·content of the duty is more strongly expressed--
e.g. a reasonable effort to reach agreement--there is an 
infringement upon the freedom of the bargaining. If the con-
tent of the duty is less strongly expressed-.,..e. g. merely to 
"meet and confer"--there is no protection against sham 
bargaining. 
As shown in Table IV, all of the twenty-four state statutes 
examined have employed specific statutory language to goverri the type of 
negotiations between concerned parties. For the most part, the concept 
7Robert E. Doherty and Walter E. Oberer, Teachers, School Boards 
and Collective Bargaining: A Changing of the Guard (New York, 1967), 
p. 85. 
State 
Alaska 
California 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
Florida 
Hawaii 
Kansas 
Maine 
TABLE IV 
COMPARISON OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS PERTAINING TO 
TYPE OF COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS 
Code Citation 
Alaska Statutes, Chapter 18, 
Section 14.20.550 
West Annotated California Code: 
~ation Code, Section 13085 
Connecticut General Statutes 
Annotated, Title 10, Section 
10-153d 
Delaware Code Annotated, Title 
14, Chapter 40, Section 4008 
Florida Statutes Annotated, Title 
15, Chapter 59, Section 233.4 
Revised Laws of Hawaii, (1970 
Supp.), Title-g, Chapter 89, 
Section 89.9 
Kansa$ Statutes Annotated, (+970 
Supp.), Chapter 72, Section 72-5413 
Maine Revised Statutes, Title 26, 
Chapter 9-A, Section 965 
Type of Collective Negotiations 
Shall negotiate in good faith. 
Shall meet and confer. 
Shall negotiate in good faith. 
Shall negotiate in good faith. 
Shall negotiate professionally. 
Shall confer and negotiate in good faith. 
Shall meet, confer, consult, and discuss in 
good faith. 
Shall confer and negotiate in good faith. 
I-' 
I-' 
('.) 
State 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
New Jersey 
New York 
North Dakota 
TABLE IV (Continued) 
Code Citation 
Annotated Code of Maryland, 
Article 77, Chapter 14. 5, 
Section 160 b 
Annotated Laws of Massachusetts, 
Chapter 14'9,"Section 178F 
Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated, 
Chaptet.423, Section 423.215 
·Minnesota-Statutes Annotated; (1970 
Supp.), Chapter 125, Section 125.23 
Revised Statutes·. of Nebraska, (1969 
Supp.)> Chapter· 7~ Section·· .79~1290 ·· 
Nevada Revised Statutes, Title 23, 
Chapter 288, Section 288.150 
New Jersey Statutes Annotated, 
Title 34, Chapter 13A, Section 
34-13A-7 
Consolidated Laws of New York: 
--------Civil Service Law, Arti_cle 14, 
Section 200 
North Dakota Century Code, (1969 
Supp.), Chapter 15, Section 38.1-12 
Type of Collective Negotiations 
Shall confer and negotiate in good faith. 
Shall confer in good faith. 
Shall meet, confer and negotiate in good 
faith. 
Shall meet and confer. 
May meet and confer at the board's 
discretion. 
Shall negotiate. 
Shall negotiate in good faith. 
Shall negotiate. 
Shall meet and negotiate in good faith. 
...... 
...... 
w 
State 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
Sout1~ Dakota 
Vermont 
Washington 
Wisconsin 
TABLE IV (Continued) 
Code Citation 
Oregon Revised Statutes; 
Chapter 342, Section 342.460 
Purdon's Legislative Service 
Pamphlet-Number 1,, Aet 195, L. 
1970, Sections 701 and 704 
General Laws of Rhede Island, 
1956, Title 28, Chapter 9.3, 
Section 28-9.3-4 
South Dakota Compiled Laws, 
(1970 Supp.), Chapter 3-18, 
Section 3-18-2 
Vermont Statutes Annotated, 
(1970 Supp.), Title 16, Chapter 
57, Section 2001 
Revised Code of Washington, 
Chapter.23 A.72, Section 28A72.030 
Wisconsin Statutes Annotated, 
Title 13, Chapter 111, Section 
111. 70 (2) 
Type of Collective Negotiations 
Shall confer, consult and discuss in good 
faith. 
Shall meet and confer in good faith, however, 
public employees shall only meet and discuss 
with first level supervisors~ 
Shall meet and confer in good faith. 
Shall meet and negotiate. 
Shall meet and negotiate in good faith. 
Shall meet, confer, and negotiate. 
Shall confer and negotiate. 
...... 
]-" 
~ 
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of "good faith'' has been expressed; however, the states of California, 
Minnesota, and Nebraska have employed statutory languag~ in which the 
duty to negotiate is not strongly asserted. The California and 
~ 
Minnesota statutesmerely indicate that school employees are authorized 
to meet and confer with the board of education. In the state of 
Nebraska, school employees may only meet and confer at the board's 
discretion. 
Apart from the states previously mentioned, the st.;ites of Florida, 
Kansa$, Massachusetts, Oregon, Rhode Island, Wa~hington, and Wisconsin 
appear to have employed language insufficient to impose a duty to bar-
gain. Kansas, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Rhode Island avoid.the term 
negotiate, yet consultation in good faith is expressed. The Washington8 
statute provides: 
• • • Representatives of an employee organization • • • shall 
have the right after using established administrative chan-
nels, to· meet, confer, and negotiate with the board of direc-
tors of the school district or a connnittee thereof to connnuni-
cate the considered professional judgment of the certificated 
staff prior to the final adoption by the board of proposed 
school policies 
While the Washington statute acknowledges the right of teachers to meet, 
confer, and negotiate, no duty to negotiate in good faith is expressed 9 
thus the right to bargain collectively has been weakened. Similarly, 
the states of Florida and Wisconsin have failed to employ language 
pertaining to· good faith bargaining; nevertheless, the tenn negotiate 
has been included. 
Though· the other fourteen states have implemented statutory 
language to effect good faith negotiations, some variations exist. Of 
8Revised Code of Washington, Chapter 23A.72, Section 28A72.030. 
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speeial interest is the Pennsylvania statute which· delineates the type 
of negotiations to be employed by level of employees. A meet and confer 
in good faith duty is imposed on the· employer with all employees except 
first line supervisors while the employer is required only to meet and 
discuss with first line supervisors. 
School Employees Covered 
As illustrated in Table V, all of the twenty-four states have 
specifically indicated the extent of employee coverage. Although the 
statutory schemes are vastly different in many respects·, one primary 
dichotomy·seems to exist. This dichotomy is between those states which 
include.all school employees· and those·which include only professional 
or certificated employees. Eleven states have enacted legislation which 
covers all school employees, 9 while thirteen states have passed legisla-
tion to cover only certificated employees.lo 
A particular problem with regard to the extent of employee coverage 
occurs when legislators attempt to consider the status of various levels 
of administrative personnel. Though the majority of the states specif-
ically exclude the· chief administrator, several of the states have 
failed to· indicate whether the chief administrator has been excluded 
from coverage. Several states have not only excluded the chief admin-
istrator·, but· also the assistant superintendent and/or other 
9The states which have responded in this fashion are: 
California, Hawaii,· Maine,· Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, 
New York, Pennsylvania> South Dakota, and Wisconsin. 
lOrhe states which have responded in this fashion· are: 
Conneci:tcut, · Delaware-,· Florida, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, 
North Dakota,· Oregon·, Rhode .Island, Vermont, and Washington. 
New Jersey, 
Alaska, 
Nebraska, 
State 
Alaska 
California 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
Florida 
Hawaii 
TABLE V 
COMPARISON OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS PERTAINING 
TO SCHOOL EMPLOYEES COVERED 
Code Citation 
Alaska Statutes, Chapter 18, 
Section 14.20.560 
West Annotated California Code: 
EdUCation Code, Section 13081 
Connecticut General Statutes 
Annotated, Title 10, Section 
10-153b 
Delaware Code Annotated, Title 
14, Chapter 40, Section 4001 
Florida Statutes Annotated, 
Title 15, Chapter 59, 
Section 233 •. 3 
Revised Laws of Hawaii, 
(1970 Supp.),-ritle 6, 
Chapter 89, Section 89.6 
School Employees Covered 
All certificated employees in a school district except 
the superintendent. 
All school employees except those persons elected by 
popular vote or appointed by the governor of the 
state. 
All certified employees in a school district except 
the superintendent of schools, assistant superintend-
ents, temporary substitutes, and professional employ-
ees who act for the board of education in negotiations, 
or are directly responsible to the board of education 
for personnel relations or budget preparation. 
All certificated non-administrative employees of a 
school district except supervisory and staff personnel, 
All counselors, librarians, classroom teachers, and 
other employees of the public schools having in whole 
or in part classroom teaching duties, in counties with 
population of not less than 390,000 nor more than 
450,000. 
All school employees except those persons elected by 
popular vote, part time employees working less than 
twenty hours per week, temporary employees of three 
...... 
...... 
" 
State 
Hawaii 
(Continued) 
Kansas 
Maine 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
TABLE V (Continued) 
Code Citation 
Kansas Statutes Annotated, 
(1970 Supp.), Chapter 72, 
Section 72.5413 
Maine Revised Statutes, Title 
26, Chapter 9~A, Section 962 
Annotated Code of Maryland, 
Article 77, Chapter 14.5, 
Section 160 a 
Annotated Laws of Massachusetts, 
Chapter 14~ection 178F 
Michigan Compiled Laws 
Annotated, Chapter 423, 
Section 423.202 
School Employees Covered 
months duration or less, and any top level administra-
tive personnel concerned with confidential matters 
affecting employee-employer relations. 
All professional employees employed by a board of 
education in a position which requires a certificate 
issued by the state board of education or employed in 
a professional educational capacity by a board of 
education. 
All school employees except the superintendent, 
assistant superintendent, and other employees employed 
for less than six months. 
All certificated professional persons except the 
superintendent of schools and persons designated by 
the public school employer to act in a negotiating 
capacity. 
All school employees except those persons whose 
participation or activity in the management of 
employee organizations would be incompatible with his 
official duty. 
All school employees. 
..... 
}--' 
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State 
Minnesota 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
New Jersey 
New York 
North Dakota 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania 
TABLE V (Continued) 
Code Citation 
Minnesota Statutes Annotated, 
(1970 Supp.), Chapter 125, 
Section 125.20 
Revised Statutes of Nebraska, 
(1969 Supp.), Chapter 79, 
S"eetion 79-1287 
Nevada Revised Statutes, 
Title 23, Chapter 288, 
Section 288,050 
New Jersey Statutes Annotated, 
Title 34, Chapter 13A, 
Section 34-13A-3 
Consolidated Laws of New York: 
Civil Service Law ,Title IT:-
Section 201 ~-
North Dakota Century Code, 
(1969 Supp.), Chapter 15, 
Section 38.1-02 
Oregon Revised Statutes, 
Chapter 342, Section 342.450 
Purdon 1s Legislative Service 
Pamphlet Number l_, Act 195, 
L.1970, Section 301 
School Employees Covered 
All certificated persons except the superintendent. 
All certificated employees in Class III, Class IV, and 
Class V school districts. 
All school employees. 
All school employees except the superintendent of 
schools or other chief administrator of the school 
district. 
All school employees except the chief executive 
officer. 
All certificated school employees. 
All ce~tificated school employees below the rank of 
superintendent. 
All school employees except those persons considered 
as confidential and/or management level employees. I-' 
I-' 
"° 
State 
Rhode Island 
South Dakota 
Vermont 
Washington 
Wisconsin 
TABLE V (Continued) 
Code Citation 
General Laws of 'Rhode Island, 
1956, Title 28, Chapter 9.3, 
Section 28-9.3-2 
South Dakota Compiled Laws, 
(1970 Supp.), Chapter 3-18, 
Section 3-18-1 
Vermont Statutes Annotated, 
(1970 Supp.), Title 16, 
Chapter 57, Section 1982 
Revised Code of Washington, 
Chapter 28 A.72, Section 28.A. 
72.020 
Wisconsin Statutes Annotated, 
Title 13, Chapter 111, Section 
111. 7 (1). 
School Employees Covered 
All certified teaching personnel except the 
superintendent, assistant superintendent, principals, 
and assistant principals. 
All school employees. 
All certificated employees except the superintendent 
and the assistant superintendent. 
All certificated employees except the chief 
administrative officer. 
All school employees. 
,~ .· 
...... 
N 
0 
administrative personnel at the managerial level. The state statutes 
of Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Rhode 
Island exclude all supervisory and administrative personnel. 
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Of special interest are the statutory enactments of Florida and 
Nebraska. Both states restrict the applicability of the provisions 
implemented on the basis of county size or size of school districto In 
Florida, certificated employees in counties with population of not less 
than 390,000 nor more than 450,000 are· covered by the provisions of the 
statutory enactment, while in Nebraska only certificated employees in 
Class III, Class IV, and Class V school districts are covered. 
Finally it should be noted that statutory schemes in which school 
employees are specifically included among other employees in the public 
sector, have extended coverage to include all school employees. As 
illustrated i.n Table VI, eleven states have extended coverage to include 
all school employees. Only the states of California and Michigan, among 
those who have enacted separate legislation for school personnel, have 
included non .... instructional staff members. 
Scope of Bargaining 
The scope of bargaining in most of the statutes, is defined to 
cover wages, hours, working conditions, and other terms and conditions 
of employment. For example in Table VII, a comparison of the scope of 
bargaining in the twenty-four state statutes, reveals a diversified 
employment of statutory language to demarcate the negotiable issues. 
Two types of reseryations with regard to the scope of bargaining 
are to be found in the state statutes. First, the states of Maine and 
Minnesota have specifically excluded educational policies as negotiable 
1 . 
TABLE VI 
COMPARISON OF STATE· STATUTES PERTAINING TO 
INSTRUCTIONAL·EMPLOYEES COVERED 
122 
State 
Statute Extends Coverage 
to Non-instructional 
Personnel 
Statutory Scheme Specifically 
Includes School Employees 
Among Other Public 
Sector Employees 
California 
Hawaii 
Maine 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
Nevada 
New Jersey 
New York 
Pennsylvania 
South Dakota 
Wisconsin 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
items, although the Maine·· statute indicates that teachers and public 
employers shall meet and consult with regard to educational policies. 
Second, the state· of Hawaii has excluded classification of employees, 
retirement benefits, salary range, and the _number of steps in each 
salary range from the areas to be considered in negotiation. For the 
most part, however,,the states have not attempted to define the terms 
employed. 
Type and Length of Representation 
Little disagreement is evident as to whether the type of 
representation scheme should be exclusive or proportional. As shown in 
Table VIII, twenty+-twoof·tbe states have enacted legislation calling· 
State 
Alaska 
California 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
Florida 
TABLE VII 
COMPARISON OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS PERTAINING TO 
SCOPE OF BARGAINING 
Code Citation 
Alaska Statutes, Chapter 18, 
Section 14.20,550 
West Annotated California Code: 
~~ ~-
Education Code, Section 13085 
Connecticut General Statutes 
Annotated, Title 10, Section 
10-153d 
Delaware Code Annotated, Title 
14, Chapter 40, Section 4006 
Florida Statutes Annotated, 
Title 15, Chapter 59, Section 
233.4 
Scope of Bargaining 
All matters relating to terms of employment and 
fulfillment of their professional duties. 
All matters relating to employment conditions and 
employer-employee relations, and in addition shall 
meet and confer with representatives of certificated 
employees with regard to educational objectives, 
determination of the content of courses and curricula, 
selection of text books and other aspects of the 
instructional program. 
All matters relating to salaries and other conditions 
of employment. 
All matters relating to salaries, employee benefits 
and working conditions. 
All matters relating to salaries, hours, wages, rate 
of benefits and other terms of employment, curriculum, 
student discipline, and personnel policies. All other 
items that affect rights and responsibilities of 
teachers shall be negotiated. 
...... 
N 
w 
State 
Hawaii 
Kansas 
Maine 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
TABLE VII (Continued) 
Code Citation 
Revised Laws of Hawaii, (1970 
Supp.), Title~, Chapter 89, 
Section 89.9 
Kansas Statutes Annotated, (1970 
Supp.), Chapter 72, Section 72-
5413 
Maine Revised Statutes, Title 
26, Chapter 9-A, Sections 965 
and 967 
Annotated Code of Maryland, 
Article 77, Chapter 14. 5, 
Section 160 b 
Annotated Laws of Massachusetts, 
Chapter 14~ection 178 D 
Michigan Compiled Laws 
Annotated, Chapter 423, 
Section 423.215 
Scope of Bargaining 
All matters relating to wages, hours and other terms 
and conditions of employment, except the classifica-
tion and reclassification of positions, retirement 
benefits and salary ranges and the number of incre-
mental and longevity steps now provided by law, pro-
vided that the amount of wages to be paid in each 
range and step shall be negotiable. 
All matters covering terms and conditions of 
professional services. 
All matters relating to wages, hours, working condi-
tions and contract grievance arbitration shall be 
negotiable. Teachers and public employers shall meet 
and consult, but not negotiate with respect to 
educational policies. 
All matters relating to salaries, wages, hours and 
other working conditions. 
All matters relating to salaries and other conditions 
of employment. 
All matters relating to wages, hours, and other terms 
and conditions of employment. 
~ 
N 
~ 
State 
Minnesota 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
New Jersey 
New York 
North Dakota 
Oregon 
TABLE VII (Continued) 
Code Citation 
Minnesota Statutes Annotated, 
(1970 Supp.), Chapter 125, 
Section 125.23 
Revised Statutes of Nebraska, 
(1969 Supp.), Chapter 79, 
Section 79-1289 
Nevada Revised Statutes, Title 
23, Chapter 288, Section 288.150 
New Jersey Statute Annotated, 
Title 34, Chapter 13 A, 
Section 34-13A-7 
Consolidated Laws of New York: 
Civil Service Law ,Article 14, 
Section 203 
North Dakota Century Code, 
(1969 Supp.), Chapter 15, 
Section 38.1-12. 
Oregon Revised Statutes, 
Chapter 342, Section 342.460 
Scope of Bargaining 
All matters relating to conditions of professional 
service. Professional service means economic aspects 
relating to terms of employment, but does not mean 
educational policies of the district. 
All matters pertaining to employee relations. 
All matters relating to wages, hours, and conditions 
of employment. 
All matters relating to the terms and conditions of 
employment. 
All matters relating to the terms and conditions of 
employment and the administratiqJl,~~1Z,ii1j~f\5 
arising thereunder. 
All matters relating to the terms and conditions of 
employment, questions arising out of an interpretation 
of an existent agreement, and the formulation of an 
agreement which may contain a provision for binding 
arbitration. 
All matters relating to salaries and related economic 
policies affecting professional services. 
....... 
N 
VI 
State 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
South Dakota 
Vermont 
Washington 
Wisconsin 
TABLE VII (Continued) 
Code Citation 
Purdon 1s Legislative Service 
Pamphlet Number l, Act 195, 
L, 1970, Section 701 
General Laws of Rhode Island, 
1956, Title 28, Chapter 9.3, 
Section 28-9.3-1 
South Dakota Compiled Laws, 
(1970 Supp.), Chapter 3-18, 
Section 3-18-2 
Vermont Statutes Annotated, 
(1970 Supp.), Title 16, 
Chapter 57, Section 1980 
Revised Code of Washington, 
Chapter 23A.72, Section 28A. 
72.030 
Wisconsin Statutes Annotated, 
Title 13, Chapter 111, Section 
lll. 70 (2) 
Scope of Bargaining 
All matters relating to wages, hours and other terms 
and conditions of employment. 
All matters relating to hours, salary, working 
conditions and other terms of professional employment. 
All matters relating to grievance procedures and 
conditions of employment, 
All matters relating to terms and conditions of their 
professional service and other matters. 
All matters relating to, but not limited to, curric-
ulum, textbook selections, inservice training, student 
teaching programs, personnel hiring and assignment 
practices, leaves of absence, salaries, salary sched-
ules, and non-.,instructional duties. 
All matters relating to wages, hours, and conditions 
·of employment. 
.. I-' 
N 
°' 
State 
Alaska 
California 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
Florida 
TABLE VIII 
COMPARISON OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS PERTAINING 
TO REPRESENTATION 
Code Citation 
Alaska Statut~~. Chapter 
18, Se.ct'.ien 14 ~ 20i56{)'-c 
West Annotated California 
Code: · · Education · Code, 
Section 13085 
Connecticut General Statutes 
Annotated, Title 10, Section 
10-153b 
Delaware Code Annotated, 
Title 14, Chapter 40, 
Section 4006 
I 
Florida Statutes Annotated, 
Title 15, Chapter 59, 
Section 233.5 
Type of 
Representation Scheme 
Exclusive 
Proportional 
Exclusive 
Exclusive 
Exclusive 
Length of Recognition Status 
One year or a term agreed upon by 
the two parties, unless a majority 
of certified staff members vote to 
request the termination of 
recongition. 
One year. 
One year or the length of the con-
tract, unless at least twenty per 
cent of the employees in the unit 
file a petition for a new election. 
Only one election per year may be 
authorized. 
Two years. 
Until recognition of such prof es-
sional association is withdrawn by 
a vote of the majority of the. 
teachers represented or the board. !-' 
N 
........ 
State 
Hawaii 
Kansas 
Maine 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
TABLE VIII (Continued) 
Type of 
Code Citation Representation Scheme 
Revised Laws of Hawaii, Exclusive 
(1970 Supp.),--'"'.fitle 6, 
Chapter 89, Section 89.7 
Kansas Statutes Annotated, Exclusive 
· (1970 Supp.), Chapter 72, 
Section 72-5415 
Maine Revised Statutes, Exclusive 
Title 26, Chapter 9-A, 
Section 967 
Annotated Code of Maryland, Exclusive 
Article 77, Chapter 14.5, 
Section 160f 
Annotated Laws of Massachusetts, Exclusive 
Chapter 149;"Section 178 F (4) 
Michigan Compiled Laws Exclusive 
Annotated~ Chapter 423, 
Section 423.214 
Minnesota Statutes Annotated, Proportional 
(1970 Supp.), Chapter 125, 
Section 125.22 
Length of Recognition Status 
One year. 
Minimum of one year. 
Minimum of one year. 
Minimum of two years. 
Minimum of one year. 
One year. 
One year. 
f-' 
N 
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TABLE VIII (Continued) 
Type of 
State Code Citation Representation Scheme 
Nebraska Revised Statutes of Nebraska, Exclusive 
(1969 Supp.), Chapter 79, 
Section 78-1290 
Nevada Nevada Revised Statutes, Exclusive 
Title 23, Chapter 288, 
Section 288.160 
New Jersey New Jersey Statutes Annotated, Exclusive 
Title 34, Chapter 13A, Section 
34-13A-7 
New York Consolidated Laws of New York: Exclusive 
Civil Service Law,-:Article 14, 
Section 208 --
North Dakota North Dakota Century Code, Exclusive 
(1969 Supp.), Chapter ---r5; 
Section 38.1-11 
Oregon Oregon Revised Statutes, Exclusive 
Chapter 342, Section 342.460 
Length of Recognition Status 
One year. 
Until such time the representative 
ceases to be supported by a major-
ity of the employees, or the board 
of education determines the repre-
sentative organization has violated 
certain statutory requirements. 
One year. 
Minimum of two budget submission 
dates less 120 days. 
One year from the date of selection. 
One year. 
I-' 
N 
l.O 
State 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
South Dakota 
Vermont 
TABLE VIII (Continued) 
Type of 
Code Citation Representation Scheme 
Purdon's Legislative Service Exclusive 
Pamphlet No. 3, Act 195,L. 
1970, Section-605 
General Laws of Rhode Island, Exclusive 
1956, Title 2"'8,:'" Chapter 9.3, 
Section 28-9.3-7 
South Dakota Compiled Laws, 
(1970 Supp.), Chapter 3-18, 
Section 3-18-5 
Vermont Statutes Annotated, 
(1970 Supp.), Title 16, 
Chapter 57, Section 1992 
Exclusive 
Exclusive 
Length of Recognition Status 
No election shall be conducted in 
any unit within which an election 
was held in the preceeding twelve 
months, nor during the term of an 
agreement providing said agreement 
does not exceed three years. 
Until such time that recognition is 
withdrawn, or changed by a vote of 
the certified public teachers after 
a duly conducted election. Elec-
tions shall not be held more of ten 
than once each twelve months. 
Minimum of one year unless it 
appears to the labor commissioner 
that sufficient reason exists. 
For the remainder of the fiscal 
year in which recognition is 
granted for an additional period of 
twelve months after final adoption 
of the budget and thereafter until 
a petition for election has been 
filed. 
I-' 
w 
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TABLE VIII (Continued) 
Type of 
State Code Citation Representation Scheme 
Washington Revised Code of Washington, Exclusive 
Chapter 28A.7'2; Section 
28A.72.030 
Wisconsin Wisconsin Statutes Annotated, Exclusive 
Title 13, Chapter 111, 
Section 111.70(4) 
Length of Recognition Status 
Not specifically mentioned. 
Until such time as a petition has 
been filed with the W.E.R.C. 
requesting an election. 
I-' 
w 
I-' 
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for exclusive representation, whil~ only the states of California ancl 
Minneseta have adopted a proportional representation scheme or 
modification thereof, 
Under proportional· representation schemes, negotiating councils or 
committees are established with each employee organization afforded mem-
bership according to some predetermined formula. For example, the 
Californiall statute provides: 
The negotiating council shall have not more than nine 
or less than five members and shall be composed of represent-
atives of those employee organizations who are entitled to 
representation on the negotiating council. An employee organ-
ization representing certificated employees shall be entitled 
to appoint such number of members of the negotiating council 
as bears as nearly as practicable the same ratio to the total 
number of members of the negotiating council as the number of 
members of tl\e employee organization bears to the total num-
ber of certificated employees of the public school employer 
who are members of employee organizations representing 
certificated employees. 
Similarly, the Minnesota12 statute states: 
When more than one teacher organization has as members 
teachers employed in the district, the board shall grant 
recognition to a committee of five teachers selected by these 
organizations on a proportionate basis determined by member-
ship. Each teacher organization shall be entitled to appoint 
such number to the council which bears, as nearly· as practica-
ble, the same ratio as the total membership of the appointing 
organization bears to the combined membership of teacher 
organizations to be represented on the council. 
It is significant to note that the California and Minnesota 
statutes do not provide for the bilateral determination of employment 
conditions though both states have granted employees the right to meet 
and confer. Whether a proportional representation scheme complements 
llwest·Annotated California Code: Education Code, Section 13085. 
12Minnesota Statutes Annotated (1970 Supp.), Chapter 125, Section 
125,22. 
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a meet and confer type of negotiation is difficult to ascertain; yet, 
two of three states have adopted proportional schemes. 
As to the· length of representation status afforded the exclusive 
representative or negotiating council, a number of statutory schemes 
have been implemented. An examination of Table VIII reveals that the 
majority of the states have adopted statutory schemes which permit the 
exclusive· representative to retain recognition for at least one year, 
The state statutes of Delaware, Maryland and New York specify a period 
of two years, while the state statutes of Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, 
Nevada, Rhode Island, South Dakota and Wisconsin provide a method 
whereby recognition status can be terminated under given conditions. 
Only the Washington statute fails to specifically mention the length of 
recognition of the representative. 
Unfair Labor Practices 
In order to prohibit, in the private sector, management and union 
practices that would' impede or interfere with the collective bargaining 
process, the federal government established provisions within the Wagner 
and Taft-Hartley Acts to prohibit unfair labor practices.13 Though 
numerous activities are considered as unfair labor practices, the most 
pertinent, for present purposes, is the practice of coercion, discrim-
ination, interference, and restraint of employees in the exercise of 
their rights. 
13Joel Seidman, "State Legislation on Collective Bargaining by 
Public Employees," Labor Law Journal, XXII (January, 1971), p. 17. 
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As illustrated in Table IX, thirteen14 of the twenty-four state 
statutes include language relevant to unfair·labor practices. Of the 
thirteen state statutes, ninel5 have followed the present federal policy 
of prohibiting unfair· labor practices both by management· and employee 
organizations. Four states (Connecticut,- Michigan, Rhode Island, and 
Washington)·· have followed the Wagner Act policy of :prohibiting unfair 
practices by management only. 
With regard to means of enforcement, the states of Hawaii, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and 
Wisconsin have incorporated the same type of mechanism, usually "cease 
and desist" orders by a central authority, to insure the prevention or 
continuation of unfair labor practices. As to the states of California, 
Connecticut, Maryland, Vermont, and Washington, no means of enforcement 
were expressly stated. 
Finally it should be noted that six of the eight state statutes 
with provisions for the enforcement of unfair labor practices include 
other public sector employees. Only the states of Michigan and Rhode 
Island have enacted legislation specifically for school employees in 
which a means of enforcement is provided to ensure _the prevention bf 
unfair labor practices. 
14rhe thirteen states with unfair labor practices provisions are: 
California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, 
and Wisconsin. · 
15rhe nine states which prohibit unfair labor practicei;; by manage-
ment and employee organizations are: California, Hawaii, Maine, 
Marylanp, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Wisconsin. 
State 
Alaska 
California 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
Florida 
Hawaii 
TABLE IX 
COMPARISON OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS PERTAINING 
TO UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES 
Code Citation 
Aslaska Statutes, Chapter 18, 
Sections 14.20.550-14.20.610 
West Annotated California Code: 
~ation Code, Section 13086 
Connecticut General Statutes 
Annotated, Title 10, Section 
10-153d 
Delaware Code Annotated, Title 
14, Chapter 40, Sections 4001-
4011 
Florida Statutes Annotated, 
Title 15, Chapter 59, Section 
233.2-233.15 
Revised Laws of Hawaii, (1970 
Supp.), Title"""'6, Chapter 89, 
Sections 89.13 -- 89.14 
Provision Regarding Unfair Labor Practice 
Not included. 
Public school employers and employee organizations 
shall not interfere with, intimidate, restrain, coerce 
or discriminate against public employees because of 
exercise of their rights. No provision for enforce-
ment included. 
The regional board of education, and its representa-
tives, agents and superintendents shall not interfere, 
restrain or coerce employees in derogation of their 
rights. No provision for enforcement included. 
Not included. 
Not included. 
It shall be a prohibited practice for a public 
employer or an employee organization to interfere, 
restrain, or cause any employee in the exercise of. 
any right guaranteed. Provision for enforcement 
included. 1--' VJ 
V1 
State 
Kansas 
Maine 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
TABLE IX (Continued) 
Code Citation 
Kansas Statutes Annotated, 
(1970 Supp.), Chapter 72, 
Sections 72-5413-72-5425 
Maine Revised Statutes, Title 
26, Chapter 9-A, "Section 964 
Annotated Code of Maryland, 
Article 77, Chapter 14.5, 
Section 160j 
Annotated Laws of Massachusetts, 
Chapter 14~ection 178L 
Michigan Compiled Laws 
Annotated, Chapter 423, 
Section 423.210 
Minnesota Statutes Annotated,· 
(1970 Supp.), Chapter 125, 
Sections 125.19-125.27 
Provision Regarding Unfair Labor Practice 
Not included. 
It shall be a prohibited practice for public employ-
ers, their representative and public employee organi-
zations to interfere with, restrain, or coerce 
employees in the exercise of their rights. Provision 
for enforcement included. 
Public school employers and employee organizations 
shall not interfere with, intimidate, restrain, 
coerce or discriminate against public school employees 
because of the exercise of their rights. No provision 
for enforcement included. 
Employers .and employee organizations are prohibited 
from interfering with, restraining or coercing 
~mployees in the exercise of their rights. Provision 
for enforcement.included. 
It shall be unlawful for a public employer or an 
officer or agent of the public employer to interfere 
with, restrain, or coerce.public employees in the 
exercise of their rights. Provision for enforcement 
included. 
Not included. 
t-' 
w 
°' 
State· 
Nebraska. 
He¥ada-.,·-
New Jersey 
New York 
North Dakota 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania 
TABLE IX (Continued) .. 
Code Citation 
Revised Statutes of Nebraska, 
(1969 Supp.), Chapter 79, 
Sections 79-1287-79-1296 
Nevada Revised Statutes, 
Title 23, Chapter 288, 
Sections 288.030 - 288.260 
New Jersey Statutes Annotated, 
Title 34, Chapter 13A, Sections 
34-13-A-l -- 34-13-A-ll 
Consolidated Laws of New York: 
Civil Service Law,Article 14, 
Section 209 ~-
North Dakota Century Code, 
(1969 Supp.), Chapter 15, 
Section 38 1-01-38 1-15 
Oregon Revised Statutes, Chapter 
342, Sections 342.450-342.470 
Purdon's Legislative Service 
Pamphlet Number 1._, Act 195 L. 
1970, Sections 1201 and 1301 
Provision Regarding Unfair Labor Practice 
Not included. 
Not included. 
Not included. 
It shall be unlawful for a public employer or employee 
organization to interfere with, restrain or coerce 
public employees in the exercise of the rights hereto-
fore granted. Provision for enforcement included. 
Not included. 
Not included. 
Public employers and employee organizations are pro-
hibited from interfering, restraining or coercing 
employees in the exercise of their rights. Provision 
for enforcement included. 
I-' 
w 
" 
State 
Rhode Island 
South Dakota 
Vermont 
Washington 
Wisconsin 
TABLE IX (Continued) 
Code Citation 
General Laws of Rhode 
Island 1956, Title.28, 
Chapter---g:-j", Section 
28-9.3-6 
South Dakota Compiled Laws, 
(1970 Supp.), Chapter 3-18, 
Sections 3-18-1 -- 3-18-17 
Vermont Statutes Annotated, 
(1970 Supp.), Title 16, 
Chapter 57, Section 1982 
Revised Code of Washington, 
Chapter 28A.72, Section 
28A.72.070 
Wisconsin Statutes Annotated, 
Title 13~ Chapter 111, Section 
111. 70(3) 
Provision Regarding Unfair Labor Practice 
School committees are prohibited from interfering, 
restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of 
their rights. Provision for enforcement included. 
Not included. 
The school board, employees of the school board, and 
employee organizations are prohibited from interfer-
ing, restraining, coercing, or discriminating in any 
way against or for any teacher in the exercise of 
their rights. No provision for enforcement included. 
Boards of directors of school districts or any 
administrative officer thereof shall not discriminate 
against certificated employees due to the exercise of 
their rights. No provision· for enforcement provided. 
Emp-loyers .. and. employee individually or in concert with 
others are prohibited from coercing, intimidating or 
interfering with municipal employees in the enjoyment 
of their legal rights. Provision for enforcement 
provided. 
I-' 
w 
00 
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Strikes and Other Concerted Activities 
Although private sector employees are afforded the right to strike 
and participate in other concerted activities, state legislatures have 
overwhelmingly refused. to grant public employees 'similar rightso As 
illustrated in Table X, sixteen of the twenty-four states have incorpo-
rated provisions concerning the strike and/or other concerted activities 
while eight states do not have expressly stated provisions. It should 
be noted, however, that due to common law principles and legal prec-
edence established by court litigation, public employees in the eight 
states previously mentioned do not have the right to strike. 
In all sixteen states, except Hawaii, Pennsylvania, and Vermont, 
the statutory language employed prohibits strikes and/or other concerted 
activities which may interrupt the educational programs. In Hawaii, 
Pennsylvania, and Vermont, the right to strike is afforded school 
employees under certain circumstances. The Hawaii16 statute, enacted in 
1970, sets forth the followi~g provisions: 
Strikes, rights and prohibitions. (a) Participation in a 
strike shall be unlawful for any employee who (1) is not 
included in an appropriate bargaining unit for which an 
exclusive representative has been certified by the board, or 
(2) is included in an appropriate bargaining unit for which 
process for resolution of a dispute is by referral to final 
and binding arbitration. 
It shall be unlawful for an employee, who is not prohib-
ited from striking under paragraph (a) and who is in the 
appropriate bargaining unit involved in an impasse, to partic-
ipate in a strike after (1) the requirements of section -11 
relating to the resolution of disputes have been complied with 
in good faith, (2) the proceedings for the prevention of any 
prohibited practices have been established, (3) sixty days 
,1 h~ye elapsed since the fact-finding board has made public its 
16Revised Laws of Hawaii, Title 6, Chapter 89, Section 89012. 
State 
Alaska 
California 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
TABLE X 
CC>MFAB.ISON O~ STATUTORY'PROVISIONS PERTAINING 
TO STRIKES AND OTHER CONCERTED ACTIVITIES 
Code Citation 
Alaska Statutes, Chapter 18, 
Sections 14.20.550 - 14.i0.610 
West Annotated California Code~ 
EdUCation Code, Sections 13080-
13088. --
Connecticut General Statutes 
Annotated, Title 10, Section 
10 - 153e 
Delaware Code Annotated, Title 
14, Chapter 40, Section 4011 
Strikes and Other Concerted Activities 
. . . ' . 
Not included. 
Not included. 
No certified professional employee.shall engage in any 
strike or concerted refusal to render services. The 
Superior Court for any county in which said board of 
education is located may issue a temporary injunction. 
The employee may file a motion to dissolve the injunc-
tion and a hearing upon the motion must be held within 
three days. 
It shall be unlawful for any public school employee to 
engage in any tactic which circumvents any provision 
of his teaching contract. If any employee organiza-
tion designated as exclusive representative shall vio-
late the provisions set forth, its designation as 
exclusive representative shall be revoked·for a period 
of two years and payroll deductions for that organiza-
tion's dues shall not be deducted for a period of one 
year. 
I-' 
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State 
Florida 
Hawaii 
Kansas 
Maine 
Maryland 
TABLE X (Continued) 
Code Citation 
Florida Statutes Annotated, 
Title 15, Chapter 59, 
Section 4012 
Revised Laws of Hawaii; (1970 
Supp.), Title~, Chapter 89, 
Section 89.12 
Kansas Statutes Annotated, 
(1970 Supp.), Chapter 72, 
Section 72-5411 
Maine Revised Statutes, Title 
26, Chapter 9-A, Section 964 
Annotated Code of Maryland, 
Article 77, Chapter 14.5, 
Section 160 1 
Strikes and Other Concerted Activities 
Teachers shall have no right to strike or engage in 
any work stoppage. 
Public employees may strike after certain procedures 
have elapsed. If any employee organization declares 
a strike before all procedural steps have been com-
pleted, an injunction may be issued to enjoin.the 
concerted action. 
Professional employees may not strike. 
May not engage in a work stoppage, slowdown, strike or 
the blacklisting of any public employer for the pur-
pose of.preventing it from filling employee vacancies. 
Violations may be enjoined by a temporary injunction. 
Proof of irreparable injury is not required. 
Employee organizations shall be prohibited from call-
ing or directing a strike. If an organization des-
ignated as exclusive representative participates in a 
strike, its exclusive designation shall be revoked for 
two years and payroll deductions will not be made for 
one year. 
I-' 
~ 
I-' 
State 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
New Jersey 
TABLE X (Continued) 
Code Ci ta ti on 
Annotated Laws of Massachusetts, 
Chapter 149, Section 178 M 
Michigan Compiled Laws 
Annotated, Chapter 423, 
Sections 423.202 and 423.206 
Minnesota Statutes Annotated, 
(1970 Supp.), Chapter 125, 
Sections 125.19 - 125.27 
Revised Statutes of Nebraska, 
(1969 Supp.), Chapter 79, 
Sections 79-1287-1296 
Nevada Revised Statutes, Title 
23, Chapter 288, Section 288.250 
New Jersey Statutes Annotated, 
Title 34, Chapter 13A, Sections 
34-13A-l -- 34-13A-ll 
Strikes and Other Concerted Activities 
It shall be unlawful for any employee to engage in, 
induce, or encourage any strike, work stoppage, slow-
down, or withholding of service by such employees. 
It shall be unlawful for any employee to wilfully 
absent himself from his position or abstain in whole 
or in part from the full, faithful, and proper 
performance of his duties. 
Not included. 
Not included. 
It shall be unlawful for any employee to interrupt the 
operations of the school, participate in a work stop-
page or slowdown and be absent from work on any pre-
text or excuse such as illness which is not founded in 
fact. The court may assess a fine of not more than 
$50,000 against each organization for each day of vio-
lation, $1,000 per day against any officer of any 
organization and dismiss or suspend any employee. 
Not included. 
f-' 
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State 
New York 
North Dakota 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
TABLE X (Continued) 
Code Citation 
Consolidated Laws of New York: 
Civil Service Law,-rrticle 14, 
Sections 210 and 211; New York 
Judiciary Law, Sections 75-0~­
and 751 
North Dakota Century Code, 
(1969 Supp.), Chapter 15, 
Section 38.1-04 
Oregon Revised Statutes, 
Chapter 342, Sections 342.450 -
342.470 
Purdon's Legislative Service 
Pamphlet Number l,, Act 195, L. 
1970, Sections 1001-1006 
General Laws of Rhode Island, 
1956, Title 2"8':'" Chapter 9.3, 
Sections 28-9.3-1 -- 28-9.3-16 
Strikes and Other Concerted Activities 
No public employee or employee organization shall 
engage in a strike. Injunctive relief may be sought 
and granted. A fine may be assessed in the amount 
equal to twice the daily rate of pay for each day an 
employee participated in a strike. Organizations may 
be assessed a fine in accordance to the ability of the 
organization to pay. Loss of recognition status may 
be imposed as a penalty. 
No teacher, administrator or representative organiza-
tion shall engage in a strike. Employees may be 
denied the full amount of their wages during the 
period of such violation. 
Not included. 
Public employ~es may strike after certain procedures 
have elapsed. No employee shall be entitled to pay or 
compensation from the public employer for the period 
engaged in a strike. Injunctive relief may be sought 
and granted if certain conditions prevail. 
Not included. 
I-' 
~ 
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State 
South Dakota 
Vermont 
Washington 
Wisconsin 
TABLE X (Continued) 
Code Citation 
South Dakota Compiled Laws, 
(Supp. 1970), Chapter 3-18, 
Sections 3-18-10 -- 3-18-14 
Vermont Statutes Annotated, 
(Supp. 1970), Title 16, Chapter 
57, Section 2010 
Revised Code of Washington, 
Chapter 23 A.72, Sections 
28A.72.010 - 28A.72.070 
Wisconsin Statutes Annotated, 
Title 13, Chapter 111, Section 
111.70 (4) 
Strikes and Other Concerted Activities 
No public employee shall strike. Any employee or 
employees who knowingly incite, agitate, influence, 
coerce or urge an employee to strike shall be punished 
by a fine not to exceed one thousand dollars or 
imprisonment not to exceed one year or both. An 
organization involved in a strike may be fined up to 
fifty thousand dollars. Injunctive relief may be 
sought and granted. 
Injunctive relief may be granted after the court has 
held a hearing to determine that a specific act or 
acts pose a clear and present danger. 
Not included. 
Strikes are expressly prohibited. Injunctive relief 
may be sought and granted. Fines or suits for damage 
against strikes may be imposed. 
I-' 
~ 
~ 
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findings and any recommendation, (4) the exclusive repre-
sentative has given a ten-day notice of intent to strike 
to the board and to the employer. 
Where the strike occurring, or is about to occur, endan-
gers the public health or safety, the public employer con-
cerned may petition the board to make an investigation. If 
the board finds that there is imminent or present danger to 
the health and safety of the public, the board shall set 
requirements that must be complied with to avoid or remove 
any such imminent or present danger. 
Thus, the Hawaii statute, while prohibiting a strike that " •• , endan-
gers the public health or safety," permits the members of an appropriate 
bargaining unit to strike sixty days after the recommendation of fact 
finders are made public, provided ten days notice of the strike is 
given. 
The Pennsylvania statute, also adopted in 1970, prohibits strikes 
by certain municipal employees, but school employees may strike after 
mediation and fact finding procedures have been exhausted, provided 
" ••• there is no clear and present danger and no threat to public 
health, safety, or welfare. 1117 Similarly, though lega+ authorities are 
not in total agreement, the State of Vermont has enacted legislation to 
allow strikes under certain conditions. The Vermont18 statute states: 
No restraining order on temporary or permanent injunction 
shall be gtanted in any case brought with respect to any 
action taken by a representative organization or a~ official 
thereof or by a school.board or representative thereof in con-
nection with or relating to pending or future negotiations, 
except on the basis of findings of fact made by a court of 
competent jurisdiction after due hearing prior to the issuance 
of the restraining order on injunction that the commencement 
or continuance of the action poses a clear and present danger 
to a sound program of school education which in light of all 
17 Purdon's Legislative Service Pamphlet Number 1_, Act 195, L. 1970, 
Section 1003. 
18vermont Statutes Annotated (Supp. 1970), Title 16, Chapter 57, 
Section 2010. 
relevant circumstances it is in the best public interest to 
prevent. Any restraining order or injunction passed by a 
court as herein provided shall prohibit only a specific act 
or acts expressly determined in the findings of fact to pose 
a clear and present danger. 
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Therefore, in the State of Vermont, teachers may participate in any act 
or acts that do not ". pose a clear and present danger" to the 
educational program. 
While the terms "health," "welfare," "danger," and "safety" seem 
relatively easy to define, it is difficult to determine their opera-
tional meaning until such time that the courts have ruled. It would 
appear that a broad interpretation by the court would in fact not per-
mit any employees to strike, as all public functions are assumed to 
promote the advancement of public welfare and safety. 
Apart from these problems of interpretation, some of the states 
have failed ·to provide any kind of sanctions if employees participate in 
unlawful concerted activities. As shown in Table XI, all of the states 
except Florida, Kansas, Massachusetts, and Michigan have incorporated 
some .type of sanction. The states of Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, 
Pennsylvania, and Vermont may enjoin a strike by the use of a court 
injunction; however, the states of Delaware, Maryland, Nevada, New York, 
North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin may impose specific penalties 
on employee organizations, officers, and/or employees that participate 
in unlawful concerted activities. 
Finally it should be noted that still other jurisdictions have 
dealt with or are presently considering the right of public employees to 
strike. For example, the state qf Montana has enacted legislation which 
allows nurses in the public sector to strike, provided that thirty days 
advance notice is given to the employer and no other strike is in 
State 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
Florida 
Hawaii 
Kansas 
Maine 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
Nevada 
New York 
North Dakota 
Pennsylvania 
South Dakota 
Vermont 
Wisconsin 
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TABLE XI 
COMPARISON OF STATE STATUTES PERTAINING TO 
STRIKES AND SANCTIONS IMP0SED 
Statute Statute Includes A 
Provides Specified Sanction 
Statute Includes for an for the Violation 
Anti-Strike Injunction of the Anti-Strike 
Provision Procedure Provision 
x x 
x x 
x 
x x 
x 
x x 
x x 
x 
x 
x x 
x x 
x x 
x x 
x x 
x x 
x x 
148 
effect at a health care facility within a radius of 150 miles. 19 
Furthermore, state task forces, created to study labor relations in the 
public sector, have recently submitted recommendations to allow strikes 
d . d" i 20 un er certain con it ons. 
Impasse Resolution Procedures 
Although the strike and similar concerted activities have 
traditionally been denied school employees as a means to effect a 
settlement on issues, other alternative courses to the resolution of an 
impasse have been employed. Such mechanisms as mediation, fact-finding, 
and voluntary arbitration have been the most commonly utilized; however, 
compulsory arbitration has received some attention recently. As exem-
plified in Table XII, only the states of California and Kansas fail to 
provide some mechanism to resolve impasses. Though the other twenty-two 
states have adopted procedures, no one statutory scheme has been 
promulgated. 
The states of Hawaii, Maine, and Rhode Island have authorized 
compulsory arbitration to effect settlement on certain issues, while the 
other eighteen states do not permit compulsory arbitration or insist 
that both parties mutually agree upon the procedures prior to compulsory 
arbitration. Apart from• these three states, the normal procedure is one 
of mediation and fact-finding with either or both parties able to 
initiate such proceedings after certain pre-conditions have been met. 
19 Seidman, op. cit., p. 19. 
20rbid. 
State 
Alaska 
California 
Connecticut 
TABLE XII 
COMPARISON OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS FOR 
RESOLVING AN IMPASSE 
Code Citation 
Alaska Statutes, Chapter 18, 
Section 14.20.570 
West Annotated California Code: 
~~ ~~
Education Code, Sections 13080-
13088 --
Connecticut General Statutes 
Annotated, Title 10, Section 
10-153f 
Provisions for Resolving an Impasse 
Within ten days after negotiations have terminated in 
a stalemate, each party shall choose two mediation 
board members. The four members shall meet and select 
a fifth member who shall serve as chairman. Recom-
mendations shall be submitted to both parties and the 
Commissioner of Education within thirty days. Recom-
mendations are not binding on either party. 
Not included. 
If any town or regional board of education reach an 
impasse in negotiations the issues may be submitted to 
the Secretary of the State Board of Education for 
mediation. If either party rejects the recommenda-
tions of the Secretary of the State Board of Educa-
tion, the Secretary may order the parties to appear 
for the purpose of arbitration. Each party shall 
select an arbitrator who will designate the third mem-
ber of the panel. Within fifteen days after forma-
tion, recommendations pertaining to the disposition of 
the issues must be reported. Recommendations are not 
binding on either party. 
f-' 
.i:--
\0 
State 
Delaware. 
Florida 
Hawaii 
TABLE XII (Continued) 
Code Citation 
Delaware Code Annotated, Title 
14, Chapter 40, Section 4010 
Florida Statutes Annotated, 
Title 15, Chapter 59, Sections 
233.7 - 233.9 
Revised Laws of Hawaii, (1970 
Supp.), Title'"""6, Chapter 89, 
Section 89.11 
Provisions for Resolving an Impasse 
Either the board of education or the exclusive repre-
sentative when confronted with an impasse, may request 
mediation by any method mutually agreed upon. In the 
absence of such an agreement and within 10 days, a 
mediator shall be selected by mutual agreement; how-
ever, if a mediator cannot be agreed upon.each of the 
parties involved shall select one mediator and in turn 
a third shall be selected. Within twenty-one days, 
the committee will issue a report setting forth rec-
ommendations. Recommendations are not binding. 
All unresolved issues may be submitted to an arbitra-
tion board consisting of three members. Each party 
shall select and name one arbitrator. The two 
arbitrators shall select the third and if they fail to 
reach agreement, the American Arbitration Association 
shall select the third member. Within twenty days 
after the conclusion of hearings held, a report must 
be submitted. Recommendations are not binding. 
Public employer and the ex~lusive representative may 
set forth a procedure which would culminate in a final 
and binding agreement in the event of an impasse. In 
·the absence of such a procedure, the Hawaii Public 
Employment Board, on the request of either party may 
intervene. Mediation and fact finding shall precede 
arbitration; however, the arbitration procedures must 
be mutually agreed upon. Recommendations submitted by 
the arbitration committee are binding. I-' 
Vt 
0 
State 
Kansas 
Maine 
Maryland 
TABLE XII (Continued) 
Code Ci ta ti on 
Kansas Statutes Annotated, (1970 
Supp.), Chapter 72, Sections 72-
5413 - 72 .... 5428 
Ma:Lne Revised Statutes, Title 
26, Chapter 9-A, Section 965 
Annotated Code of Maryland, 
Article 77, Chapter 14.5, 
Section 160i 
Provisions for Resolving an Impasse 
Not specifically mentioned. 
Mediation procedures may be utilized if both parties 
jointly agree; however, if the parties with or without 
the aid of a mediator are unable to resolve the 
impasse, they may call upon the Maine Board of Arbit.-
ration for fact finding services. If the parties do 
not agree to fact finding procedures and are unable to 
resolve their differences, either party may request 
the initiation of arbitration proceedings. Each party 
shall select one member of the arbitration panel and 
the two members selected will select the third member. 
Reconnnendations pertaining to salaries, pensions, and 
insurance shall be advisory; however, other recommen-
dations shall be binding. 
If upon the request of either party the state super-
intendent determines that an impasse has been reached, 
the advice of the State Board of Education may be 
requested if both parties consent. In the absence of. 
such consent, a panel shall be named consisting of 
three members. Each party shall select one member and 
the two members shall select the third. All recommen-
dations are advisory. 
I-' 
V1 
I-' 
St ate 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
Nebraska 
TABLE XII (Continued) 
Code Citation 
Annotated Laws of Massachusetts, 
Chapter 149;-section 178J 
Michigan Compiled Laws 
Annotated , Chapter 423, 
Sec tion 423.207 
Mi nnesota Statutes Annotated, 
(1970 Supp.), Chapter 125, 
Section 125.25 
Revised Statutes of Nebraska, 
(1969 Supp.), Chapter 79, 
Section 79-1293 . 
Provisions for Resolving an Impasse 
Either or both parties may petition the State Board 
of Conciliation and Arbitration to initiate fact 
finding, if a dispute exists between the parties con-
cerned. The Board of Conciliation and Arbitration 
shall submit to the parties involved a panel of three 
qualified disinterested persons in which the parties 
shall select one for fact finding. If the parties 
involved are unable to select one member, the fact 
finder shall be appointed by the Board of Conciliation 
and Arbitration. Recommendations are not binding. 
Either or both parties may request the intervention of 
the Labor Mediation Board in the event of an impasse. 
Recommendations are not binding. 
An adjustment panel may be established at the request 
of either party to consider the issues involved. Each 
of the parties involved shall select one member and 
the two selected shall select the third member. If 
the two members appointed by the parties involved are 
unable to agree upon the third member, the senior or 
presiding judge of the district court shall appoint 
the third member. Recommendations are not binding. 
If the parties are unable to agree on any such 
matters, the dispute may be submitted to a fact find-
ing board composed of three members. Each of the 
involved parties shall select one member and the two 
members selec ted shall appoint the third member . If 
they fail to appoint the t hird member , the State 
I-' 
Vl 
N 
State 
Nebraska 
(Continued) 
Nevada 
New Jersey 
TABLE Xrr (Continued) 
Code of Citation 
Nevada Revised Statutes, Title 
23, Chapter 288, Section 288.190 
New Jersey Statutes Annotated, 
Title 34, Chapter 13A, Sections 
34-13A-6 and 34-13A-7 
Provisions for Resolving an Impasse 
Department of Education shall submit a list of five 
persons from which one must be selected. Reconimenda-
tions are not binding. 
If the parties involved are unable to agree on a final 
contract, unresolved issues may be submitted to the 
Employees Management Relations Board. The board shall 
appoint a competent impartial person to act as media-
tor. If the mediator is unsuccessful, the parties 
shall submit the issues to a fact finding panel con-
sisting of three members. Each of the parties shall 
select one member and.the two members shall select the 
third. If they fail to select the third member, the 
Board shall make the selection. Recommendations are 
not binding. 
The Division of Public Employment Relations shall 
upon the request of either party, take such steps as 
it may deem expedient to effect a voluntary resolution 
of the impasse. If a voluntary resolution of the 
impasse fails, the Division of Public Employment 
Relations may invoke fact finding with recommendations. 
If the dispute remains unresolved, the matter may be 
submitted to an arbitration panel consisting of three 
people. Each party shall select one member and the 
two selected members shall appoint the third member. 
Recommendations are not binding. 
I-' 
V1 
w 
State 
New York 
North Dakota 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania 
TABLE XII (Continued) 
Code C;itation 
Consolidated Laws of New York: 
Civil Service Law ,Article 14, 
Section 209 
North Dakota Century Code, (1969 
Supp.), Chapter 15, Section 38.1-
13 
Oregon Revised Statutes, Chapter 
342, Section 243.470. 
Purdon 1s Legislative Service 
Pamphlet Number 2_, Act 195, 
L. 1970, Sections 801 and 802. 
Provisions for Resolving an Impasse 
Unresolved issues may be submitted to impartial 
arbitration; however, in the absence or failure of 
such procedures the.Public Employment Relations Board 
at the request of either party or upon its own motion, 
may provide assistance. Assistance shall.consist of 
mediation, fact finding, and voluntary arbitration and 
upon failure of all the foregoing processes, the dis-
pute shall be considered by the appropriate legisla-
tive body to take·such action as it deems to be in the 
best interest of all concerned. All of the recommen-
dations forthcoming from mediation, fact finding, and 
arbitration are not binding. 
An impasse may be resolved by the mutual selection of 
one or more mediators to act in an advisory capacity. 
If mediation fails or is not attempted either party 
may request the intervention of the state fact finding 
commission for the purpose of submitting recommenda-
tions. Recommendations are not binding. 
An impasse may be resolved by either of the parties 
requesting the appointment of consultants. The panel 
shall consist of one member appointed by each of the 
parties and one member chosen by the other two members; 
Recommendations are not binding. 
The parties involved may voluntarily submit to 
mediation but if no agreement is reached, the matter 
may be submitted to a fact finding panel which may 
consist of one or three members. The Pennsylvania 
I-' 
Vl 
~ 
State 
Pennsylvania 
(Continued) 
Rhode Island 
South Dakota 
Vermont 
TABLE XII (Continued) 
Code Citation 
General Laws of Rhode Island 
1956, Title 2~ Chapter 9.3, 
Sections 28-9.3~9 ~- 28-9,3~12 
South Dakota Compiled Laws, 
(1970 Supp.), Chapter 3-18, 
Section 3-18-8 
Vermont Statutes Annotated, 
(Supp. 1970), Title 16, Chapter 
57, Sections 2006 - 2008 
Provisions for Resolving an Impasse 
Labor Relations Board at its discretion shall appoint 
the fact finding panel; however~ if mutually agreed 
upon, the impasse may be resolved by the use of volun-
tary binding arbitration. All recommendations are 
advisory unless both parties agree to binding 
arbitration. 
Either party may request mediation and conciliation 
upon any and all unresolved issues by the state 
department of education. If mediation fails or is not 
requested, all unresolved issues may be submitted to 
arbitration. Each party shall select a member of the 
arbitration panel and the two shall appoint the third 
member. Recommendations are binding on all matters 
not involving the expenditure of money. Recommenda-
tions involving the expenditures of money shall be 
advisory until such time the state agency responsible 
for budget approval reviews the recommendations set 
forth. 
Either party may request the commissioner of labor to 
intervene in case of an impasse; however, any proced-
ures mutually agreed upon by both parties may be 
utilized to facilitate a settlement. Recommendations 
are not binding. 
Parties may jointly agree upon the services and person 
of a mediator and if they are unable to reach agree-
ment on the selection of the mediator, the American 
Arbitration Association may be called upon. If 
I-' 
V1 
V1 
State 
Vermont 
(Continued) 
Washington 
Wisconsin 
TABLE XII (Continued) 
Code Citation 
Revised Code of Washington, 
Chapter 23A.72, Section 28A. 
72.060 
Wisconsin Statutes Annotated, 
Title 13, Chapter 111, Section 
111. 70 (4) 
Provisions for Resolving an Impasse 
mediation fails, either party may request that the 
issues be submitted to a fact finding committee. The 
committee shall be composed of three members. Each 
party shall select one member of the panel and the two 
shall appoint the third. Recommendations are not 
binding. 
Either party may request the assistance and advice of 
a committee composed of educators and school directors 
appointed by the state superintendent in the event of 
an impasse. Recommendations shall not be binding. 
Eithe~ party may request a mediator from the Wisconsin 
Employment Relations Commission. Fact finding may be 
requested if either party refuses to meet and negoti-
ate in_good faith. Recommendations shall not be 
binding. 
f-' 
\JI 
CJ'\ 
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Concluding Remarks 
As public employees, teachers have been excluded from federal 
legislation regulating the collective bargaining process in the private 
sector. Thus, the extent, if indeed any, in which governing entities 
are required to participate in collective negotiations is a matter for 
state legislation and not federalo Therefore, the primary purpose of 
this chapter has been· to report the "state labor relations acts" 
relevant to collective negotiations in the public schoolo 
While there has been· a substantial increase in the legislation 
adopted by the states, there is no reason to believe that the volume of 
state legislation will diminish in the years ahead, It is unlikely 
therefore, that ad hoc conditions, though certainly prevalent in many 
states, will continue to exist. In fact, school employees will 
undoubtedly continue to pursue the same bargaining rights afforded 
private sector employees, except where clear priorities can be 
established pertaining to societal needs. 
In the final analysis, it seems clear that state legislatures will 
continue to adopt·new legislation or amend existing legislation t~ 
regularize the negotiations process. Although the statutory schemes 
employed will no doubt vary due to local constraints and attitudes, it 
appears that new legislation and amendments will move steadily in the 
direction of existing federal legislation. However, as Justice Holmes 
stressed, there is wisdom in allowing states to make social experiments 
that reflect community desires " in the insulated chambers afforded 
I 
by the several states; 1121 hence, it would appear appropriate for the 
federal government to permit the states to regulate the collective 
negotiations process. 
21Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921). 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMA.RY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Introduction 
It is a well established fact that education in the American scheme 
of government is essentially a matter of state policy, Though public 
schools are largely administered in a unilateral fashion at the local 
level, the recent emergence of collective negotiations involving school 
personnel has provided an impetus for the bilateral determination of 
policies, Too, a legal doctrine, whether it be precedence established 
by court litigation or the enactment of statutory provisions, has come 
,forth. Indeed, the convergence of this research pertains to the legal 
doctrine governing the unique relationship between local government 
entities and school personnel. 
In many respects,·collective negotiations involving school 
personnel have emerged during the last decade. It is evident, however, 
that the legal doctrinegoverning this new relationship has not clearly 
emerged in all jurisdictions; the law has been in a constant state of 
flux. Whether a perceptible legal doctrine will emerge in all jurisdic-
tions is difficult to ascertain; yet, the impetus for a more formalized 
interaction between the public school employee and employer has brought 
forth an applicable doctrine in several jurisdictions, Therefore, this 
study has attempted to gather, and bring together in an organized form, 
the information on case and statutory law which defines this doctrine. 
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Summary 
The foregoing chapters pertaining to litigation and statutory 
enactments can· be summarized in an abbreviated form by reporting some of 
the generalizations implied from the litigation reviewed and noting the 
main provisions of statutory enactments employed. However, ·three 
limitations must be noted, First, differences among jurisdictions were 
found in large number, whereby the courts, though responding to the same 
legal questions, ruled differently. Second, many issues have not been 
litigated in· all jurisdictions, thus one should approach cautiously the 
application of generalizations. Finally, only the comprehensive labor 
relations acts were reported and not all statutes that could conceivably 
be relevant to collective negotiations in the public school. Therefore, 
within these limitations, the following summation concerning the legal 
aspects of collective negotiations in the public school is presented. 
1. The right to organize and maintain membership in organizations 
is now generally conceded whether said membership involves a profes-
sional organization or labor union. It would appear that such rights 
are afforded by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution 
and may not be abridged. 
2o In most instances, public employees dismissed because they 
maintained membership in an organization, may seek damages and injunc-
tive relief under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 against the official who 
dismissed them. 
3. School authorities may not terminate a teacher's contract on 
the basis of participation in union activities. In fact, it appears 
that "substantial" evidence relative to incompetencies must exist before 
the governing entities may dismiss an employee active in union 
activities. 
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4. Compulsory membership in employee organizations is prohibited; 
however, the courts, in all reported cases, upheld the legality of 
imposing a service fee to help defray the cost of representation incur-
red during the negotiations process. Furthermore, it appears that in 
certain jurisdictions an employee's refusal to pay the service fee is 
"just and reasonable cause" under state tenure laws for dismissal. 
5. In the presence of legislation authorizing dues checkoff, said 
authorization usually connotes discretion on the part of the board, as 
opposed to a mandate. 
6. In the absence of specific statutory authority, dues checkoff 
becomes a matter of board discretion; yet, arbitrary and discriminatory 
procedures may not be implemented once the school board has exercised 
its discretionary power. 
7. There is some evidence that the court will permit a board of 
education the right to afford exclusive privileges to the majority 
union. 
8. In the absence of specific statutory authority, a school board 
may establish procedures to recognize and negotiate with an organization 
as long as such procedures are not manifestly unreasonable. 
9. Without supportive legislation, the majority of the teachers 
in a school system do not have the "right" of exclusive representation. 
10. The "right" of teachers to negotiate without supportive 
legislation cannot be substantiated. 
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11. School personnel may not legally participate in concerted 
activities that impede: the operations of the educational program in the 
absence of enabling legislation. 
12. In most instances, the court will enjoin any unlawful action 
of school personnel in which irreparable injury may be sustained to the 
educational process. 
13. There is some evidence that the courts are becoming more 
concerned with the "principal of equity" before the issuance of an 
injunction. 
14. Local school authorities may not assess fines for an unlawful 
act as such action is deemed ultra vires. 
15. The courts, in all reported cases, have ruled that no 
distinguishing differences exist between en masse resignation and a 
strike if the resignations were not effective at the end of the contract 
period. 
16. Teachers may not absent themselves en masse to present a 
petition of grievance or exert political pressure if such action impedes 
the operations of the educational program. 
17. Local school authorities may not circumscribe a teacher's 
right to publicize his views unless cause can be shown for confidential-
ity and/or it can be proved that the employee's working relationship 
with his supervisors would be effected. 
18. In determining the legality of actions of teachers and 
associates to exert pressure on local governing authorities, the courts 
will consider the substance of the situation and not its shape. Thus, 
concerted activities such as sanctions, picketing, and en masse 
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resignations will be considered in the same legal context as strikes if 
such action impedes the operations of the educational program. 
19. It appears that picketing, whether peaceful or not, may be 
enjoined by the courts if it interrupts a critical process or is 
construed as a means of coercing a governing board to meet demands. 
20. Twenty-four states were identified as having comprehensive 
labor relations acts pertaining to collective negotiations in the public 
school. 
21. Fifteen of the states have provided separate statutory cover-
age for school employees, while nine of the states have included school 
employees with other public sector employees. 
22. Twenty~one of the state statutes specifically provide for one 
or more of the following: (1) right to participate in lawful concerted 
activities, (2) right to maintain membership, (3) right to refrain from 
any or all of the above activities, and (4) assessment of service fee 
regardless of membership status to offset representation costs. 
23. Though all of the twenty-four states have employed specific 
statutory language to govern the type of negotiations, only fourteen 
states have imposed an obligation to negotiate in good faith. Two 
states have authorized school employees to meet and confer with the 
board of education, while one state allows school employees to meet and 
confer at the board's discretion. Seven of the twenty-four states 
appear to have employed statutory language insufficient to impose a 
duty to negotiate. 
24. Eleven states have enacted legislation which covers all 
school employees, while twelve states have passed legislation to cover 
only certificated employees. 
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25~ Though all of the states employed statutory language to 
demarcate the negotiable issues, most of the states confine the scope of 
bargaining to wages, hours, w0rking conditions, and other terms and 
conditions of employment. Only two types of reservations were found 
with regard to the scope of bargaining. First, two states specifically 
excluded educational policies as negotiableitems. Second, one state 
excluded classification of employees, retirement benefits, salary range, 
and the number of steps in each salary range from the areas to be 
considered in,negotiations. 
26. Twenty--two of the states have enacted legislation calling for 
exclusive representation, while only two states have adopted a 
proportional representational scheme. 
27. Twenty-three of the states specifically mention the length of 
recognition of the representative. Thirteen of the states permit the 
exclusive representative to retain recognition for at least one year, 
Three states specify a period of two years, while seven states employ a 
scheme whereby recognition status is continuous in nature, until 
terminated under given conditions. 
28, Thirteen of the state statutes include language relevant to 
unfair labor practices. Nine of the thirteen prohibit unfair labor 
practices by both management and employee organizations. Four of the 
states have prohibited unfair labor practices by management only. 
29. Eight of the thirteen states with provisions relevant to 
.unfair labor practices have incorporated a means of enforcement to 
insure the prevention of unfair labor practices, while five states have 
not provided a means for enforcement. 
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30. Sixteen of the states have provisions concerning the strike 
and/or concerted activities while eight states do nothave expressly 
stated provisions. Thirteen of the sixteen states expressly prohibit 
the strike, while three states appear to have employed statutory lan-
guage permitting strikes under given conditions. Seven of the sixteen 
states specify penalties that will be imposed, while five states merely 
indicate a strike may be halted by a court injunction. Four states have 
failed to mention any provisions for enforcement or penalties to be 
imp:esed in case:of participation in .. unlawful.:c.once-rted activities. 
31. Twenty-two of the states have provided one or more mechanisms 
to resolve impasse conditions. Such mechanisms are usually mediation, 
fact.finding, and voluntary arbitration. Only three of the twenty-two 
states have authorized· compulsory arbitration to effect settlement on 
certain issues. 
It should be remembered that· certain limitations were mentioned 
prior to the foregoing summary comments. Any generalization of these 
comments should be done sparingly and with great care. 
Recommendations 
Though many dilemmas appear to exist with due regard to public 
interest, legislators, school board members, administrators, teachers, 
and the courts have .begun to effectuate a structure for collective 
negotiations i.n the public school. Experiences in the private sector 
should prove to be invaluable in promulgating a legal framework; yet, 
it is contended that any legislation enacted must be fully cognizant 
of the distinguishing differences between the public and private 
sectors. Indeed, to ignore such differences could prove to be 
detrimental to the effectiveness of the actual goals and purposes of 
educational institutions·in this nation. 
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Nonetheless, on the basis of litigation and statutory enactments 
reported and analyzed, the following recommendations seem to be in 
order. Though these recommendations are subjective in nature and may 
be contrary to basic beliefs cherished by many authorities, the writer 
is of the opinion that they have merit. 
First, there is a need for comprehensive state legislation 
concerning the collective negotiation rights of public school employees. 
Though it was not the intent of this research to propose a "model" 
statute, certain comments relative to an appropriate statutory scheme 
are hereby suggested: 
1. Such legislation should provide for the uniqueness of the 
employer-employee relationship in the public school, Whether this can 
be done by the enactment of single legislation to include all public 
employees is debatable; it appears that a large number of rigidities 
appear when all public employees are included. 
2. School employees should be afforded the right of self-
organiza.tion and the right to participate in lawful concerted activ-
ities. Furthermore, employees should have the right'to refrain from 
any or all of the foregoing activities. 
3. An obligation to meet, confer, and negotiate in good faith 
should be imposed on both parties. Such an obligation would reduce 
"sham" bargaining and provide a basis for the resolution of issues. 
4. Rigidities in bargaining unit determination should be avoided, 
as the opportunity for local option should exist whenever feasible. 
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5. Exclusive representation rights should be afforded the 
majority of the school employees in a bargaining unit; however, exclu-
sive privileges such as dues-checkoff and internal channels of communi-
cations should not be granted the majority representative. 
6. All representation elections should be conducted by secret 
ballot to avoid possible reprisal, discrimination, and intimidation. 
7, Specific statutory language should be employed to cover all 
school employees; however, the superintendent and other board of educa-
tion confidential employees should be considered in light of their 
responsibilities to the board. 
8. The scope of bargaining should be defined in broad terms to 
permit elasticity in the spectrum of issues to be negotiated. 
9. The right of exclusive representation should be extended for 
at least one year. Furthermore, an "election bar" should be incorpo-
rated whereby exclusive representation may continue beyond one year 
unless at least 20% of tbe members of the bargaining unit petition for 
an election, No more than one election per year should be permitted. 
10, Specific statutory language should be employed to prevent 
both the employer and the employee from committing unfair labor 
practices. An appropriate means for enforcement should be provided. 
11. Specific provisions should be incorporated into a statute to 
provide direction relative to an impasse. Specifically, the following 
are suggested: (1) mediation should be undertaken at the local level 
with either party able to invoke mediation, (2) fact finding procedures 
should be implemented if mediation fails and the results made public, 
and (3) compulsory arbitration with the recommendations not binding, 
All of the above procedures should be placed on a well-defined time 
schedule in light of annual budget deadlines. 
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12. The strike should be considered lawful for school employees 
provided: (1) school employees have participated in good'faith in all 
attempts to resolve the impasse, (2) disputed matters are not beyond the 
local board's control, (3) state retains authority to evoke a sixty to 
ninety day injunction period designed to intensify efforts to resolve 
the issues, (4) public health and safety are not jeopardized in the 
narrowest of interpretation, and (5) sufficient notice of intent to 
strike is given prior to the strike. 
Second, when considering problems relevant to collective 
negotiations, local school authorities should be fully cognizant of the 
appurtenant judicial decisions, statutes, and attorney general opinions. 
Such an understanding will allow for the clear delineation of rights and 
responsibilities of the parties involved in negotiations. 
Third, local school authorities should not continue to reply upon 
rapidly diminishing principles of law such as sovereignty and illegal 
delegation of authority; instead, a spirit connnensurate with the intent 
of collective negotiations should prevail. Thus, the mutuality of con-
cern which boards and their professional employees hold in certain mat-
ters should be maximized if educational procedures are to be enhanced. 
It should be emphasized once again that the law is not static. 
Already there has been a marked change in judicial decisions and legis-
lative enactments relative to collective negotiations. Whether this 
will continue is difficult to ascertain; yet, it appears that school 
employees will continue to pursue collective negotiation rights 
commensurate with those afforded to private sector employees. 
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Future Research 
Future research in the area considered in this study could and 
should take many forms. Although this study could be replicated in the 
next two years, it is suggest~\! that future legal research in collective 
negotiations be concerned with a legal spectrum not as broad as was 
explored in this study. Specifically, the following research seems 
worthy of consideration within the next two or three years. 
1. Legal research should be undertaken to analyze the judicial 
decisions and all attorney general opinions pertaining to collective 
negotiations. Emphasis should be placed on union security issues, bar-
gaining unit determinations, representative elections, injunctions, 
strikes, and contempt proceedings. 
2. Legal research should be undertaken to analyze the state 
statutory enactments pertaining to collective negotiations. Attorney 
general opinions and judicial decisions relevant to the statutes located 
should be reported and analyzed. Furthermore, all applicable statutes 
should be analyzed, including peripheral but applicable laws relative to 
the private sector. 
3. Legal research should be undertaken to analyze the decisions 
of various state labor relations commissions such as the Wisconsin 
Employment Relations Commission and the Michigan Labor Relations Board. 
In summary, possibilities for legal research in all areas of 
collective negotiations seem limitless. Although some studies have 
been completed, the number of judicial decisions and statutory enact-
ments has been increasing rapidly. It would appear that legal research 
in collective negotiations is one of the ~ost neglected, yet fruitful 
areas of research in education today. Therefore, such research seems 
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essential to the understanding of the evolving legal relationships. 
Indeed, it is imperative that additional research be undertaken to 
investigate the subsequent implications of judicial decisions, statutory 
enactments and peripheral legal aspects. Though research of this kind 
would not be a panacea for resolving all the issues in collective 
negotiations, it could be an integral part of providing a structure for 
interaction, which may conceivably enhance the welfare of public 
educators in this nation. 
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Teachers at Buffalo V-: 
Board of Education of City. 
of Buffalo, 287 N. Y-:S. (2d) 
756 
City of New York v. DeLury, 
295 N7f .S:-(2d) 901 
Helsby v. Board of Educa-
tion of-City School Dis-
ttictof---p(}ughkeepsi0;-304 
N.Y.S.(2d) 236 
Warren Education Associa-
tion v. Lapan, 235 A (2d) 
866 -
Decision by the Court 
The court held that the Governor, rather than the 
State Board of Higher Education, was the public 
employer authorized to bargain with association of 
college faculty members. 
The court held that an election to determine which of 
two organizations should be exclusive representative 
of public school teachers was valid, although the 
election was held before effective date of statute. 
The court upheld the constitutionality of the 
statutory prohibition against strikes by public 
employees. 
The court ruled that the Public Employment Relations 
Board had no power or jurisdiction concerning summer 
school teachers' association. 
The court ruled that the word "may" is connotative of 
permissiveness. 
I-' 
00 
°' 
State Year 
South Dakota 
Vermont 
Washington 1965 
Wisconsin 1967 
1967 
TABLE XIII (Continued) 
Case Citation 
American Federation of 
Teachers, Yak1ma Local 1485 
v. Yakima School Distri~ 
447 p (2Cl) 593 
City of Madison v. 
WiS'Consin Employroent Rela-
tions Board, 155 N,W,---c2d) 
~ 
Muskego-Norway Consolidated 
School v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Board, 151 
N.W. (2d) 617 --
Decision by the Court 
The court upheld the constitutionality of the act 
providing for organizations of certificated 
employees, 
The court ruled that the statute did not impose a 
duty on a school board to collectively bargain, as 
the ultimate responsibility for decision is solely 
that of the school board. 
The court held that teachers cannot be required to 
attend conventions of professional employee organiza-
tions under threat of loss of pay, but teachers who 
do not attend such conventions can be required to 
work for the school. 
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